Bryant v. Brown, 4.
| Citation | 271 N.W. 566,278 Mich. 686 |
| Decision Date | 01 March 1937 |
| Docket Number | No. 4.,4. |
| Parties | BRYANT v. BROWN et al. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Michigan |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Action by Leonard D. Bryant against Harry A. Brown and another. From a judgment for the defendants, the plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Cass County; Glenn E. Warner, judge.
Argued before the Entire Bench.
Carl D. Mosier, of Dowagiac, for appellant.
Burns & Hadsell, of Niles, for appellees.
Defendants had verdict and judgment in an action for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff in a collision of automobiles.
Plaintiff's claim is that, as he was passing defendant Brown on the highway, Brown turned his car to the left, across the center line, it struck plaintiff's car, and caused it to run off the road and against a tree.
Brown claims he remained at all times on his own right side of the road, that plaintiff's car crossed the center line and struck defendants' car.
The testimony presented such direct conflict of facts, and they were presented to the jury with such clear and correct instructions covering all the issues, that the recore affords no ground for the claim that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence or that the failure of the court to give plaintiff's requests to charge in his language, instead of in the equally plain words of the court, was prejudicial.
Plaintiff was chauffeur for Charles Heddon, whose car he was driving when injured. Plaintiff complains that defendants stressed prejudicially Heddon's connection with plaintiff and the automobile, particularly in that the jury probably was led to imagine that Heddon was a party to the suit. Plaintiff introduced Heddon into the case and, when he and his witnesses had finished, it was apparent that Heddon was taking a natural and decent interest in the case. The character of his interest was evident, and nothing occurred thereafter which presented incompetent testimony or charged Heddon with impropriety, nor could the jury have been misled as to the issues or parties.
Plaintiff testified that for some miles before the accident he had not exceeded a speed of 42 miles per hour, had reduced to 28 miles, and from a curve some 450 feet from the scene of the collision had driven at 35 miles, accelerating to 38 as he came close to defendants' car.
Testimony offered by defendants as to plaintiff's speed at remote points was rejected by the court, but witnesses were permitted to state his speed just before and as he came to...
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Comins v. Scrivener
...competency of such testimony does not always depend entirely upon specific distance or time but upon causal connection. Bryant v. Brown, 278 Mich. 686, 271 N.W. 566. The testimony given by the witness Schifani did not merely show the speed at which plaintiff was traveling at a point three, ......
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