Bryant v. Donnell

• Decision Date: 10 March 1965
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 1517,1525.
• Citation: 239 F. Supp. 681
• Parties: Arlan (Bill) BRYANT v. Billy DONNELL and Jackie Donnell. Euel SISCO v. Billy DONNELL and Jackie Donnell.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

239 F. Supp. 681

Arlan (Bill) BRYANT v. Billy DONNELL and Jackie Donnell.

Euel SISCO v. Billy DONNELL and Jackie Donnell.

Civ. Nos. 1517, 1525.

United States District Court W. D. Tennessee, E. D.

March 10, 1965.

Lucius E. Burch, Jr., Burch, Porter & Johnson, Memphis, Tenn., Ewing J. Harris, Bolivar, Tenn., for plaintiffs.

James H. Smith, Tiptonville, Tenn., Carmack Murchison, Jackson, Tenn., for defendants.

BAILEY BROWN, District Judge.

These are actions to recover damages for violation of plaintiffs' federal civil rights. Defendants have made motions to dismiss on the grounds that there is no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the complaints fail to state claims for which relief can be granted. Since the facts relied upon in the two actions are closely related and raise substantially the same issues, we are disposing of the motions to dismiss in one memorandum decision.

The complaints allege that these actions arise under the laws of the United States and that the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. There is no diversity of citizenship alleged. Neither complaint attempts or purports to state a claim under state law, and therefore we have no question relating to the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction.

The facts alleged in the complaints are in substance as follows:

Prior to September 19, 1964, plaintiff Bryant was employed by defendant Billy Donnell on his farm in Lake County, Tennessee for the purpose of making a crop on a share basis and for performing farm labor. Bryant, his wife and children lived in a house owned by Billy Donnell. The wife and eldest child also performed services on the farm. Bryant and his family were entirely dependent upon a store owned by Billy Donnell for their groceries and other necessaries, which were to be paid for by their labors and by charging against Bryant's share of the crop. Billy Donnell refused to furnish groceries and other necessaries sufficient to maintain Bryant and his family, with the result that Bryant was forced to obtain employment elsewhere but left his wife and children behind to perform agricultural services for Billy Donnell. Bryant was later able to find accommodations for his family at the location of his job, decided to move the family, and so advised Billy Donnell. Bryant enlisted the help and use of the truck of plaintiff Sisco to move his family.

The defendants, Billy Donnell and Jackie Donnell, thereupon entered into a conspiracy to hold Bryant and his family in a condition of forced servitude. In furtherance of this conspiracy, defendants lay in wait at the house. While Bryant's furniture was being placed in the truck, defendants opened fire on the hood and radiator of the truck in close proximity to Bryant's family, putting them in fear of their lives. Further, and pursuant to this conspiracy, the defendants forcibly made a citizen's arrest and took Sisco into custody. Later they charged him with the crime of criminal trespass, causing him to be imprisoned, well knowing that Sisco had entered the premises with permission of Bryant who was in lawful possession thereof. Further, and pursuant to this conspiracy, defendants caused to be issued a warrant for the arrest of Bryant, charging him with criminal trespass, as a result of which he was placed in jail, when defendants well knew that Bryant was a lawful resident of the premises.

Bryant charges that defendants thereby violated the "peonage" statutes. Title 42, Sec. 1994, and Title 18, Sec. 1581, U.S.C. While Bryant does not expressly rely also on Title 42, Secs. 1983 and 1985 (3), U.S.C., it is clear from the memoranda furnished to the Court by counsel that Bryant does so rely and that defendants assume he so relies. Sisco relies on these same statutes.

To the extent that plaintiffs ground their claims on Title 42, Sec. 1994, and Title 18, Sec. 1581, their claims arise under the laws of the United States within the meaning of Title 28, Sec. 1331, U.S.C., because the claims under these statutes do not clearly appear to be "immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction" and the claims are not "wholly insubstantial and frivolous." This Court therefore has jurisdiction. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939, 943 (1946). To the extent that plaintiffs ground their claims on Title 42, Secs. 1983 and 1985 (3), for the same reason there is jurisdiction under Title 28, Sec. 1331 and under Title 28, Sec. 1343(1) and (3), U.S.C.

Title 42, Sec. 1994 and Title 18, Sec. 1581 provide as follows:

"Sec. 1994. Peonage abolished.

"The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is abolished and forever prohibited in any Territory or State of the United States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void."

"Sec. 1581. Peonage: obstructing enforcement

"(a) Whoever holds or returns any person to a condition of peonage, or arrests any person with the intent of placing him in or returning him to a condition of peonage, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."

It will be noted that neither of these provisions expressly creates a civil cause of action for damages. It follows, defendants contend, that plaintiffs cannot ground their claims on these provisions. Plaintiffs contend, however, that these provisions impliedly create a civil cause of action.

The question whether a civil cause of action is impliedly created by a statutory enactment is dealt with in the Restatement, Torts, Secs. 286 to 288. Secs. 286 and 287, which are applicable here, provide as follows:

"Sec. 286. Violations Creating Civil Liability.

"The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another if:

"(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the other as an individual; and

"(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect; and

"(c) where the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a particular hazard, the invasion of the interests results from that hazard; and,

"(d) the violation is a legal cause of the invasion, and the other has not so conducted himself as to disable himself from maintaining an action."

"Sec. 287. Effect of Provision for Penalty.

"The existence in a legislative enactment of a provision for the imposition of a penalty for doing a prohibited act or failing to do a required act is immaterial in determining whether the actor is subject to liability for an invasion of the interest of another; * * *."

In Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (C.A.2, 1947), Judge Learned Hand, citing the Restatement, said at page 694:

"The first questions are whether the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S. C.A. § 151 et seq., imposes a civil, as well as a criminal, liability upon anyone who `publishes' a telephone message, and whether, if so, the District Court had jurisdiction over the action. Although the Act does not expressly create any civil liability, we can see no reason why the situation is not within the doctrine which, in the absence of contrary implications, construes a criminal statute, enacted for the protection of a specified class, as creating a civil right in members of the class, although the only express sanctions are criminal."

See also, in this connection, O'Dell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123, 127 (C.A.10, 1953), cert. denied 345 U.S. 941, 73 S.Ct. 833, 97 L.Ed. 1367 (1953), and Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422, 426 (C.A.2, 1944), cert. denied 323 U.S. 737, 65 S.Ct. 36, 89 L.Ed. 590 (1944).

Peonage has been defined by the Supreme Court in the following language in Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 9, 64 S.Ct. 792, 795, 88 L.Ed. 1095, 1099 (1944) quoting Clyatt v. U. S., 197 U.S. 207, 215, 25 S.Ct. 429, 430, 49 L.Ed. 726, 729 (1905):

"It may be defined as a status or condition of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master. The basal fact is indebtedness. * * * Peonage is sometimes classified as voluntary or involuntary; but this implies simply a difference in the mode of origin, but none in the character of the servitude. The one exists where the debtor voluntarily contracts to enter the service of his creditor. The other is forced upon the debtor by some provision of law. * * * A clear distinction exists between peonage and the voluntary performance of labor or rendering of services in payment of a debt. In the latter case the debtor, though contracting to pay his indebtedness by labor or service, and subject, like any other contractor, to an action for damages for breach of that contract, can elect at any time to break it, and no law or force compels performance or a continuance of the service." (Emphasis ours.)

Applying the standards of these authorities, Sisco has not alleged a claim under the peonage statutes because his interest alleged to be invaded is not the interest these statutes are aimed to protect. It is not alleged that defendants held or retained Sisco in peonage, or arrested him for the purpose of placing him in or returning him to peonage, or conspired to do so. Accordingly, Sisco has no claim under the peonage statutes. On the other hand, it is alleged that defendants have invaded Bryant's interest in being free from peonage. Actually, Bryant's complaint does not specifically allege that there was an existing indebtedness and that defendants conspired to hold him in forced labor to discharge the debt. But the factual allegations together with the allegation...