Bryant v. Giacomini, S.P.A.
| Decision Date | 12 October 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 7:04-CV-114-R.,7:04-CV-114-R. |
| Citation | 391 F.Supp.2d 495 |
| Parties | James A. BRYANT, as Next Friend of Bobby James Lee Bryant, a Minor; Sybil Sanchez, Temporary Administratrix of the Estate of Amanda Bryant, Deceased; Sybil Sanchez, Individually; Bob Lemmons & Lloyd Lizakowski, Plaintiffs, v. GIACOMINI, S.p.A., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Darlington Nnabuihe, Haskell, TX, pro se.
James P. Laurence, US Attorney's Office, Department of Justice, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.
Now before the Court are:
(1) Defendant Giacomini's Motion for Summary Judgment with supporting brief, Plaintiffs' response, and Defendant's reply, filed August 22, 2005; and
(2) Plaintiff Bryant's, et al., Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with supporting brief, Defendant's response, and Plaintiffs' reply, filed August 26, 2005.
After a thorough review of all parties' submissions, all matters of record, and all applicable law, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
On the morning of June 17, 2002, Plaintiffs Amanda Bryant, Bobby James Lee Bryant (a minor), and Lloyd Lizakowski ("Plaintiffs") were inside their trailer home in Bowie, Montague County, Texas when it caught fire.
Plaintiffs allege that at some time prior to the fire, they had removed a space heater from the trailer. The propane gas supply for the heater was left connected to the trailer, but was cut off from the residence by a gas valve. Plaintiffs allege that Bobby James Lee Bryant, a four-year old at the time of the accident, turned the valve on. Propane gas spread throughout the trailer and was ignited when Amanda Bryant ignited a cigarette lighter. Plaintiffs suffered burn injuries from the fire, and Amanda Bryant eventually died from her injuries.
On June 14, 2004, Plaintiffs filed their complaint against Giacomini ("Defendant"), the manufacturer of the valve at issue, in federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. They sought compensatory and incidental damages on the basis of product liability, including defective design, manufacturing defect, and defective marketing, both in strict liability and negligence. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant breached a post-sale duty to warn and recall on the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the valve.
On July 25, 2005, Giacomini moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal on all of Plaintiffs' claims. It argues that there is no evidence to support claims for any theory of product liability under Texas law, or claims for breach of post-sale duty to warn or express or implied warranty. Plaintiffs cross-filed on August 29, 2005, seeking partial summary judgment only on the product liability issues of their case.
Defendants in this case request summary judgment on the issues of manufacturing defect, design defect, marketing defect, post-sale duty to warn, and express and implied warranty. Plaintiffs request summary judgment solely on their strict liability and negligence theories of defective design.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is material if it involves a fact that might affect the outcome of a suit under governing law. See Burgos v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 20 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir.1994). The court must decide all reasonable doubts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272 (5th Cir.1994). As long as there appears to be some support for the disputed allegations such that "reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence," the motion must be denied. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a claim upon which summary judgment is sought, the moving party may discharge its burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must present affirmative evidence, setting forth specific facts, to show the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
The court must inquire as to whether there is sufficient evidence upon which reasonable jurors could properly find by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff is entitled to a verdict. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In other words, summary judgment will be granted "against any party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. A "sufficient showing" consists of more than a scintilla of evidence in support of the moving party's position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Slaughter v. Allstate Ins. Co., 803 F.2d 857, 860 (5th Cir.1986) ().
Products liability claims in Texas fall into three categories: design defect, manufacturing defect, and marketing (or warning) defect. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (); American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 426 n. 1 (Tex.1997); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tex.1995); Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 604-05 (Tex.1972). Plaintiffs are suing under all three theories and the Defendant seeks summary judgment on all three. Plaintiffs seek summary judgment solely on the issue of defective design.1
Under Texas law, a manufacturing defect claim requires the deviation of a finished product, in terms of its construction or quality, from the specification or planned output in a manner that renders it unreasonably dangerous. See Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d at 433.
A plaintiff claiming a manufacturing defect must prove three elements: (1) that the product did not conform to the manufacturer's plans and specifications; (2) the nonconformance made the product unreasonably dangerous; and (3) the defect was the cause of the injuries for which conformance was sought. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d at 434.
The moving party in a summary judgment motion must show that if the evidentiary material of record were reduced to admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to carry its burden. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs did not produce evidence as to any of the elements required to prove a manufacturing defect. At no point in the material of record do Plaintiffs provide evidence identifying the manufacturer's plans for the valve at issue, nor do they point to the existence of a nonconformance with the plan that made the valve unreasonably dangerous. In fact, Plaintiffs do not even respond to Defendant's assertion on this issue in their Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiffs have not met their burden of production on summary judgment for a manufacturing defect claim, leaving no genuine issue of material fact for the jury. Defendants are therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue.
Plaintiffs' primary claim is that Defendants are liable under theories of negligence and strict liability based on the defective design of the valve at issue. In Texas, product liability claims for design defects are analyzed under § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the Texas Civil Practice & Remedy Code § 82.005. Flock v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 319 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir.2003).
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states in relevant part:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the ultimate user, consumer or his progeny, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product;
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.
Under Texas law, "[a] plaintiff must prove that there is a safer alternative design in order to recover under a design defect theory." Flock, 319 F.3d at 236; General Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Tex.1999) (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 384 (Tex.1995)). To establish a design defect in Texas, Section 82.005 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code requires a claimant "to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1)...
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