Bryant v. Industrial Acc. Commission

• Court: California Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SCHAUER; GIBSON; CARTER
• Citation: Bryant v. Industrial Acc. Commission, 231 P.2d 32, 37 Cal.2d 215 (Cal. 1951)
• Decision Date: 15 May 1951
• Parties: BRYANT, Director of Employment et al. v. INDUSTRIAL ACC. COMMISSION. Sac. 6175.

Page 32

231 P.2d 32

37 Cal.2d 215

BRYANT, Director of Employment et al. v. INDUSTRIAL ACC. COMMISSION.

Sac. 6175.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

May 15, 1951.

Fred N. Howser v. Edmund G. Brown, Attys. Gen., Chas. W. Johnson, Irving H. Perluss, William L. Shaw and Vincent P. Lafferty, Deputy Attys. Gen., for petitioners.

Sidney L. Weinstock, San Francisco, as amicus curiae on behalf of petitioners.

Edmund J. Thomas, Jr., T. Groezinger and Robert Ball, all of San Francisco, for respondent.

Charles P. Scully, San Francisco, as amicus curiae on behalf of respondent.

SCHAUER, Justice.

Petitioners, the Director of Employment and the Department of Employment, seek review of an award of respondent Industrial Accident Commission, and annulment of the portion of the award which denies petitioners' claim of a lien against certain workmen's compensation awarded to Herbert R. Wade. On June 22, 1948, Wade sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. He instituted proceedings before the Industrial Accident Commission to recover workmen's compensation. During the pendency of such proceedings, over a period of four months from June through October, 1949, the Department of Employment paid the applicant Wade, as unemployment compensation disability benefits, ¹ the sum of $460.72. In the proceedings before the Industrial Accident Commission, the Department of Employment claimed a lien in this amount against any workmen's compensation which might be awarded Wade. ² The Industrial Accident Commission determined that Wade was entitled to workmen's compensation for temporary total disability from June 30, 1948, to July 26, 1949, and for permanent partial disability from August 3, 1949, until expiration of 175 weeks. It allowed a lien for the amount of unemployment disability benefits paid during the period when, according to its order, applicant was entitled to workmen's compensation for temporary disability and disallowed the lien for the benefits paid during the period when, according to its determination, applicant was entitled to workmen's compensation for permanent disability.

Petitioners contend that as a matter of law they are entitled to a lien against workmen's compensation for the entire amount paid as unemployment disability benefits, regardless of whether the workmen's compensation was awarded for temporary disability or for permanent disability. The Industrial Accident Commission contends that in every case it has discretion as to whether it will allow a lien against workmen's compensation; that where the claimed lien is for unemployment disability benefits it would be an abuse of discretion to deny the lien for benefits paid during a period of temporary disability, but that the commission 'is fully justified' in denying a lien for benefits paid during a period of permanent disability. Amicus curiae State Federation of Labor contends that as a matter of law an unemployed, disabled applicant is entitled to both unemployment disability benefits and workmen's permanent disability compensation. Resolution of the various contentions depends upon interpretation of the Labor Code and the Unemployment Insurance Act (3 Deering's Gen.Laws, Act 8780d). Consideration of the pertinent statutory provisions leads to the conclusion that the petitioners as a matter of law are entitled to the lien claimed in its entirety and that the respondent commission exceeded its authority in denying the lien in part.

Prior to the adoption of the unemployment compensation disability insurance program, the Senate Interim Committee on Unemployment Insurance reported that 'In California where a worker is unemployed because of injury arising within the scope of his employment, some protection is offered by the Workmen's Compensation Act. If an individual is unemployed because of lack of work, benefits are provided under the Unemployment Insurance Act. However, for the worker who is unemployed because of an injury not within the reach of the Workmen's Compensation Act no protection whatsoever is granted. Your committee feels it is an anomalous situation and a serious gap in providing economic security for the large working population of the state.' (Senate Journal, May 7, 1945, p. 85.) The committee recommended adoption of an insurance program 'to pay benefits to individuals who are unemployed because of illness or injury for which no compensation is otherwise made' (id., p. 126; italics petitioners') and further recommended 'That no disability benefits be paid to an individual receiving unemployment insurance benefits or workmen's compensation' (id., p. 89).

The next session of the Legislature adopted article 10 of the Unemployment Insurance Act (3 Deering's Gen.Laws, Act 8780d; Stats. 1st Ex.Sess.1946, ch. 81, § 1). Article 10 provides for unemployment disability benefits. Section 207 thereof provided, 'An individual shall be ineligible for unemployment compensation disability benefits with respect to any week which the commission (the Unemployment Stabilization Commission) finds that he has received or is entitled to receive * * * benefits under a workmen's compensation law * * *' Under this language an unemployed disabled applicant might have been found ineligible for unemployment disability benefits if he received, for example, medical treatment, or a very small workmen's compensation payment for a slight previous disability unrelated to the disability which caused his unemployment. Therefore, in 1947 the Legislature amended section 207.

Paragraph (b) of section 207, as amended in 1947, now provides, 'An individual shall not be eligible for unemployment compensation disability benefits for any week of unemployment due primarily to a disability, for which week the commission (the Unemployment Stabilization Commission) finds that with respect to such disability he has received, or is entitled to receive, in the form of cash payments, benefits under a workmen's compensation law, * * * provided, however, that if such benefits are less than the weekly amount he would have otherwise received as disability benefits under Article 10 of this act, he shall be entitled to receive for such week, if otherwise eligible, disability benefits, reduced by the amount of such cash payments.' Section 207 clearly shows that the Legislature did not intend to permit recovery of both unemployment disability benefits and workmen's compensation for the same period of unemployment. At the same session during which it enacted the lastquoted version of section 207, the Legislature added paragraph (f) to section 4903 of the Labor Code. That section had provided that 'The commission (the Industrial Accident Commission) may determine, and allow as a lien against any amount to be paid as compensation:' (a) Reasonable fee for legal services in connection with the claim for compensation. (b) Reasonable expenses for medical treatment of the industrial injury. (c) Reasonable value of living expenses subsequent to the injury. (d) Reasonable burial expenses of deceased employe. (e) Reasonable living expenses of deserted wife or minor children. Paragraph (f), added in 1947, reads, 'The amount of unemployment compensation disability benefits which have been paid under or pursuant to the Unemployment Insurance Act in those cases where, pending a determination under Division 4 of this code, there was uncertainty whether such benefits were payable under that act or payable hereunder.' Paragraph (g), added in 1949, reads, 'The amount of unemployment compensation benefits paid erroneously to the injured employee for a period for which he was unable to work and for which he received temporary total disability payments under this division.'

It does not appear that the Legislature, by adding paragraph (f) to section 4903 of the Labor Code in 1947, changed the right of an applicant to receive unemployment disability benefits; it merely provided a means for the Unemployment Stabilization Commission to recover such benefits when it was finally determined by the Industrial Accident Commission that the applicant was entitled to workmen's compensation. The reason for providing such means is obvious. An applicant is not entitled to unemployment disability benefits for a period of unemployment which, according to the findings of the Unemployment Stabilization Commission, was due to a disability for which he was entitled to workmen's compensation. But if the question whether the applicant is entitled to workmen's compensation is contested, the Unemployment Stabilization Commission cannot make a final determination of the question; such determination must be made by the Industrial Accident Commission. Pending such final determination the Department of Employment might, as it did here, pay the applicant unemployment disability benefits. This is precisely the situation described in paragraph (f) of section 4903 'where, pending a determination under Division 4 of this code, there was uncertainty whether such benefits were payable under that act (the Unemployment Insurance Act) or payable hereunder.'

It is the commission's ³ position that, because section 4903 provides that it 'may' allow a lien and because "may' is permissive' (Lab.Code, § 15), it 'may' in its discretion refuse to allow liens under section 4903. The following cases suggest that the commission's 'discretion' as to liens under paragraphs (a) through (e) of section 4903, though wide, does not include 'discretion' to disallow completely a lien where it is established that the lien claimant did furnish services or living expenses of value: Independence Indem. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm. (1935), 2 Cal.2d 397, 404, 407, 41 P.2d 320; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm. (1938), 10 Cal.2d 567, 578, 75 P.2d 1058; Schilling v. Ind. Acc. Comm. (1920), 47 Cal.App. 190, 192, 190 P. 373; Safway Steel Scaffold Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm. (1942), 55 Cal.App.2d 388, 389, 130 P.2d 484; Bentley v. Ind....