Bryant v. Jones
| Decision Date | 12 March 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:04-cv-2462-WSD.,1:04-cv-2462-WSD. |
| Citation | 696 F. Supp.2d 1313 |
| Parties | Michael BRYANT, John Drake, Becky Kelley, and Herbert Lowe, Plaintiffs, v. Vernon JONES, Marilyn Boyd Drew, Morris Williams, Richard Stogner, and Joe Stone in their individual capacities and in their official capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Balch & Bingham, John Thomas Morgan, III, Michael J. Bowers, K. Alex Khoury, Balch & Bingham LLP, Joshua Barrett Belinfante, Robbins Law, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs.
Brent L. Wilson, Elarbee Thompson Sapp & Wilson, LLP, Dwight Lowell Thomas, Office of Dwight L. Thomas, Preston Bryan Davis, Sharon P. Morgan, Elarbee Thompson Sapp & Wilson, LLP, Robert B. Remar, Kerri Anne Gildow, Rogers & Hardin, Elizabeth Penn Payne, Penn Payne, Atlanta, GA, Scott R. Sausser, Peachtree City, GA, for Defendants.
Christopher Scott Anulewicz, James L. Hollis, Balch & Bingham, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs and Movant.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Michael Bryant, John Drake, and Becky Kelley's Motion for Reconsideration 354 (the "Motion for Reconsideration") of the District Court's November 21, 2006 Opinion and Order, 464 F.Supp.2d 1273, on Defendants' Renewed Motions for Summary Judgment 303 (the "November 21, 2006 Order"), and on Kristy Bryant Yule's Motion to Substitute Plaintiff Michael Bryant with Kristy Bryant Yule, Temporary Administrator of the Estate of Michael Bryant 397.
This action arises from allegedly racially-discriminatory policies and actions by employees of DeKalb County.1 Plaintiffs Michael Bryant ("Bryant"),2 John Drake ("Drake"), Becky Kelley's ("Kelley") and Herbert Lowe's ("Lowe") Complaint alleges, among other causes of action, violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. ¶ 100.) It is well-settled that in cases involving claims against government defendants, § 1983 is the exclusive damages remedy for the violation of rights guaranteed by § 1981. Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 893 (11th Cir.2000).
Section 1981 provides, in part:
Section 1981 was amended to its present form in 1991, when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the "1991 Act"). Section 101 of the Act amended § 1981 by adding § 1981(b). The amendment permits employees to bring employment actions, such as those for discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, based on existing employment relationships.
Just prior to the enactment of the 1991 Act, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1658 which provided a catchall four-year statute of limitations for actions arising under federal statutes enacted after December 1, 1990, which do not have statute of limitations provisions. Palmer v. Stewart County Sch. Dist., 178 Fed.Appx. 999, 1002-03 (11th Cir.2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1658 and Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 371, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004)). Neither § 1981 nor § 1983 have statute of limitations provisions. In the absence of a limitations period in § 1983, our Circuit has held that the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims3 is the Georgia state statute of limitations for claims related to injuries to a person, which is two years. Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 626 (11th Cir.1986); see also O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Our Circuit had not addressed what limitations period applied to § 1981 claims enabled by the 1991 Act and brought against a government defendant under § 1983 when the Court entered its summary judgment Opinion and Order in this case
In June 2006, the Defendants each moved for summary judgment. In these motions, the Defendants argued that Bryant, Kelley and Drake's § 1981 discriminatory transfer claims, Drake's § 1981 failure to promote claim, and Kelley's § 1981 hostile work environment claim were untimely because they were brought through § 1983, which has a two year statute of limitations.4 Plaintiffs argued in opposition that the statute of limitations for these § 1981 claims was four years based on 28 U.S.C. § 1658.5
On November 21, 2006, the Court issued its order on Defendants' summary judgment motions. In it, the Court discussed that the Eleventh Circuit had no published authority on this statute of limitations question. The Court then held that the two year statute of limitations applied to Plaintiffs' § 1981 claims brought under § 1983. Based upon this two year limitations period, summary judgment was granted on: (1) Bryant's § 1981 discriminatory reassignment or transfer claim brought against Defendants in their official capacities; (2) Kelley's § 1981 discriminatory reassignment or transfer claim brought against Defendants in their official capacities; (3) Drake's § 1981 discriminatory reassignment or transfer claim brought against Defendants in their official capacities; and (4) Drake's § 1981 failure to promote claim brought against Defendants in their official capacities (the "Dismissed Claims").6
On December 18, 2006, Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal based on the Court's denial of Defendants' qualified immunity defense. While the case was on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed in Baker v. Birmingham Board of Education, 531 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir.2008), which statute of limitations period applies for employment cases alleging § 1981 claims against government defendants. In Baker, the plaintiff brought race discrimination and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, by and through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for actions occurring during his employment with the Board of Education. The district court granted summary judgment for the Board of Education on the grounds that Baker's claims, which arose more than two years prior to filing suit, were untimely. Baker appealed and argued that a four year statute of limitations should apply.
Noting the inconsistent decisions on this statute of limitations issue, the Eleventh Circuit held that the applicable statute of limitations for § 1981 claims, enabled by the 1991 Act and brought under § 1983 against government defendants, is four years.7
The case now has been remanded for trial following the Circuit's review of this Court's November 21, 2006 Opinion and Order.8 After remand, on December 22, 2009, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Reconsideration, asserting that Baker constitutes an intervening change in the law requiring reconsideration of the November 21, 2006 Order on the issue of the statute of limitations to be applied to the Dismissed Claims. Defendants opposed the Motion for Reconsideration on the grounds that it is untimely and procedurally defective.
A district court has the discretion to revise or reconsider interlocutory orders at any time before final judgment has been entered. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); e.g., McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., 966 F.Supp. 1209, 1222 (M.D.Ga.1997). A motion for reconsideration generally is appropriate where there is: (1) newly discovered evidence; (2) an intervening development or change in controlling law; or (3) a need to correct a clear error of law or fact. See, e.g., Jersawitz v. People TV, 71 F.Supp.2d 1330, 1344 (N.D.Ga.1999); Pres. Endangered Areas of Cobb's History, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 916 F.Supp. 1557, 1560 (N.D.Ga.1995), aff'd, 87 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir.1996)
Plaintiffs contend that the Baker decision constitutes an intervening change of law which compels reconsideration of the November 21, 2006 Order. The Court agrees. Baker established new Eleventh Circuit authority on this unsettled question of law. Reconsideration of the November 21, 2006 Order based on this new authority is appropriate.
Defendants do not dispute that Baker constituted an intervening change in the law. Defendants instead argue that the Motion for Reconsideration should be denied because it was not timely brought and because it is procedurally defective. These arguments are unconvincing.
The Motion for Reconsideration is timely. Under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may revise an interlocutory order prior to the entry of final judgment. Here, final judgment has not been entered, and the Motion for Reconsideration that the Court now considers was made promptly after this action was remanded from the Eleventh Circuit after the appeal of the Court's November 21, 2006 Order was concluded. The Motion for Reconsideration is timely under Rule 54(b).9
The Motion for Reconsideration also does not suffer from any procedural defects. Defendants generally assert Plaintiffs should have been more specific in stating which claims they are asking the Court to reconsider. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently identified the rulings to be reconsidered by requesting reconsideration of their § 1981 claims.10
Plaintiffs Bryant, Drake, and Kelley seek reconsideration of the Court's grant of summary judgment on:
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