Bryant v. New Jersey Dept. of Transp.
| Decision Date | 18 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. A. 97-1397.,CIV. A. 97-1397. |
| Parties | Lillian E. BRYANT, Lillian W. Bryant, Carl Briscoe, Gustavia Ellis, Pierre Hollingsworth, Michael F. Johnson, Elwood S. Davis, First Ward Civic Association, Third Ward Civic Association and West Side Protective Homeowners Association, Plaintiffs, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, State of New Jersey, South Jersey Transportation Authority, Mirage Resorts Incorporated, New Jersey Transportation Trust Fund Authority and Casino Reinvestment Development Authority, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Stanley C. Van Ness, Karen L. Cayci, Herbert, Van Ness, Cayci & Goodell, Princeton, NJ, for Plaintiffs.
Edward N. Fitzpatrick, Benjamin Clarke, William J. Bailey, DeCotiis, Fitzpatrick & Gluck, Teaneck, NJ, for Defendant, Mirage Resorts, Inc.
Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, Jeffrey J. Miller, Jerry Fischer, Assistant Attorneys General, Josh Lichtblau, Kevin Marc Schatz, Robert Marshall, Deputy Attorneys General, Trenton, NJ, for Defendants, State of New Jersey, New Jersey Department of Transportation and New Jersey Transportation Trust Fund Authority.
Thomas Edward Monahan, Jean L. Cipriani, Gilmore & Monahan, P.A., Toms River, NJ, for Defendant, South Jersey Transportation Authority.
Theodore W. Geiser, Patrick J. McAuley, Liza M. Walsh, Mark D. Haefner, Connell, Foley & Geiser, LLP, Roseland, NJ, for Defendant, Casino Reinvestment Development Authority.
Renee Steinhagen, Public Interest Law Center of New Jersey, An Appleseed Affiliate, Newark, NJ, for Amicus Curiae.
Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Joan A. Magagna, Acting Chief, Housing and Civil Enforcement Section, Joseph D. Rich, Burtis M. Dougherty, Attorneys, Housing and Civil Enforcement Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Faith S. Hochberg, United States Attorney, Louis J. Bizzarri, Assistant United States Attorney, Camden, NJ, for Intervenor, United States.
The plaintiffs filed this action to prevent the construction of a highway and tunnel through their neighborhood which will require the condemnation of several homes and will allegedly cause flooding, noise and traffic problems. The plaintiffs claim that this project will have a disparate impact on their predominantly African-American community in violation of United States Department of Transportation regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits racial discrimination by entities receiving federal funds. This case has already given rise to several novel and complex legal issues and two published decisions.1
The State of New Jersey, the New Jersey Department of Transportation, the New Jersey Transportation Trust Fund Authority, the South Jersey Transportation Authority and the Casino Reinvestment and Development Authority have moved to dismiss this suit on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity or, in the alternative, have asked this Court to abstain from exercising federal jurisdiction over this controversy in favor of state eminent domain proceedings. Congress has expressly abrogated state sovereign immunity from suits filed under Title VI.2 Therefore, the defendants' motion directly challenges the constitutionality of that abrogation provision. For the reasons set forth below, I conclude that the congressional abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title VI is constitutional, and that abstention is not warranted under the circumstances of this case. Consequently, the motion of these defendants will be denied.
Lillian E. Bryant, Lillian W. Bryant, Carl Briscoe, Gustavia Ellis, Pierre Hollingsworth, Michael F. Johnson, Elwood S. Davis, the First Ward Civic Association, the Third Ward Civic Association and the West Side Protective Homeowners Association (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed this action against the State of New Jersey, the New Jersey Department of Transportation, the New Jersey Transportation Trust Fund Authority, the South Jersey Transportation Authority (collectively the " "), the Casino Reinvestment Development Authority ("CRDA") and Mirage Resorts, Inc. ("Mirage"). The factual allegations contained in the Amended Complaint have been outlined in my first opinion in this case, and will not be repeated here. See Bryant v. New Jersey Department of Transportation ("Bryant I"), 987 F.Supp. 343, 345-46 (D.N.J.1998).
In Bryant I, I determined that the Department of Transportation's regulations implementing Title VI could support Plaintiffs' private cause of action for disparate impact discrimination. See id. at 348. Nevertheless, I dismissed the Amended Complaint for lack of standing under the "Simpson Doctrine" which required that Title VI plaintiffs be the intended beneficiaries of, participants in, or applicants for federal financial assistance. See id. at 352. In light of a Supreme Court opinion issued several days after I decided Bryant I, however, I reconsidered my decision and concluded that the so-called "intended beneficiary" doctrine was no longer a valid interpretation of the zone of interests protected by Title VI. See Bryant v. New Jersey Department of Transportation ("Bryant II"), 998 F.Supp. 438 (D.N.J.1998) ( National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & Trust Co., ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 927, 140 L.Ed.2d 1 (1998)). Consequently, pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I vacated my prior order dismissing Plaintiffs' Title VI claim and reinstated this action.
The reinstatement of Plaintiffs' claim now requires that I decide the dispositive motions which had originally been filed by the State Defendants, CRDA and Mirage prior to my decision in Bryant I. During a hearing on March 27, 1998, however, Mirage withdrew its motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. See Transcript of Hearing before Hon. Stephen M. Orlofsky (dated Mar. 27, 1998) at 4, 21. At the same hearing, and with the consent of Plaintiffs, I dismissed Plaintiffs' claims against CRDA without prejudice because of the absence of any evidence that CRDA had played a role in deciding where to locate the highway and tunnel. See id. at 26. That rendered CRDA's motion for judgment on the pleadings moot, and left pending only the motion of the State Defendants to dismiss the Amended Complaint.3
As I explain below, the motion of the State Defendants to dismiss Plaintiffs' claim on Eleventh Amendment grounds directly calls into question the constitutionality of a congressional statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7, insofar as it abrogates state sovereign immunity under Title VI. Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a), I certified this issue to the Attorney General of the United States of America.4 On April 15, 1998, I granted the motion of the United States to intervene in this case to allow the government to defend the constitutionality of § 2000d-7 against the State Defendants' Eleventh Amendment challenge.
The State Defendants have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Technically, this motion must be treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) because each of the State Defendants has answered the Amended Complaint. See Turbe v. Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir.1991); Borough of Sayreville v. Union Carbide Corp., 923 F.Supp. 671, 675 (D.N.J.1996); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(2) (). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, however, even when presented as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, should be evaluated by the familiar standards of Rule 12(b)(6). See Turbe, 938 F.2d at 428; Union Carbide, 923 F.Supp. at 675.
That inquiry generally requires that I "accept as true the factual allegations in the amended complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, and to refrain from granting a dismissal unless it is certain that no relief can be granted under any set of facts which could be proved." Fuentes v. South Hills Cardiology, 946 F.2d 196, 201 (3d Cir.1991) (citing Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir.1988)); see Schuylkill Energy Resources, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 412 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 435, 139 L.Ed.2d 335 (1997). However, "Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); accord Mruz v. Caring, Inc., 991 F.Supp. 701, 706-07 (D.N.J. 1998).
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. Since Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890), the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to bar claims in federal court against a state by its own citizens, thus applying the bar in both diversity and federal-question cases. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 2033, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997).5
Subject to the conditions described in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), however, Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity and thereby subject states to suit in federal court.6 To determine whether Congress has properly abrogated the State Defendants' sovereign immunity, I must answer two questions: (1) has Congress "unequivocally...
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