Bryant v. Palmer Coking Coal Co.

• Decision Date: 24 August 1992
• Docket Number: No. 28168-2-I
• Citation: Bryant v. Palmer Coking Coal Co., 834 P.2d 662, 67 Wn.App. 176 (Wash. App. 1992)
• Parties: William R. BRYANT and Maxine B. Bryant, husband and wife, Respondents, v. PALMER COKING COAL COMPANY, John Does I through X, Partners in Palmer Coking Company, Jane Does I Through X, Their Spouses and All Other Persons or Parties Unknown Claiming Any Right, Title, Estate, Lien or Interest in the Real Estate Described in the Complaint Herein, William Kombol and Jane Doe Kombol, and the John Doe and Jane Doe Partnership Claiming Title Herein, Appellants.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 176

67 Wn.App. 176

834 P.2d 662

William R. BRYANT and Maxine B. Bryant, husband and wife, Respondents, v. PALMER COKING COAL COMPANY, John Does I through X, Partners in Palmer Coking Company, Jane Does I Through X, Their Spouses and All Other Persons or Parties Unknown Claiming Any Right, Title, Estate, Lien or Interest in the Real Estate Described in the Complaint Herein, William Kombol and Jane Doe Kombol, and the John Doe and Jane Doe Partnership Claiming Title Herein, Appellants.

No. 28168-2-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington Division 1.

Aug. 24, 1992.

Republished as modified, 858 P.2d 1110

, September 21, 1993.

Douglass A. North, Douglas W. Ahrens, Maltman, Weber, Reed, North & Ahrens, Seattle, for appellants.

Paul G. Winter, Seattle, for respondents.

BAKER, Judge.

In this case we decide that a settlement agreement allegedly entered into by the parties is unenforceable because it does not satisfy the requirements of CR 2A or RCW 2.44.010.

I

The Bryants brought a quiet title action against Palmer Coking Coal Company (Palmer), claiming rights in two parcels of real property based on breach of contract and adverse possession. ¹

Within a month prior to trial, the parties and their attorneys met at the site to negotiate a settlement agreement. The Bryants understood that a settlement agreement had been worked out and notified the court that afternoon that the case had settled. As a result, the trial date was struck.

The next day, the Bryants' attorney sent a letter to Palmer summarizing their understanding of the parties' agreement. The letter summarized the agreement in part as follows:

Parcel 1 will belong to Palmer, with Bill Bryant's right to use the turnaround and runway for his lifetime. A fence will be put in on the south side on open ground to the sides of the runway, with gates across the runway.

Palmer will have a 120-foot non-exclusive easement on the southwest portion of Mr. Bryant's property, by Morgansville, for road purposes. Palmer's expense for road construction. Palmer is to provide adequate notice to Mr. Bryant so he can have time to remove the timber.

On the west side of the runway, Mr. Bryant and Mr. Kombol will pick a starting point to the north and west side of the runway approximately 120 feet inside the west line of Parcel 2, and the line is to run approximately parallel with the runway across Parcel 2.

Bill Kombol and Bill Bryant will get together out on the property to see about locating that corner spot where Mr. Bryant had that iron, tanks and other equipment, so that they can agree on a line. I don't think there's any necessity that the attorneys be there when they look it over; or at least it's okay with me if they meet and discuss this. Certainly they should be able to.

The trial court found that this letter accurately reflected the agreement reached but that it did not constitute the agreement itself.

Meanwhile, Palmer decided it did not wish to proceed with a settlement and its attorney so informed the Bryants. Palmer asserts that the framework for a settlement had been discussed but that many details were left to future agreement.

The Bryants then filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. After the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter, it issued a memorandum opinion stating that the parties had entered into an enforceable settlement agreement. The trial court appointed a special master to resolve any issues not agreed upon by the parties and ordered Palmer to pay for all fees charged by the master.

II

Palmer argues that the alleged settlement agreement is unenforceable because it is not in writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought and was not entered on the record in open court, and therefore does not satisfy the requirements set forth in CR 2A ² and RCW 2.44.010. ³

Both CR 2A and RCW 2.44.010 require a stipulation in open court on the record, or a writing acknowledged by the party to be bound. It is undisputed that these procedures were not followed. The Bryants, however, contend that strict compliance with RCW 2.44.010 is not required, citing Stottlemyre v. Reed, 35 Wash.App. 169, 665 P.2d 1383, review denied, 100 Wash.2d 1015 (1983). Stottlemyre involved an oral settlement agreement in a personal injury lawsuit. This court held that where the attorney stated on the record that he negotiated a settlement with the approval of his client, the requirements of RCW 2.44.010 were satisfied.

We do not find Stottlemyre to be persuasive in this context. First, Stottlemyre's attorney stated on the record that he had accepted a settlement with the approval of his client. Second, Stottlemyre fails to explain why Eddleman v. McGhan, 45 Wash.2d 430, 275 P.2d 729 (1954) is not controlling authority. In Eddleman, our Supreme Court held that where it is disputed that a settlement agreement was reached, noncompliance with the statute and court rule governing settlements...