Bryant v. Rego Enters., LLC

• Decision Date: 23 December 2016
• Docket Number: 16 Civ. 5131 (BMC)
• Parties: RACQUEL BRYANT, Plaintiff, v. REGO ENTERPRISES, LLC doing business as DALLAS BBQ, GREG WETANSON, and ALEJANDRO HERRERA Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

RACQUEL BRYANT, Plaintiff, v. REGO ENTERPRISES, LLC doing business as DALLAS BBQ, GREG WETANSON,and ALEJANDRO HERRERA Defendants.

16 Civ. 5131 (BMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

December 23, 2016

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

COGAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff has brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290-301 ("NYSHRL"), and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-101 to 8-703 ("NYCHRL"), against Rego Enterprises, LLC doing business as Dallas BBQ ("REL"), Greg Wetanson, the owner of REL, and Alejandro Herrera, a former manager at Dallas BBQ, arising from the alleged assault and battery, sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and hostile work environment caused by defendant Herrera.

The case is before me on the motion for summary judgment of REL and Wetanson (the "REL defendants").¹ The REL defendants argue that plaintiff's action is barred by the release she signed in connection with her departure from her employment and the severance package she received. Thus, although plaintiff's complaint is one sounding in civil rights, the issue before me is one of contract. For the reasons that follow, the REL defendants' motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the parties' Local Rule 56.1 statements, specifically the facts that the parties have deemed undisputed. I have noted where there are disputes.

Plaintiff had been employed as a manager overseeing customer service at the Rego Park branch of Dallas BBQ. On May 19, 2016, she was completing her work in an office in the Rego Park branch when defendant Herrera groped her buttocks. Plaintiff made an internal complaint regarding the incident on May 27. She spoke with a few individuals after making the complaint, including Wetanson.

During a meeting on June 2 with Eric Levine, the Director of Human Resources of REL, and Wetanson, plaintiff advised them that she did not wish to continue working for Dallas BBQ following the incident with Herrera. What followed in the days between June 3 and June 9 were conversations between plaintiff and Levine negotiating her departure from Dallas BBQ.²

On June 3, Levine received an e-mail from plaintiff in which she stated: "Starting today, I will take my vacation and look forward to discussing a golden parachute." The next day, plaintiff emailed Levine and summarized the events giving rise to the current situation; in relevant part, she summarized the previous day in the following way: "The next day, June 3, 2016, I called Greg Wetanson and proposed that I use my earned vacation days and within that time, maybe they can consider a severance package because of the circumstances and my discomfort of working due to the sexual offense crime."

On June 5, plaintiff and Levine spoke on the telephone about a severance package, a conversation that was recorded. During the phone call, plaintiff and Levine spoke aboutcompensation. Plaintiff and Levine spoke again that next day on June 6 via telephone. During that conversation, which lasted nearly 23 minutes, the following was stated:

Plaintiff: And I do not, I don't want to take legal action against the company. I don't want to. That's why I'm putting everything on the table so we can bow out gracefully and we can tap out gracefully.

* * *

Plaintiff: Okay. It's a lawsuit, Eric. It's a very serious lawsuit. It's a lawsuit not only of sexual harassment and discrimination - for the mere fact that I'm over 40 years old in the workplace and the proper channels weren't taken - it's a very serious lawsuit, and I'm just gonna be very honest. And I don't want to do that...

* * *

Plaintiff: Are you aware of like what the purpose of a severance package or a golden parachute is? Are you aware of the concrete definition, what it's in place for?

Levine: A severance package is when you leave a job and sometimes you get one week per year or two weeks per year, depending on the situation.

Plaintiff: Okay, that's a severance package; a golden parachute is for management.

Levine: You use that term golden parachute; we're not using that term. This is not lotto, nobody's using that term -

Plaintiff: No, I'm I'm -

Levine: You're using that term.

Plaintiff: No, but it's a term. Just like a severance package. It's a, it's a, it's an escalated version of a severance package in situations [inaudible] in situations that are similar to mine where there is a possibility of legal action being taken or there is a merger or there is some type of company buyout, but it's some significant situation where it would be better for the employee and the employer to part ways, okay? And then I would then, therefore, forfeit my right to take legal action -

Levine: I got you. I got you. We're on the same page. We're talking [inaudible] Go on.

Plaintiff: So now. Okay, so now - if I have the ability and I have all the credibility to sue the company for an excess of maybe 7, 8, 9 million, which I could very easily win -Levine: Okay.

Plaintiff: I don't want to do that. So, therefore, I ought to resort to a golden parachute. And I say you know what, I would be satisfied with about $250,000 to $300,000.

After that, Levine stated to plaintiff that they were not on the same page in terms of pay-out, and plaintiff ultimately reduced her figure, stating, "I won't sell myself short. I won't. . . . I will not settle for 20 weeks. I need at least a whole year's salary." Levine then asked plaintiff if she would need benefits, then stating that she is going to need COBRA benefits given the fact that she is a parent and that benefits are expensive. Thereafter, plaintiff stated that she wanted benefits to be part of her severance package.

Plaintiff and Levine spoke again that next day on June 7 via telephone. Levine updated plaintiff on the status of his negotiations with upper management regarding the terms negotiated during their previous day's phone call. He told her that he had negotiated for her six months' salary and six months of benefits. Plaintiff then asked whether there would be loan forgiveness, as plaintiff had borrowed money from several individuals, amounting to over $7,800.

Plaintiff and Bryant spoke again later on June 7 via telephone. During that conversation, the following was stated:

Plaintiff: . . . My hope was that, you know, initially if I could at least get like a year's salary, you know, and I see that that's not - we're not in the same ball park. Um. Just taking into consideration that we aren't meeting on those ends, can we do it - let's say $30,000 net.

Levine: $30,000 net. Could I call the CFO and talk about that? Okay?

Plaintiff: That's fine. Yeah. That's fine.

Plaintiff and Levine spoke again the following day on June 8 by telephone. During that conversation, plaintiff sought an update on when she would see a draft of a letter memorializingtheir agreement. Levine responded, "Oh yeah, no problem, we made the deal yesterday. I have it being written up." Plaintiff then asked for the letter to include a term for the money to be wired into her account: "Okay, can we draft in the letter for it to be wired into my account?"

Plaintiff and Levine spoke again the following day on June 9 by telephone. In relevant part, plaintiff asked whether the money could be wired into her account by June 16.

The following day, on June 10, Levine met plaintiff and her husband at a Starbucks, during which time he provided her with the Severance Agreement and General Release (together, the "Agreement"). Plaintiff denies receiving the whole Agreement at that precise moment; instead, she avers that she was only shown the first and last pages and did not review the entire Agreement before signing.

The Severance Agreement outlined the following terms of plaintiff's departure from her employment at Dallas BBQ:

severance pay in the total amount of Thirty Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Two and 08/100 Dollars ($35,852.08), less normal tax and payroll deductions. The net amount to be paid to you will be $30,000. Also, you are relieved from repaying the salary advances from petty cash totaling $2,290. You understand and acknowledge that all rights and claims waived and released herein are in exchange for these payments and other consideration provided in this Agreement to which you otherwise would not be entitled and which are greater than benefits normally given by the Company to terminated employees.

This language appears on the first page of the Agreement, which plaintiff admits she received prior to signing the Agreement's signature page.

The Severance Agreement had a general release clause, which stated, in relevant part that, that plaintiff "agree[s] to execute and be bound by the terms of the General Release annexed to and made a part of this Agreement," and that she "understand[s] the payments and benefits provided in this Agreement are made in consideration of the waiver and release of claims as provided in the General Release." Plaintiff denies seeing this language before signing theAgreement, asserting that she was only given the first and last pages of the Agreement, and this language appears on the second page of the Agreement.

The Severance Agreement also contained a representations and acknowledgement clause, where plaintiff warranted that she "carefully read and understand[s] the provisions of this Agreement and the incorporated General Release." Plaintiff denies seeing this language before signing the Agreement, again alleging that she was only given the first and last pages of the Agreement, and this language appears on the second page of the Agreement.

On the last page of the General Release, which plaintiff admits she received (of course she must admit this, as the last page is the signature page), the following paragraph appears in all capital letters above where plaintiff signed her name:

RELEASOR ACKNOWLEDGES SHE FULLY

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