Bryant v. State, S07A0925.

• Decision Date: 05 November 2007
• Docket Number: No. S07A0925.,S07A0925.
• Citation: Bryant v. State, 282 Ga. 631, 651 S.E.2d 718 (Ga. 2007)
• Parties: BRYANT v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

282 Ga. 631

651 S.E.2d 718

BRYANT v. The STATE.

No. S07A0925.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

October 9, 2007.

Reconsideration Denied November 5, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Kirk Emerson Gilliard, Garrett & Gilliard, P.C., Augusta, for Appellant.

Madonna Marie Little, Asst. Dist. Atty., Daniel J. Craig, Dist. Atty., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Mary N. Kimmey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Appellee.

HINES, Justice.

Following the denial of his motion for new trial, as amended, Michael Wayne Bryant appeals his convictions for malice murder, burglary, and arson in the first degree in connection with the death of Edith Ann Haynes and the burglary and arson of her mobile home. Bryant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence; certain rulings regarding the admission of evidence; the allowance of an in-court demonstration; and the effectiveness of trial counsel. For the reasons which follow, the challenges are without merit, and we affirm.¹

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdicts, it showed that Bryant entered into an agreement to purchase the house of Edith Ann Haynes, his co-worker. Bryant was to pay off Haynes's two mortgages on the house, make minor repairs to her purchased mobile home, move her into the mobile home, and pay her $25,000 in return for the house. Bryant had begun making repairs to the mobile home by the spring of 2000. He eventually asked Haynes for a deed to the house, stating that he would return it along with the balance of his payment. A warranty deed was executed on June 3, 2000, and filed of record on October 20, 2000, but Bryant did not make the promised payment.

After Bryant did not return her messages for more than a month, Haynes gave him an ultimatum that she would sell to another interested buyer unless he paid. Bryant responded by giving Haynes a check. They eventually agreed to go to the bank on November 15, 2000 to cash the check and finalize the transaction. Bryant had repeatedly requested that Haynes delay cashing the check because of his financial difficulties. Checks he had written in previous months had been dishonored. His application for a hardship withdrawal from his 401(k) account had been denied. After receiving the check, Haynes sustained a head injury from falling boards. Haynes believed that Bryant intentionally caused the boards to fall on her. It was not until November 2001, a year after Haynes's death, that Bryant paid the $25,000 to her estate.

At 11:00 a.m. on November 15, 2000, Bryant was seen arriving at Haynes's mobile home. He was also seen there around 12:30 p.m. His white truck was still parked there at 2:45 p.m. At one point, when he earlier left the scene, Bryant appeared agitated. He slammed the door to the mobile home, "stomped" to his truck, slammed the door of the truck, and spun his tires. Although two witnesses placed Bryant at Haynes's mobile home, he had told his then-wife that he was going elsewhere.

At 8:15 p.m., police dispatched an officer to the mobile home park to investigate a 911 hangup call. The officer observed Haynes's mobile home on fire. After the fire was extinguished, Haynes's body was found inside the mobile home. She was lying face down in the bathroom. The front of her clothing and the floor underneath her were not burned. Her body had sustained first and second degree burns, but there also were contusions not explained by the burns. She had swelling and bruising of her lips, right eye, and chest. A cheek was discolored. There were three abrasions on her neck, and petechia in her eyes and trachea. A neck bone was broken. She had hemorrhaging around her thyroid. The insignificant amount of carbon monoxide in her blood indicated that she had died before the fire started. The medical examiner determined the cause of her death to be manual strangulation.

A fire analysis expert investigating the mobile home fire concluded that the fire had spread due to flammable liquid poured in the bathroom, hall, and living room. The expert noted the heavy burn pattern in these areas. The aluminum base of the front door had melted, which was unusual due to the high melting point of aluminum and the tendency of heat to rise. Lab tests revealed that gasoline was under the threshold of the front door.

A search of Bryant's home yielded evidence of fire-related activity. The house had been soaked with water, although there was no obvious source. The police found fuse wire, lighter fluid, wax, candles, matches, and the partially-burned drivers license of an ex-wife. Bryant had certificates for the completion of firefighting courses in connection with his role in the fire brigade at his place of work. These courses taught fire ignition and arson awareness, including training in delayed-ignition devices constructed from household items. The search also yielded three letters between Bryant and an attorney who dealt with criminal matters. One letter, dated February 11, 2001, three months after the incident and ten months before Bryant's arrest, was titled, "State versus Michael Wayne Bryant, Jr." Two other letters dealt with money owed by Bryant to Haynes's estate.

Bryant's former home was destroyed by fire in 1995. In August 1994, Bryant's then-wife, Melissa Carter, found him playing with fuse wire. On January 3, 1995, Bryant insisted that she take their dog and spend the night with her parents. The home burned that night. Carter later learned that Bryant had begun renting an apartment in December 1994, a month before the fire. She also discovered that he had retained some of his belongings which would have been destroyed in the fire. The couple used the insurance proceeds to pay debts.

1. Bryant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for malice murder and arson because the prosecution presented a purely circumstantial case and he had an uncontradicted alibi that he was with his wife at the time of the murder and fire. However, it is the jury that determines the credibility of the witnesses, and it was authorized to disbelieve the alibi testimony. Daniels v. State, 281 Ga. 226, 228-229(2), 637 S.E.2d 403 (2006). What is more, questions about the reasonableness of hypotheses are generally for the jury's determination, and where the jury is authorized to find that the evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of the defendant's guilt, this Court does not disturb such finding unless the verdict of guilty is insupportable as a matter of law. Id. And that is not the situation in this case. The State presented evidence of Bryant's motive and opportunity for the killing as well as for the fire; also, any alleged alibi regarding the time frame of the fire is readily explained by the possibility of the use of a delayed-ignition device.

The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Bryant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the malice murder of Haynes and arson in the first degree. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. Bryant likewise contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for burglary because there was not sufficient evidence of a lack of authority to enter Haynes's dwelling, and in fact, he had permission to enter the mobile home to conduct repairs. But, the contention is unavailing. Certainly, a conviction for burglary requires, inter alia, the lack of authority to enter the dwelling. OCGA § 16-7-1. However, circumstantial evidence can suffice to prove the lack of authority. Jones v. State, 258 Ga. 25, 27(1), 365 S.E.2d 263 (1988). Here, Haynes was found partially dressed in the bathroom, apparently having used the lavatory immediately before her death. A reasonable inference is that her murderer intruded on her privacy. Moreover, a witness testified that Haynes had recently refused to give Bryant a new key to her mobile home. Thus, the jury was authorized to find that even if Bryant at some point had permission to enter the mobile home, he no longer did at the time of the murder and arson. The evidence of Bryant's burglary of Haynes's mobile home was sufficient as a matter of law. Jackson v. Virginia, supra.

3. Bryant next contends that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the State to present evidence about his prior house fire as a similar transaction. Similar transaction evidence must satisfy three elements to be admitted: (1) the evidence must be introduced for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant perpetrated the similar transaction; and (3) the two transactions must be sufficiently similar or connected so that the existence of the former transaction tends to prove the latter transaction. Freeman v. State, 268 Ga. 185, 188(4), 486 S.E.2d 348 (1997); Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642(2)(b), 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991). Bryant argues that the evidence was introduced for an improper purpose because it was used to show motive, when motive was not at issue, that the State failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he burned down his former home, and that the State failed to prove a sufficient nexus between the two fires because there were insufficient similarities. But, the arguments are without merit.

The trial court found that the evidence was admissible to show motive and course of conduct, which in general are proper purposes for such evidence. Biggs v. State, 281 Ga. 627, 628-29(2), 642 S.E.2d 74 (2007). Nevertheless, Bryant urges that motive is an improper purpose for introduction of the evidence in his case as it was in Banks v. State, 216 Ga.App. 326, 328, 454 S.E.2d 784 (1995). In Banks, the trial court permitted evidence of an earlier incident involving kidnapping and robbery as a similar transaction to the aggravated assault with intent to commit robbery on trial in order to "prove...