Bryant v. State

• Decision Date: 14 January 2010
• Docket Number: No. CR 08–1033.,CR 08–1033.
• Citation: 377 S.W.3d 152,2010 Ark. 7
• Parties: Lloyal Willie BRYANT, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

2010 Ark. 7

377 S.W.3d 152

Lloyal Willie BRYANT, Appellant,

v.STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR 08–1033.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Jan. 14, 2010.

Michael Scott Hodson, Wendy R. Howerton, Fayetteville, AR, for appellant.

Eileen W. Harrison, Little Rock, AR, for appellee.

JIM GUNTER, Justice.

Appellant Lloyal Willie Bryant appeals his conviction of two counts of rape and two counts of second-degree sexual assault for which he was sentenced to life plus forty years to run concurrently. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred (1) in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during interrogation; (2) in admitting into evidence letters he wrote to his wife while incarcerated; (3) in allowing testimony regarding a prior sexual-assault offense; and (4) in denying his motion for directed verdict. Because this is a criminal appeal in which life imprisonment has been imposed, this court has jurisdiction under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1–2(a)(2). We affirm on all points.

On April 28, 2007, the Boone County Sheriff's Office was called to appellant's mobile home in Lead Hill, where he lived with his wife and stepchildren, to investigate a domestic disturbance. During that investigation, five-year-old C.H. alleged that appellant had sexually abused him. Appellant was arrested, and two days later Detective Troy Walker interviewed him regarding the allegations of sexual abuse. Following that interview, appellant was charged with two counts each of rape and sexual assault in the second degree.

Prior to trial, appellant filed several motions, including: (1) a motion to suppress his statement made to Detective Walker alleging that it was involuntary and coerced in violation of his constitutional rights; (2) a motion in limine to exclude letters appellant wrote to his wife while incarcerated because they were more prejudicial than probative under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 403; (3) a motion in limine pursuant to Rule 609(a) to prevent the State from using a prior sexual-assault conviction to impeach appellant because the prior conviction was more prejudicial than probative; and (4) a motion in limine based on Arkansas Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b) to exclude testimony regarding appellant's prior crimes as more prejudicial than probative and because the introduction of the prior conviction was to show appellant's bad character.¹

Appellant's trial began on April 28, 2008. His twenty-one-year-old stepdaughter, Brittany Bailey, testified that she was at the home the day the police arrested appellant. She stated that appellant was intoxicated that day and that he was arguing with her sister Belinda. Appellant had accused Belinda of molesting her brother, C.H., and Brittany explained that the argument escalated and that appellant “spit in her face.” Brittany stated that she talked to C.H. alone and that his story was inconsistent with appellant's version. She stated that C.H. indicated that appellant had been the abuser.

C.H., at the time six years old, testified that he lived with appellant and thought of him as a father. C.H. stated that while he lived with appellant—who C.H. identified as the defendant sitting in the courtroom—appellant touched him inappropriately on his “wiener” and “bottom.” C.H. accurately located these areas on a diagram of body parts. He stated that appellant touched him with his hand, his arm, and his mouth. C.H. testified that appellant “sucked on” his “wiener.” C.H. also said that he was forced to put appellant's penis in his mouth and that “white stuff came out.”

The State called Detective Walker to testify regarding his interrogation of appellant. Appellant objected to the introduction of the confession on the basis that the detective only mirandized appellant once during the six-hour interview and that when appellant indicated he wished to cease the interview, the detective did not honor that request. The court stated that it had “ruled on it, so I'll just show it as a continuing objection.”

Detective Walker testified that prior to the interrogation, he read appellant his rights, using the form required by the sheriff's office, and that appellant indicated he could read, write, and had received an equivalency diploma after finishing the tenth grade. Detective Walker noted that the interview began just before noon and lasted approximately six hours, with three or four breaks during its course. Upon questioning appellant regarding C.H.'s allegations, appellant's response was that the child was lying. When the detective asked appellant about specific events, he stated that he did not remember and continued to deny he abused the child. After Detective Walker and appellant viewed the videotaped interview of C.H., appellant said that he had never touched C.H. and that if he had been abused, someone else did it. The interrogation then turned to appellant's excessive drinking, and Detective Walker asked appellant if he could have inappropriately touched C.H. while he was drunk. Appellant stated that “[i]f it happened, I don't remember none of it.” Appellant admitted that he was an alcoholic and that if C.H. was telling the truth, “I don't remember if it did happen.” Appellant also expressed that “[i]t's tearing me up right now. It's hurts [sic] me to know that I could do something like that with him.” The detective then questioned appellant about his history of being sexually abused by his own father. Appellant admitted that his father had molested him and that he occasionally dreamt about the abuse. At one point, appellant stated that “I'm not denying it didn't happen, it—more than likely, it has happened but I [inaudible] dreams about my dad.” Thereafter, the following colloquy occurred:

Detective Walker: We don't have to wait Willie.

Appellant: Troy, I don't remember it.

Detective Walker: Yes, you do.

Appellant: No, I don't.

Detective Walker: Yes, you do. Stop, I'm not going to hear it.

Appellant: Okay, then we're through with [inaudible] this interview then.

Detective Walker: Be quiet.

Appellant: I can't answer it, I can't admit something ...

Detective Walker: He needs your support Willie.

Appellant: I know and I'm ...

Detective Walker continued to question appellant, and he continued to deny the allegations. Detective Walker described appellant's demeanor throughout the interview as “stoic,” showing “no emotion,” and like a “statue.” The detective stated that appellant never seemed offended, even when the detective used profanity to attempt to elicit an emotional response. Detective Walker noticed tears in appellant's eyes at one point during the discussion of his own abuse by his father.

A deputy with the Boone County Sheriff's Office testified that he served as jailer while appellant was incarcerated prior to trial. The deputy testified that appellant wrote two letters to his wife. Brittany Bailey was recalled to testify regarding letters received at her residence for her mother. She stated that she had seen appellant's handwriting several times during the three years she lived with him. She indicated that she had no doubt the letters were from appellant. Appellant objected to the introduction of the letters on the basis that they were more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403 and that the State had failed to lay a proper foundation. The court allowed the letters but noted appellant's continuing objection. Brittany testified that in one of the letters, appellant wrote that “God, I wish I could turn back this, turn back time but I can't. Everything happens for a reason. This has opened up my eyes to see where I'm going. The one I need to show is [C.H.]. If I did touch him.” He also indicated in the letter that when he got out the family should move to Missouri where “DHS don't follow you.”

Thirteen-year-old C.L. was also called to testify. He stated that appellant's wife babysat him when he was younger and that during that time, appellant touched him inappropriately. C.L. indicated that during the time of the abuse, he often stayed the night at appellant's home and that he spent significant time with appellant. C.L. described how appellant “would mess with our penises and our butts. He would play with our penises. He would feel our butts and put his finger in it.” He said that it happened more than once and that appellant “put his penis on us and inside our butts.” C.L. stated that he touched appellant's penis and “semen came out.” C.L. testified that appellant was normally intoxicated during the abuse. C.L.'s mother testified that her son's allegations were investigated and that appellant pled guilty and received nine months' incarceration. Appellant objected to the testimony on the basis of Rules 404(b) and 403 as highly inflammable. He maintained that the rape charge was a “strict liability” crime and that the State had enough proof through C.H.'s testimony alone to convict on the rape and sexual-assault charges so that it did not need the additional testimony. The State responded that whether there was adequate proof was a decision for the jury. The court found that it had previously ruled on the admissibility of the testimony and that it would be allowed.

The State rested, and appellant chose not to testify in his own defense. Appellant moved for directed verdict on the basis that the State failed to offer any evidence to show sexual gratification, which appellant argues was necessary to prove rape and second-degree sexual assault; that there was no physical evidence of abuse; that C.H.'s testimony was not credible nor sufficient alone to sustain a conviction; that the State failed to prove two counts of rape and two counts of sexual assault rather than a continuing course of conduct; that appellant was forced to forfeit an opportunity to testify in his own defense else be impeached by his prior offense; and that if sentenced as a habitual rape offender, appellant would receive a life sentence without ever addressing the jury. The court denied the motion. The jury...