Bryant v. State

Decision Date15 June 1978
Docket NumberNo. 277S131,277S131
Citation376 N.E.2d 1123,268 Ind. 498
PartiesLeroy BRYANT, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

William C. Erbecker, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Alembert W. Brayton, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, Justice.

Appellant Bryant was charged with the first-degree murder of one David Williams Jr. At the conclusion of a jury trial in the Marion Criminal Court on August 31, 1976, appellant was found guilty of second-degree murder. He was sentenced to a term of not less than fifteen nor more than twenty-five years.

Appellant raises two issues for our consideration in this appeal: (1) an alleged error in the failure of the police to take lie detector tests and paraffin tests of appellant, and; (2) sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the state's principal witness.

I.

Appellant claims that he asked the police to give him lie detector and paraffin tests. The purpose of the paraffin tests would have been to determine whether or not there were gun powder fragments on appellant's hands which would indicate if he had shot a gun recently. The police allegedly refused to give these requested tests. Appellant claims that this is tantamount to a suppression of evidence, as he is certain that both tests would show that he was innocent of this crime.

Police officers deny that appellant ever made reference to the taking of a lie detector test. They also testified that appellant did make some statement to them to the effect that, "don't they have some kind of test that can prove I'm innocent?," and that they then told appellant that there was no such test. Officer Patton of the Indianapolis police testified that paraffin tests are no longer used, and have been replaced by a neutron activation test. He said there would have been no point in taking this test at the time of appellant's arrest, since gunpowder tends to wash off very easily and could have been washed off by appellant within the couple of hours since the incident, and also since chemical reaction in the skin tends to wash gunpowder off in a very short time. Appellant's trial testimony relating to the request for the paraffin test is essentially the same as the police officers' testimony.

Appellant's contention that the refusal of these tests amounts to a suppression of evidence by the state has no merit. Appellant raised no such question at trial even though the above facts were testified to by the witnesses. The question of suppression has first been raised on appeal. Further, appellant could have submitted himself to a lie detector test had he wished to do so, and could have attempted to stipulate it into evidence, should it have been favorable to him. The speculative results of such test thus do not represent evidence peculiarly within the knowledge or possession of the state. Indeed, they do not represent evidence at all. The possibilities of whether or not paraffin or neutron activation tests might have helped establish any facts in the case are also speculative. The question presented under this issue is simply one concerning the weight or the credibility to be given to the police officers in their investigation and trial testimony. The jury heard all of this testimony, together with all of the other facts, and made its determination. No legal question is raised which can be considered by this court on appeal, nor is anything presented here which as a matter of law merits reversal of the judgment.

II.

Appellant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. He specifically contends that the testimony of the state's principal witness was not credible. Also, in the sufficiency context, appellant reargues the issue of the tests already discussed and disposed of in issue I of this opinion, supra. Those specific allegations relate to sufficiency and thus we discuss them together here.

The record before us shows that shortly after 11 o'clock p. m. on April 11, 1976, Indianapolis police were called to the home of one Vivian Boyce in the city of Indianapolis, and upon arrival found a black male lying on the front porch of the residence, apparently dead. It was later determined that the victim died from a .38 caliber bullet wound in the chest. Vivian Boyce was the girlfriend of the deceased, David Williams Jr. She was employed as a go-go dancer at the Silver Dollar Saloon at 34th and Arlington streets, which was partially owned by the victim's father, David Williams Sr. The victim, David Williams Jr., also worked part time at this saloon.

Several witnesses testified that on the day previous to the killing, April 10, 1976, the victim and appellant Bryant were involved in a fight at the Silver Dollar Saloon. After the fight was broken up by several of the men in the saloon, including the bartender, Barry Cole, and David Williams Sr., appellant was quoted as telling the victim, "I'm going to get you for this nigger." Vivian Boyce testified that appellant came to her home at about 10:30 p. m. on the night of the 11th, and demanded to know where David Williams Jr. was. She refused to tell him anything and asked him to leave. As he was leaving, there was a knock at the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases
  • Fox v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • January 30, 1979
    ...Ind., 376 N.E.2d 1129. Furthermore, this Court does not judge the credibility of witnesses nor weigh the evidence. Bryant v. State (1978), Ind., 376 N.E.2d 1123. While the Swing Bar was being closed, Officer Ellis, enroute back to his squad car, noticed suspicious-looking tools 8 on the rea......
  • Sizemore v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • January 29, 1979
    ... ...         Our Supreme Court has continued to recognize the vitality of case law which holds that equivocal and weak testimony may not attain the necessary quality of substantive evidence of probative value. See Wims v. State (1977), Ind., 370 N.E.2d 358; Bryant v. State (1978), Ind., 376 N.E.2d 1123 ...         Moreover, when more than one defendant is tried for the same offense, the State must bring the criminal act home to the Particular defendant. The fact of the crime is insufficient to find a particular defendant guilty without evidence ... ...
  • Sizemore v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • October 25, 1979
    ... ... The Court of Appeals concluded that the prosecutrix' testimony was equivocal, citing Wims v. State, (1977) Ind., 370 N.E.2d 358, and Bryant v. State, (1978) Ind., 376 N.E.2d 1123, for the proposition that equivocal or weak testimony may not attain the necessary quality of substantive evidence of probative value. The opinion concludes that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to convict Sizemore and Sandlin individually of ... ...
  • Prentice v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • February 18, 1985
    ... ... Bryant v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 498, 376 N.E.2d 1123. We reversed a criminal conviction based upon insufficient evidence when eyewitness testimony was characterized as "vacillating, contradictory, and uncertain." Gaddis v. State, (1969) 253 Ind. 73, 251 N.E.2d 658. The insufficiency determination was ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT