Bryant v. Turney
| Decision Date | 25 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 5:11-CV-00128-TBR |
| Parties | RICHARD BRYANT, individually and on behalf of THE ESTATE OF KIRA BRYANT PLAINTIFF v. JAMISON TURNEY, ET AL. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Dedra Turney's Motion to Dismiss. Def.'s Mot. Dismiss, Docket Number ("DN") 24. The Plaintiff has responded. Pl.'s Resp., DN 29. The Defendant has replied. Def.'s Reply, DN 35. This matter is now ripe for adjudication. Having considered the matter and being fully advised, the Defendant's motion is DENIED.
The facts underlying this matter give rise to a legal issue of first impression in Kentucky law. The Court must determine whether a beneficiary of an estate has standing to maintain a wrongful death action against parties and for claims that the estate's duly appointed personal representative has refused to pursue in a previously filed wrongful death action. In other words, where a personal representative has instituted a wrongful death action but has refused to pursue certain claims and parties, may a beneficiary bring a separate wrongful death action to pursue those claims and parties? Although an issue of first impression, Kentucky law is not entirely silent on the topic. In Kentucky, a beneficiary may bring a wrongful death action where the personal representative has altogether refused to bring such an action or where there is evidence of fraud or collusion between the personal representative and the potentially liable parties. Extending this principle to the facts of the present case, the Court holds that a beneficiary hasstanding to bring a wrongful death action for those claims and against those parties that the personal representative has refused to pursue in the underlying wrongful death action. This outcome is a logical extension of Kentucky law and would likely be reached by a Kentucky court considering the issue.
On June 13, 2011, 14-year-old Kira Bryant ("Kira"), was severely injured in a motorcycle accident in Paducah, Kentucky. At the time of the accident, Kira was a passenger on the motorcycle driven by her stepfather, Jamison Turney ("Jamison"). Although the details are still the subject of discovery, it is alleged that Jamison was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. The motorcycle was owned by Paducah Nissan, LLC ("Paducah Nissan"), Jamison's employer. Tragically, Kira succumbed to her injuries and died on June 14, 2011.
On July 5, 2011, Dedra Turney ("Dedra"), Kira's mother, was appointed administratrix and personal representative of her daughter's estate by the Probate Division of the McCracken Country District Court. On that same day she filed a wrongful death action against her husband, Jamison, in the McCracken County Circuit Court. She only alleged negligence against her husband, not gross negligence or recklessness, which would have allowed Dedra to seek punitive damages from Jamison. See State Ct. Compl., DN 29-5, ¶ 9; Am. State Ct. Compl., DN 24-7, ¶ 12.
On July 13, Kira's biological father, and plaintiff in the case at bar, Richard Bryant ("Richard"), petitioned to have Dedra removed and himself appointed as administrator of Kira's estate. Richard sought to remove Dedra for at least two reasons. First, Richard argued that Dedra had a conflict of interest that rendered her incapable of administering the estate because the wrongful death action was instituted against her current husband and any recovery beyondavailable insurance limits would be collected from Dedra and Jamison's marital assets. Second, the wrongful death action was insufficiently pled because it failed to name Paducah Nissan as a defendant.1
By order on July 19, 2011, the McCracken County District Court denied Richard's petition for removal. In a subsequent order clarifying its findings, the probate court affirmed its denial and found that Probate Ct. Order of Aug. 12, 2011, DN 24-6, p. 2.
Two days after the petition for removal was denied, Richard filed his original complaint in federal court, seeking to recover against Jamison, Paducah Nissan, and Dedra for loss of consortium with his minor daughter. On September 6, 2011, Richard amended his complaint and added a cause of action which alleges that Kira's wrongful death was directly and proximately caused by the Defendants' gross negligence and recklessness. The amended complaint also seeks damages for Kira's pain and suffering, medical bills, and funeral expenses.
Richard brought suit in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction found in 28 U.S.C § 1332. Richard is a citizen of Alabama. The Defendants are citizens of Kentucky. At the time of her death, Kira was also a citizen of Kentucky.
On November 17, 2011, Dedra moved to dismiss the first amended complaint. She asserts three grounds for dismissal. First, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case under the "probate exception" established in Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946). Second, diversity jurisdiction was destroyed when Richard sued for wrongful death "on behalf ofthe Estate of Kira Bryant." Finally, Richard is without standing to pursue a wrongful death action under Kentucky law because he has not been appointed administrator and personal representative of Kira's estate. The Court will consider each argument in turn.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party may file a motion to dismiss for "lack of subject-matter jurisdiction." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). "Subject matter jurisdiction is always a threshold determination," Am. Telecom Co. v. Leb., 501 F.3d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998)), and "may be raised at any stage in the proceedings," Schultz v. Gen. R.V. Ctr., 512 F.3d 754, 756 (6th Cir. 2008). "A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can either attack the claim of jurisdiction on its face, in which case all allegations of the plaintiff must be considered as true, or it can attack the factual basis for jurisdiction, in which case the trial court must weigh the evidence and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists." DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 516 (6th Cir. 2004). "A facial attack on the subject-matter jurisdiction alleged in the complaint questions merely the sufficiency of the pleading." Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Steel Peel Litig., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007). "A district court must generally confine its Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6) ruling to matters contained within the pleadings and accept all well-pleaded allegation as true." Tackett v. M&G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 481 (6th Cir. 2009). "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also Bauer v. RBX Indus. Inc., 368 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2004).
The Court does not lack subject-matter jurisdiction under the "probate exception" because, under Kentucky law, any recovery in a wrongful death action is not property of theestate. Rather, a wrongful death recovery accrues to the estate's beneficiaries, and the Court would not "interfere with probate proceedings" or exercise control of property in the custody of the state court by retaining jurisdiction in this case.
The probate exception is not statutory. It is a court-made rule first recognized in Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946). See Lepard v. NBD Bank, 384 F.3d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 2004) (). The exception has two components. First, "a federal court has no jurisdiction to probate a will or administer an estate . . . ." Markham, 326 U.S. at 494. Second:
[F]ederal courts of equity have jurisdiction to entertain suits "in favor of creditors, legatees and heirs" and other claimants against a decedent's estate "to establish their claims" so long as the federal court does not interfere with the probate court proceedings or assume general jurisdiction or control of the property in the custody of the state court.
Id. (citations omitted). In other words, where a federal court is not probating a will or administering an estate the court may retain jurisdiction so long as it "does not interfere" with the probate proceedings.
In Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311 (2006), the Supreme Court acknowledged that the "[l]ower courts have puzzled over the meaning of the words 'interfere with the probate proceedings,' and some have read those words to block federal jurisdiction over a range of matters well beyond probate of a will or administration of a decedent's estate." In an effort to clarify Markham's holding, the Marshall Court explained:
[W]e comprehend the 'interference' language in Markham as essentially a reiteration of the general principle that, when one court is exercising in rem jurisdiction over a res, a second court will not assume in rem jurisdiction over the same res. Thus, the probate exception reserves to state probate courts the probateor annulment of a will and the administration of a decedent's estate; it also precludes federal courts from endeavoring to dispose of property that is in the custody of a state probate court. But it does not bar federal courts from adjudicating matters outside those confines and otherwise within federal jurisdiction.
Id. at 311-12 (citations omitted). As Marshall clarified, the Markham probate exception applies only where a federal court: 1) seeks to probate a will, 2) attempts to...
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