Bryant v. Wilkes-Barre Hosp., Co.

• Decision Date: 17 November 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-1062
• Citation: 146 F.Supp.3d 628
• Parties: Aneesha Bryant, Plaintiff v. Wilkes-Barre Hospital, Company, LLC, Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

146 F.Supp.3d 628

Aneesha Bryant, Plaintiff

v.Wilkes-Barre Hospital, Company, LLC, Defendant

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-1062

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed November 17, 2015

Kimberly D. Borland, Borland & Borland, Wilkes-Barre, PA, for Plaintiff.

David E. Renner, Jackson Lewis, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, Sidney R. Steinberg, Post & Schell, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

MALACHY E. MANNION

, United States District Judge

Pending before the court is the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to all counts of the plaintiff's complaint, (Doc. 33), on the grounds that the undisputed facts demonstrate that plaintiff failed to establish her race discrimination in employment, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims. Based upon review of the briefs and the record, the court will DENY the defendant's motion with respect to all of plaintiff's claims since there are several disputed material facts.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

By way of relevant background, the plaintiff, Aneesha Bryant, filed the instant action, (Doc. 1), on June 2, 2014, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e , et seq .,

the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 , as well as state law, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 P.S. § 955. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 28 U.S.C. § 2202 . Plaintiff attached as exhibits (A & B) to her complaint a copy of her November 26, 2012 Charge of Discrimination she filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”), (Doc. 1, at 24-29, Ex. A), and a copy of her August 28, 2012 resignation letter from her employment with defendant to Lisa Cernera, the Director of Surgery, (Doc. 1, at 29, Ex. B). The defendant is plaintiff's prior employer, Wilkes-Barre Hospital Company, LLC (“WBHC”), doing business as Wilkes-Barre General Hospital (the “Hospital”), located on North River Street, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.

In Count I of her complaint, plaintiff raises a claim of race discrimination in violation of Title VII. In Count II, plaintiff raises a claim of race discrimination under § 1981

. In Count III, plaintiff raises a retaliation claim under Title VII, and in Count IV, she asserts a retaliation claim under § 1981. In Count V, plaintiff raises a claim of race discrimination under § 955(a) of the PHRA. In Count VI, plaintiff raises a claim of retaliation under § 955(d) of the PHRA. In Count VII, plaintiff raises a claim of racial harassment under Title VII, and in Count VIII (mislabeled as Count VII), plaintiff asserts a claim of racial harassment under § 1981. Finally, in Count IX, plaintiff raises a claim of racial harassment under § 955(a) of the PHRA.

As relief, plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that defendant engaged in discrimination in violation of state and federal law, a permanent injunction enjoining defendant from discriminating against its employees based on their race, back pay, front pay, compensatory and punitive damages, as well as costs and attorneys' fees.

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's federal claims based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331

and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) , and on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) . The court can exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff's pendent state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 . Venue is proper in this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 since the alleged unlawful employment practices occurred in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

After defendant was served, it filed an original motion to dismiss the complaint on July 21, 2014, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)

, and argued, in part, that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her race-based discrimination, harassment and retaliation claims under Title VII and the PHRA. Subsequently, defendant was advised by plaintiff that she received a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC dated July 15, 2014. Thus, defendant withdrew its original motion to dismiss. (Doc. 9). On July 22, 2014, defendant filed an amended motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), 12(f), and 12(e). (Doc. 10). On February 10, 2015, the court denied defendant's amended motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. (Docs. 23, 24). Defendant filed its answer to the complaint with affirmative defenses on March 2, 2015. (Doc. 27).

After discovery, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56

, with respect to all of plaintiff's claims on July 8, 2015. (Doc. 33). On July 14, 2015, defendant filed its statement of material facts with exhibits, (Doc. 34), and its brief in support on July 22, 2015, (Doc. 35). On August 17, 2015, plaintiff filed her response to defendant's statement of material facts with exhibits and her counter statement of material facts, (Doc. 36), and her brief in opposition to defendant's motion, (Doc. 37). Defendant filed its reply brief on August 31, 2015, (Doc. 38). Plaintiff, with leave of court, filed a sur reply brief on September 18, 2015, (Doc. 41). As such, defendant's motion for summary judgment is ripe for disposition.

As indicated, plaintiff submitted a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC and the PHRC signed on November 26, 2012, alleging discrimination, harassment, retaliation and constructive discharge due to race, color and national origin. (Doc. 1, at 24-29, Ex. A). Plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC dated July 15, 2014.¹

II. MATERIAL FACTS²

Plaintiff, an African-American, began her employment with defendant in March of 2009, as a part-time Operating Room Scheduling Specialist. During her employment with defendant, plaintiff was one of three Operating Room Scheduling Specialists. At all relevant times, the Scheduling Specialists, including plaintiff, were physically located in the Hospital's Ambulatory Surgery Center (“ASC”). Specifically, in October 2010, the Hospital's Operating Room Scheduling Specialists' work location was moved from the main hospital building to the Hospital's ASC. (Doc. 34-3). Plaintiff was the only person of color who worked in the ASC. Plaintiff did not recall having any duties and responsibilities within the ASC. Plaintiff was responsible for the scheduling of surgeries in the main operating rooms of the Hospital as well as in the Hospital's Center for Same Day Surgery (“CSDS”). The Scheduling Specialists did not have any supervisory duties.

Plaintiff's scheduling work was performed on a computer provided by the Hospital and she also used paper documentation to perform her duties. Plaintiff had the complete operating room schedule electronically on her computer. As a Scheduling Specialist, plaintiff's job duties consisted of taking phone calls from physicians or their staff to schedule surgeries in one of the Hospital's main operating rooms or in the CSDS and then scheduling the requested surgery in an available operating room at an available time with the appropriate Hospital staff. The Scheduling Specialists would also make the surgery schedules available for the staff, including the schedules for the main operating rooms and the same day surgery center. The schedules for both were available to plaintiff on her computer screen but at times she needed a paper version of the schedule when there was a change, such as if a surgery was canceled and another one was re-scheduled. At times, the cancellation may have been noted on a piece of paper and it was later placed on the computer. The schedule was clearer when it was printed in paper version since it would show which doctor was in what room at one time, how many doctors were scheduled in that operating room, what time the surgery was, and what time the surgery was going to end. Also, the boxes on the computer version of the schedule were very small and one could not see what type of surgery was occurring in the operating room. However, when the schedule was printed, you could see the type of surgery to be performed.

Additionally, nurses who worked at night in the Hospital's operating room may have to change a surgery on the schedule when directed to do so by the doctor and they would just write down the change on paper since they did not know how to manage the schedule on the computer. The next morning when the paper message was delivered to the Scheduling Specialists, the change in the schedule would then be placed into the computer. Plaintiff was also responsible for transcribing the data from the written operating room report into the computer and for filing the report in the surgery folder for that particular day.

At times, plaintiff would receive a fax request from a doctor's office to schedule surgery and an operating room. She would also receive a marked-up paper copy of the schedule from the night before and be required to input or delete information on the operating room schedule.

Ms. Cernera was plaintiff's immediate supervisor at all relevant times. Cernera was the Hospital's Director of Surgery since October 2012. (Doc. 34-3). Michael Padden, RN, was the Hospital's Director of the ASC since February 2011, and he reported to Cernera. The following personnel reported directly to Padden: the secretary/scheduler for the ASC; two pre-op nurses; four recovery room nurses; four surgical technicians; and four operating room nurses. None of the personnel who reported to Padden had any supervisory duties. Plaintiff did not ever report to Padden. The Scheduling Specialists physically worked in the ASC but they reported directly to Cernera. Padden had no authority to direct any work of the Scheduling Specialists. If the secretary/scheduler for the ASC, who reported to Padden, was absent, the Scheduling Specialists would assist and schedule a case for one of the operating rooms at the ASC.

In August of 2012, Maureen Gaydosh was the secretary/scheduler for the ASC and she reported to Padden. Padden and plaintiff worked in the same building and in the same...