Bryce v. Cayce

• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: GARY, A. J.
• Citation: Bryce v. Cayce, 62 S.C. 546, 40 S.E. 948 (S.C. 1902)
• Decision Date: 25 February 1902
• Parties: BRYCE v. CAYCE et al.

40 S.E. 948

62 S.C. 546

BRYCE v. CAYCE et al.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

February 25, 1902

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Lexington county; Gage Judge.

Action by John Campbell Bryce against R. W. G. Cayce and James Cayce. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Wm. H Lyles and D. W. Robinson, for appellant . P. H Nelson, G. T. Graham, and J. S. Muller, for appellees.

GARY A. J.

This action was commenced on the 8th August, 1895, for the recovery of a tract of land, and resulted in a verdict for the defendants. As the questions raised by the exceptions are dependent to a great extent on the issues in the case, we desire to call special attention to the pleadings. The complaint is in the usual form, and alleges that the plaintiff is the owner and entitled to the immediate possession of the land therein described; that the defendants are in possession thereof, and wrongfully withhold the same from the plaintiff. The defendants, in their answer to the complaint, deny each and every allegation thereof and set up the following defenses: "For a second defense: (1) Allege that neither the plaintiff, nor his predecessors, ancestors, or grantors, has been in possession or has had any right, title, or interest in and to the premises at issue under the pretended title by virtue of which he claims to be the owner thereof for twenty years and more next preceding the commencement of said action, but that these defendants, their predecessors, ancestors, and grantors, have for the same period of time been in undisturbed, peaceable, continuous, and hostile possession of the same against the pretended title of said plaintiff, those under whom he claims, and all the world. (2) And these defendants further make answer that they, their ancestors, predecessors, and grantors, have been for the ten years next preceding the commencement of this action in the continuous, uninterrupted, hostile, and adverse possession of the land in question against the pretended title of the plaintiff, his predecessors, grantors, and ancestors, as well as all other persons under whom he claims title therein." The plaintiff relied upon the following sources from which he claimed to have derived title: (1) From a judgment, and sale under execution issued thereon, against James Cayce, Sr., and a deed of conveyance made upon such sale, dated 4th October, 1847, by the sheriff of Lexington district to John Bryce. Deed recorded 16th November, 1847, and again in 1901. (2) The codicil to the will of John Bryce, dated 28th July, 1853, probated and executor qualified December, 1855. The codicil contains the following provision: "The plaintation and mill in Lexington district, near what was formerly West Granby, formerly the property of James Cayce, but sold by Isaac Vansant, sheriff of Lexington district, at the suit of A. G. Sumter and B. R. Carroll, on the first Monday, 4th October, 1847, and bought in by me, having also an execution against Cayce for a debt of $1,900, which I had to pay as his indorser to the two banks in Columbia, and for which I have paid, first and last, its full value, for I had to take up a note of $770 to P. & R. Bryce, besides. This plantation I give, devise, and bequeath to my grandson John Campbell Bryce, and to his heirs, etc.; should he die without issue, then to go to his father and to his children precisely as the rest of my estate. Nevertheless it is my wish and desire that Mrs. Cayce be permitted to occupy the house and premises as she has hitherto done since the death of Mr. Cayce, and to plant, if she desires to do so, one-third of the cleared land, and to receive one-fourth of the toll of all the corn ground at the mill, as long as she determines to prefer this to a fair equivalent in money for her dower. I know my son will at all times be willing to make a fair and liberal arrangement with her, and this is my desire and wish." (3) The following agreement, dated 27th February, 1856, recorded 13th March, 1856, and again in 1901, to wit: "South Carolina, Richland District. Know all men by these presents that I, Elizabeth R. Cayce, widow of James Cayce, in consideration of being permitted by the executor of the late John Bryce and by his devisee, John Campbell Bryce, to occupy during my life the houses and the yards and gardens thereto attached in the premises below mentioned, and in consideration of the privilege of planting during my life sixty acres of average quality of the cleared land upon the said tract, and also of the sum of five hundred dollars to me secured to be paid by Campbell R. Bryce, executor of the last will and testament of John Bryce, deceased, have granted, bargained, and sold and released, and by these presents do grant, bargain, sell, remise, and release, unto the said John Campbell Bryce, the grandson and devisee of the said John Bryce, all my interests and estate of dower in and to that tract of land situate in Lexington district, in the state aforesaid, whereon I now live, formerly the property of my late husband, James Cayce, and purchased at sheriff's sale by the late John Bryce, and conveyed to him by Sheriff Vansant on the 4th October, 1847, to wit, a tract of land containing about five hundred acres, near old Granby, on the State road, and on the south side of the Congaree river, and bounded by lands of Henry Arthur, Rachel Hayne, or Alexander R. Taylor, and others, now or formerly. To have and to hold, all and singular, my right, title, and estate of dower or of any other kind in and to the said premises to him, the said John Campbell Bryce, his heirs and assigns, forever. And I hereby covenant and agree to and with the said John Campbell Bryce to hold the said lands for the benefit of himself and his heirs and assigns during the period of my life, and subject to my use thereof as herein is first above recited, releasing my right of dower and other interests I may have in said lands, and disclaiming to hold the said lands, or any part thereof or any interest therein, by adverse possession. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this twenty-seventh day of February, Anno Domini 1856. Elizabeth Rea Cayce. [ Seal.] Signed, sealed, and delivered in the presence of Robert Bryce, Jno. F. Speck." (4) The will of Elizabeth R. Cayce, dated 14th April, 1874, probated 7th August, 1876, and under which R. W. G. Cayce duly qualified as executor, as follows: "*** Second. Inasmuch as there is now pending in the courts of this state a question of ownership of a certain tract of land on Congaree river, in Lexington county, about one and a half miles below the Columbia bridge, containing five hundred acres of land, more or less, bounded on the north by Arthur's, south by Taylor's, west by Arthur's land, and east by the Congaree river, it is my will and desire, if the courts should decide the aforesaid question of ownership in my favor, that the said tract of land be equally divided between my three children, James Cayce, Jane Stingley, widow of the late James Stingley, of the state of Mississippi, and R. W. G. Cayce, to them and their heirs forever, share and share alike. *** Lastly, I hereby nominate, constitute and appoint my sons, James Cayce and R. W. G. Cayce, executors of this, my last will and testament. ***" The defendant, R. W. G. Cayce, claimed title from R. W. Gibbes by adverse possession and under certain judicial proceedings described in the record.

The plaintiff made a motion for a new trial on the following grounds: "(1) It is respectfully suggested that there is no evidence in the case tending to prove that notice or knowledge of the adverse character of defendant's possession upon the lands in controversy was brought home to the knowledge of the plaintiff as much as ten years prior to the commencement of the action. (2) It is respectfully suggested that, according to the undisputed record and admitted evidence, the defendant is estopped to claim under what is termed in the case the 'Gibbes deed,' or to claim title to the land under any other title and possession save and except through, from, and under his mother, and charged with the duties and trusts with which she was charged; his possession did not and could not become adverse to the plaintiff until he brought home to plaintiff notice or knowledge of his disclaimer of said trust, and of his adverse holding; and that it was erroneous to submit to the jury, upon the evidence, the question as to whether the defendant had held possession of said land adversely, either under the Gibbes deed or otherwise, sufficiently long to ripen his title prior to the commencement of the action. (3) It appearing by the undisputed testimony that the defendant R. W. Cayce was a child of tender years, residing upon the premises in question with his mother, who was a widow at the time of the execution of the deed whereby she covenanted to hold the premises for the benefit of the plaintiff, John Campbell Bryce, and that he continued to live on said premises with his mother until her death, and by her will he was appointed executor, and qualified as such, and that he became, by substitution as such executor, a party to the suit to which he had been made defendant, it is respectfully submitted that his possession could not have become adverse to the right of John Campbell Bryce, for whom his mother held under said deed, until he had brought home to said John Campbell Bryce knowledge of the adverse character of his holding, and that there is no evidence that such knowledge had ever been brought home to said John Campbell Bryce."

In disposing of the motion, his honor signed the following order: "This is a motion for a new trial. The motion was not argued until 13th May, at Columbia. The subject of the action was a parcel of...