Brydger v. Wolfe

• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: STEVENSON, J.
• Citation: Brydger v. Wolfe, 847 So.2d 1074 (Fla. App. 2003)
• Decision Date: 11 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 4D02-552.,4D02-552.
• Parties: Gordon C. BRYDGER, P.A., Appellant, v. Adrienne Victoria WOLFE and Larry C. Wolfe, Appellees.

847 So.2d 1074

Gordon C. BRYDGER, P.A., Appellant, v. Adrienne Victoria WOLFE and Larry C. Wolfe, Appellees.

No. 4D02-552.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 11, 2003.

Carin M. Porras of the Law Offices of Gordon C. Brydger, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Victoria A. Calebrese of Lewis Kapner, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee Larry C. Wolfe.

Martin H. Colin of the Law Offices of Martin H. Colin, Lake Worth, for appellee Adrienne Victoria Wolfe.

STEVENSON, J.

Gordon C. Brydger, P.A., appeals an order denying its motion to satisfy an attorney's charging lien as untimely. We reverse. Because Brydger's notice of charging lien was filed in the original action prior to its termination, it was properly perfected. Additionally, Brydger promptly moved for a judgment on the charging lien once Brydger discovered that a final judgment had been entered without notice to him and without resolving the charging lien issue. We remand so that the trial court can determine the proper amount of the charging lien and impose the judgment against any responsible parties.

On April 25, 2000, Brydger filed a notice and claim for attorney's charging lien and money judgment to secure fees owed by former wife, Adrienne Victoria Wolfe, in her dissolution action against former husband, Larry Charles Wolfe. A copy of the notice was sent to James M. Henderson, Esq., who was counsel for former husband at the time, and to former wife, who was then pro se.

On June 14, 2000, Brydger noticed Henderson and former wife that the claim for attorney's charging lien and money judgment was set for an August 3, 2000 hearing. On June 30, 2000, by stipulation of counsel, Attorney Victoria A. Calebrese, Esq., was substituted as counsel of record for former husband. Following former husband's change of counsel, the hearing set for August 3, 2000, was re-noticed for September 29, 2000. Notice resetting the hearing was sent to Henderson, now former husband's ex-counsel, and to former wife.

At the September 29, 2000 hearing, the court orally granted the motion for charging lien, reserved jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of the fees, and ordered Brydger to submit a proposed order reflecting its oral ruling. Neither former husband nor his counsel, Calebrese, attended the hearing, however, former wife was present and represented herself.

Three days later, on October 2, 2000, former wife and her new counsel, Eric S. Glatter, Esq., who was retained during the three-day period following the hearing, went to mediation with former husband and Calebrese. Brydger was not given notice of the mediation. The parties reached an agreement at mediation which provided for a Plan A and a contingent Plan B. Plan B contemplated that both parties would pay Brydger's fees for his representation of former wife.

On October 17, 2000, a final judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered by the court incorporating the mediation settlement agreement reached by the parties and reserving jurisdiction to enter orders relating to the enforcement of charging liens. On November 14, 2000, following entry of the final judgment, the court rendered its written order on Brydger's motion it had orally granted on September 29, 2000, finding that Brydger was entitled to a charging lien.

In January of 2001, Brydger filed a motion claiming that he had just been made aware that the parties proceeded to final judgment without resolving his charging lien and sought an order determining the amount of charging lien and order satisfying the charging lien. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court declined to determine the amount of the charging lien or require satisfaction of the charging lien on the grounds that the order granting the charging lien was untimely because it was filed on November 14, 2000, after the final judgment had been entered and because it had not reserved jurisdiction to enter such an order in the final judgment.

There is a fundamental difference between the perfection of a charging lien and the imposition of the lien on certain proceeds or property after it has been perfected. See Brown v. Vermont Mut. Ins. Co., 614 So.2d 574, 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). "`There are no requirements for perfecting a charging lien beyond timely notice.'" Id. (quoting Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik v. Baucom, 428 So.2d 1383, 1385 (Fla.1983))(emphasis in original).

Thus, all that is required to entitle the attorney to perfect a charging lien "is for the attorney to file the notice of lien or otherwise pursue the lien in the original action" prior to its termination. Hannah v. Elder, 545 So.2d 503, 504 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). So long as the notice of lien is filed before the case goes to final judgment or is dismissed, "`The lien is chargeable against any person who, at the time

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