Bryson v. Crown Oil Co.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1916
• Docket Number: No. 22683.,22683.
• Citation: 112 N.E. 1,185 Ind. 156
• Parties: BRYSON et al. v. CROWN OIL CO. et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

185 Ind. 156

112 N.E. 1

BRYSON et al.

v.CROWN OIL CO. et al.

No. 22683.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 31, 1916.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Madison County; Charles K. Bagot, Judge.

Action by Lucy M. Troyer and others against the Crown Oil Company and others, with cross-complaint by defendant Crown Oil Company against the other parties to the action, seeking to quiet its title, and against David A. Bryson and others for damages. Judgment for defendant Crown Oil Company against plaintiffs, and against David A. Bryson and others for damages, and Bryson and others appeal. Affirmed.

Condo & Browne, of Marion, and Simmons & Dailey and Frank C. Dailey, all of Bluffton, for appellants. R. W. McBride, of Indianapolis, and Blacklidge, Wolf & Barnes, of Kokomo, for appellees.

SPENCER, J.

This proceeding has its origin in an action commenced in the Grant circuit court on June 20, 1901, by all of the appellees, except the Crown Oil Company, to quiet title to certain land in Grant county as against an oil lease contract thereon which was held by the Crown Oil Company through assignment from its codefendants. The Crown Oil Company subsequently filed a cross-complaint against the other parties to the action, to quiet its title to the rights granted by said lease contract, and to recover damages from the appellants herein for oil taken by them from wells which they had drilled on the land in question under another lease contract. Such further proceedings were had as resulted in a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their complaint and against the Crown Oil Company on its cross-complaint, but on appeal the judgment was reversed by this court (New American, etc., Co. v. Troyer, 166 Ind. 402, 76 N. E. 253, 77 N. E. 739), and the cause remanded for a new trial. A change of venue was then taken to the Madison circuit court, and such proceedings there had as resulted in a judgment in favor of the Crown Oil Company and against appellants in the sum of $18,083.90 as damages, and against the other appellees on their complaint. This appeal follows, and presents generally the question as to the proper measure of damages in cases of this character.

[1][2] It has been held that one who willfully and intentionally takes ore, timber, or other property from the land of another must respond in damages for the full value of the property taken, at the time of the conversion, without any deduction for the labor bestowed or expense incurred in removing and preparing it for the market; but that if he commits the wrongful act unintentionally, or by mistake, or in the honest belief that he is acting within his legal rights, the measure of liability is the value of the property taken, less what it costs to produce it. Campbell v. Smith, 180 Ind. 159, 171, 101 N. E. 89;Kahle v. Crown Oil Co., 180 Ind. 133, 146, 100 N. E. 681.

[3] Appellants rely on this statement of the general rule and assert that its proper application precludes the allowance of interest as an element of recovery, particularly when the defendants have acted in good faith, which the trial court has found specially to be the fact in this case. Assuming that in the reported decisions expressions may be found which suggest that the amount of the judgment in a case of this character must be limited to the actual value of the property taken, at the time of its conversion, it should be remembered that such statements are to be construed in the light of the questions actually under consideration in the given case.

[4][5] In reference generally to the question of interest it is stated in Richards v. Citizens' Nat. Gas Co., 130 Pa. 37, 39, 18 Atl. 600, that:

“Interest as such is recoverable only where there is a failure to pay a liquidated sum due at a fixed day, and the debtor is in absolute default. It cannot therefore be recovered in actions of tort, or in actions of any kind where the damages are not, in their nature, capable of exact computation, both as to time and amount. In such cases the party chargeable cannot pay or make tender until both the time and the amount have been ascertained, and his default is not therefore of that absolute nature that necessarily involves interest for the delay. But there are cases sounding in tort, and cases of unliquidated damages, where not only the principle on which the recovery is to be had is compensation, but where also the compensation can be measured by market value, or other definite standards. Such are cases of the unintentional conversion or destruction of property, etc. Into these cases the element of time may enter as an important factor, and the plaintiff will not be fully compensated unless he receive, not only the value of his property, but receive it, as nearly as may be, as of the date of his loss. Hence it is that the jury may allow additional damages, in the nature of interest, for the lapse of time. It is never interest as such, nor as a...