Bryson v. State
| Decision Date | 26 April 1955 |
| Docket Number | 8 Div. 426 |
| Citation | 84 So.2d 782,38 Ala.App. 517 |
| Parties | Ola Mae BRYSON v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Appeals |
Bradshaw, Barnett & Haltom, Geo. E. Barnett, Jr., Florence, for appellant.
John Patterson, Atty. Gen., and Robt. Straub, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The following charge was refused to defendant:
36. I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that it is not necessary, under the evidence in this case, that the defendant, Ola Mae Bryson, should have been actually in danger of death or great bodily harm at the time she stabbed J. B. Bryson, or that retreat would have really increased her peril, in order for her to have been justified in stabbing the deceased. She had the right to act on the appearance of things at the time, taken in the light of all the evidence, and she had the right to interpret the conduct of the deceased in the light of any threats that the evidence proves to your reasonable satisfaction that the deceased may have made against the defendant. If the circumstances attending the stabbing were such as to justify a reasonable woman in the belief that she was in danger of great bodily harm or death, and that she could not have retreated without adding to her peril, and she honestly believed such to be the case, then she had the right to cut the deceased in her own defense, although as a matter of fact she was not in actual danger, and retreat would not have endangered her personal safety; and, if the jury believed that the defendant acted under such conditions and circumstances as above set out, the burden of showing that she was not free from fault in bringing on the difficulty is on the State, and, if not shown, they should acquit the defendant.
This appellant's trial under an indictment charging murder in the first degree resulted in her conviction of manslaughter in the first degree and an imposition of a sentence of ten years in the penitentiary.
The appellant and the deceased had been married, but at the time of this killing had been separated for some two months.
The evidence presented by the State tended to show that on the night of the homicide the appellant and deceased came to a cafe operated by Annie Butler. They ordered sandwiches, and Annie went into the back part of the cafe to prepare the food. Through a window in the partition between the kitchen and the public area of the cafe she observed the appellant and deceased standing near a Rockola. The appellant had an open knife held near deceased's chest. The pair however consumed the food and after awhile left the cafe.
The appellant resided with her mother. A neighbor, Hattie Weems, testified that on the night of the killing she was on her porch. She heard a male voice say: 'You just don't want to do right.' She then saw the appellant and deceased walking arm in arm. They went onto the porch of appellant's home and she heard the appellant say she had to go to bed. The deceased insisted that she go with him to his house and go to bed. At this time the appellant's mother came to the screen door and called appellant in. The appellant began cursing, and her mother tried to get out on the porch but the door was latched on the outside.
The argument between appellant and deceased as to the sleeping arrangements continued, and appellant during its course stabbed the deceased in the chest with a knife, from which wound he died in a short while.
Testifying in her own behalf, the appellant denied that she any time stood near a Rockola in Annie Butler's cafe, or that she placed a knife against deceased's chest. Appellant stated that the deceased had followed her to the cafe, and that she sat at a table with a man named 'Dodie' and his wife. The deceased did not join them, and she ate nothing at the cafe.
The deceased followed her when she left the cafe, insisting that she was going to spend the night with him.
When they reached the porch of her home she found the screen door latched. As she would attempt to open the door the deceased would jerk her arm. This happened serveral times, and appellant saw the deceased put his right hand in his pocket and pull it out. It was then that she stabbed the deceased with a knife that she had in the pocket of her blue jeans, and had managed to get out and open during the argument.
Appellant's mother, who came to the screen door during the argument, gave testimony tending to corroborate that of the appellant.
Evidence was also introduced by the defense to the effect that on previous occasions the deceased had cut appellant and inflicted other injuries on her.
During the cross examination of defense witness, Sarah Sloss, mother of appellant, she testified that the deceased had jerked appellant with only one hand during the argument on the porch.
She was then asked if she had not testified before the grand jury that the deceased caught appellant's arm with both his hands, and if she did not demonstrate his actions by taking hold of the solicitor's arm with both her hands.
A series of questions were asked along this line. At one point the court asked if the solicitor intended using the members of the grand jury as impeaching witnesses. The solicitor first replied he did not, but later stated he did not know whether he would impeach her or not.
The court overruled appellant's objections to the questions, and to all the witness denied she had so testified.
Counsel for appellant argue that the court erred in its rulings in the above instances in view of the solicitor's first announcement that he had not intended to summon the grand jury members as impeaching witnesses.
There is no merit in this contention.
It is elemental that a witness may be impeached by prior contradictory statements. Testimony before a grand jury furnishes no exception. Williams v. State, 32 Ala.App. 597, 28 So.2d 731; Wyatt v. State, 35 Ala.App. 147, 46 So.2d 837.
In order to introduce the impeaching witnesses, a predicate must be laid through the witness being examined. If the witness denies making the statement covered by the predicate, then the impeaching witnesses may be...
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