Bua v. Purcell & Ingrao, P.C.

Decision Date17 October 2012
Citation2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 06908,952 N.Y.S.2d 592,99 A.D.3d 843
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
PartiesMario BUA, appellant, v. PURCELL & INGRAO, P.C., et al., respondents.

99 A.D.3d 843
952 N.Y.S.2d 592
2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 06908

Mario BUA, appellant,
v.
PURCELL & INGRAO, P.C., et al., respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Oct. 17, 2012.


[952 N.Y.S.2d 594]


Schwartz & Ponterio, PLLC, New York, N.Y. (Matthew F. Schwartz and John Ponterio of counsel), for appellant.

L'Abbate, Balkan, Colavita & Contini, LLP, Garden City, N.Y. (Diane P. Whitfield and Scott E. Kossove of counsel), for respondents.


ANITA R. FLORIO, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, L. PRISCILLA HALL, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.

[99 A.D.3d 843]In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Driscoll, J.), entered November 23, 2010, which granted the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the amended complaint and denied, as academic, the plaintiff's cross motion to consolidate the action with an action

[952 N.Y.S.2d 595]

commenced by the defendants against the plaintiff to recover unpaid legal fees.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages allegedly sustained as a result of the defendants' legal malpractice. The amended complaint alleged that the plaintiff retained the defendants to represent and advise him in connection with the sale of certain real property. The plaintiff entered into a contract of sale with a buyer, who tendered a deposit to be held in escrow. The amended complaint further alleged that, prior to the closing date, the buyer's attorney attempted to terminate the contract of sale because the buyer was unable to obtain financing for the purchase. The defendant Joseph A. Ingrao informed the plaintiff that the buyer wished to cancel the contract of sale, and the plaintiff agreed to cancel the contract and return the deposit.

The amended complaint stated that Ingrao sent the buyer's attorney a letter “purporting to terminate” the contract of sale and returning the deposit. More than seven months later, however, the buyer attempted to revive the contract of sale and purchase the property under its terms. The plaintiff refused, maintaining that the contract had been terminated. The buyer subsequently commenced an action against the plaintiff for specific performance of the contract of sale and filed a notice of pendency. In that action, the plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the contract of sale, had been terminated when the deposit was [99 A.D.3d 844]returned. The plaintiff also commenced a holdover proceeding. The plaintiff ultimately prevailed in the specific performance action.

The amended complaint asserted that the defendants committed malpractice by failing to “obtain a clear and unambiguous termination of the [contract of sale] after [the buyer's] attorneys advised Ingrao that she wished to terminate the [contract of sale].” The amended complaint listed various things that the plaintiff claimed the defendants “should have done” in order to accomplish a “clear and unambiguous” termination of the contract of sale.

The amended complaint alleged that, as a result of the defendants' malpractice, the plaintiff sustained damages in the form of, inter alia, legal fees and costs incurred in the specific performance action and the holdover proceeding. The plaintiff also asserted that his damages included the loss of rental income, the loss of value to the property, and the loss of profits that would have been realized if he had been able to sell the property free of the notice of pendency that was filed in connection with the action for specific performance.

The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (a)(7), submitting documentary evidence in support of their motion. The defendants contended that the plaintiff should be judicially estopped from asserting the malpractice cause of action since it was premised on a position inconsistent with a position he took in the specific performance action. The defendants also contended that the amended complaint failed to state a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice.

The plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved to consolidate this action with an action commenced by the defendants against the plaintiff to recover unpaid legal fees. The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel and denied, as academic, the plaintiff's cross motion. We affirm the Supreme Court's order, but on grounds different from those relied upon by the Supreme Court ( see

[952 N.Y.S.2d 596]

South Point, Inc. v. Redman, 94 A.D.3d 1086, 1087, 943 N.Y.S.2d 543;Matter of Long Is. Pine Barrens Socy., Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 55 A.D.3d 610, 611–612, 866 N.Y.S.2d 225;Goldin v. Engineers Country Club, 54 A.D.3d 658, 659, 864 N.Y.S.2d 43;Garcha v. City of Beacon, 39 A.D.3d 587, 588, 834 N.Y.S.2d 275;Green v. Conciatori, 26 A.D.3d 410, 410–411, 809 N.Y.S.2d 559;see also Menorah Nursing Home v. Zukov, 153 A.D.2d 13, 19, 548 N.Y.S.2d 702).

A motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to [99 A.D.3d 845]CPLR 3211(a)(1) may be granted only if the documentary evidence submitted by the moving party utterly refutes the factual allegations of the complaint and conclusively establishes a defense to the claims as a matter of law ( see Goshen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 N.Y.2d 314, 326, 746 N.Y.S.2d 858, 774 N.E.2d 1190). On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Goshen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 N.Y.2d at 326, 746 N.Y.S.2d 858, 774 N.E.2d 1190;Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511). Where a party offers evidentiary proof on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and such proof is considered but the motion has not been converted to one for summary judgment, “the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he [or she] has stated one, and, unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the pleader to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it ... dismissal should not eventuate” ( Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 275, 401 N.Y.S.2d 182, 372 N.E.2d 17;see Jannetti v. Whelan, 97 A.D.3d...

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