Bubla v. Bradshaw, s. 85-2318
| Decision Date | 08 July 1986 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 85-2318,s. 85-2318 |
| Citation | 795 F.2d 349 |
| Parties | Winifred G. BUBLA, in her own right and as Executrix of the Estate of Joseph B. Bubla, deceased, Jamie Bubla, Patricia Jacobs, and Joseph B. Bubla, Jr., Appellees, v. Waverly Daniel BRADSHAW, Sr., Appellant, and Ann R. HUDGINS, Executrix of the Estate of Allen F. Hudgins, Jr., deceased, Hudgins Marine Engine Service, Ltd., a Virginia corporation, Appellees, v. Jennings HAYNES, Third-Party Defendant. Winifred G. BUBLA, in her own right and as Executrix of the Estate of Joseph B. Bubla, deceased, Jamie Bubla, Patricia Jacobs, and Joseph B. Bubla, Jr., Appellants, v. Waverly Daniel BRADSHAW, Sr., Ann R. Hudgins, Executrix of the Estate of Allen F. Hudgins, Jr., deceased, Hudgins Marine Service, Ltd., a Virginia corporation, Appellees, v. Jennings HAYNES, Third-Party Defendant. Winifred G. BUBLA, in her own right and as Executrix of the Estate of Joseph B. Bubla, deceased, Jamie Bubla, Patricia Jacobs, and Joseph B. Bubla, Jr., Appellees, v. Ann R. HUDGINS, Executrix of the Estate of Allen F. Hudgins, Jr., deceased, Hudgins Marine Engine Service, Ltd., a Virginia corporation, Appellants, and Waverly Daniel BRADSHAW, Sr., Appellee, v. Jennings HAYNES, Third-Party Defendant. (L), 85-2377 and 85-2396. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Gordon P. Robertson and Walter B. Martin, Norfolk, Va., (Vandeventer, Black, Meredith & Martin, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellant Waverly Daniel Bradshaw, Sr.
A. Davis Bugg, Jr. (Dunton, Simmons & Dunton, White Stone, Va., on brief), for appellant Ann R. Hudgins.
John R. Crumpler, Jr. (Seawell, Dalton, Hughes & Timms, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellees.
Before MURNAGHAN and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges, and HAYNSWORTH, Senior Circuit Judge.
Joseph Bubla died of electrocution while conducting a marine survey aboard The Grand Floatel, a houseboat owned by defendant Waverly Bradshaw. At the time of the accident, the boat was docked at a pier owned by defendant Allen Hudgins and his wife Ann and leased to defendant Hudgins Marine Engine Service, Ltd. A receptacle on the dock provided electricity to The Grand Floatel. Bubla's wife and children brought this wrongful death action under general maritime law, Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970), alleging negligence on the part of Bradshaw, Hudgins, and Hudgins Marine. Though absolving Hudgins of individual negligence, the district court found both Bradshaw and Hudgins Marine negligent, and Bubla contributorily negligent. It apportioned damages accordingly, awarding plaintiffs $100,578.
We affirm the district court's conclusion that admiralty jurisdiction was proper here and that Hudgins Marine negligently contributed to the death of Joseph Bubla. Our review of the record convinces us, however, that Bradshaw could not reasonably have foreseen the problems that caused Bubla's electrocution, and accordingly was not negligent. Finally, though we recognize the district court's wide discretion in measuring damages in a wrongful death action, we remand for a more detailed explanation of the basis for and apportionment of damages in this case.
Waverly Bradshaw purchased The Grand Floatel in November, 1982. The houseboat had been sunk at least twice and needed extensive repairs. Bradshaw hired Hudgins to repair the vessel and accordingly moved it to Hudgins Marine in December, 1982. During the next several months, Bradshaw visited The Grand Floatel on several occasions, staying overnight on the boat three times.
On March 27, 1983, Bradshaw met Bubla on the boat. Bubla, recommended to Bradshaw by a marina owner, was to conduct a marine survey for insurance purposes. He had been performing marine surveys for three years, and surveyed approximately 200 boats during this period.
The accident occurred near the end of Bubla's survey, as he inspected the boat's engine compartment. The district court found that three defects contributed to Bubla's electrocution, which would not have occurred in the absence of any one of the conditions. First, the electrical outlet on Hudgins Marine's pier, to which The Grand Floatel was connected, was wired with reverse polarity. When polarity is reversed, the neutral white wire and the hot black wire are improperly crossed, making the boat's normally neutral wire hot and its hot wire neutral. Second, there existed an inadvertent connection on the boat between the ground system and the normally neutral, but now electrically charged, wires. Both the engine and the outlet box in the engine compartment, connected to the ground system, thereby became electrically charged. Under normal circumstances, these conditions would have caused the circuit breaker in Hudgins Marine's shop to trip, cutting off the electrical current because of an improperly charged ground. A defect in the grounding system, however, rendered the circuit breaker inoperative. Bubla accordingly was electrocuted when he came in contact with the energized engine or outlet and also touched a grounded surface, thereby completing a circuit.
We agree with the district court that this case falls within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1333. Historically, such jurisdiction was proper whenever a tort occurred on the high seas or on navigable waters. See, e.g., The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall) 20, 35-36, 18 L.Ed. 125 (1866). The parties do not dispute that Bubla died aboard The Grand Floatel, and that the situs of this tort supports the invocation of admiralty jurisdiction. Under Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 269, 93 S.Ct. 493, 505, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972), however, one seeking to come within admiralty must also show that the wrong "bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." See also Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 102 S.Ct. 2654, 73 L.Ed.2d 300 (1982). Though Bradshaw concedes the propriety of admiralty here, Hudgins and Hudgins Marine assert that this additional "nexus" requirement is not satisfied on these facts.
Four factors must be considered "in analyzing the relationship a given claim bears to traditional maritime activity: (1) the functions and roles of the parties; (2) the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved; (3) the causation and type of injury; and (4) traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law." Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 764 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir.1985) (en banc ), cert. denied sub nom. Oman v. H.K. Porter Co., --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 351, 88 L.Ed.2d 319 (1986). See also Hassinger v. Tideland Electric Membership Corp., 781 F.2d 1022, 1027-28 (4th Cir.1986), petitions for cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, ----, 106 S.Ct. 3294, 90 L.Ed.2d ---- (1986). The district court properly considered these factors and applied maritime law, which conferred federal jurisdiction and invoked principles of comparative negligence.
The functions and roles of the parties clearly support admiralty jurisdiction. Joseph Bubla boarded The Grand Floatel as a marine surveyor, a job for which his experience with boats and maritime activities was crucial. As noted by the district court, "Bubla's job could not have been duplicated on land, nor could anyone inexperienced in maritime matters have performed the survey." The survey, moreover, related to insurance coverage for seagoing craft. Hudgins Marine and Hudgins likewise performed services related to maritime activity, providing the boat slip at which The Grand Floatel was docked for repairs and inspection, and electricity for use on boats docked at the pier. 1
The types of vehicles and instrumentalites involved also related to traditional maritime activity. The mere fact that the injury occurred on a boat, of course, does not dictate the application of admiralty. See, e.g., Oman, 764 F.2d at 231. In Oman, this court found admiralty improper because the claims, while arising on a ship, "would be exactly the same if the plaintiffs had been employed constructing or repairing buildings on land." Here, by contrast, the vessel and pier possess a "uniquely maritime character," id., that supports the application of admiralty. Though principles of electricity are of universal application, the nature of electrical forces in an aqueous environment presents distinct problems. As trial testimony indicated, use of electricity on or near the water demands special maritime materials and unique precautions. Receptacles, extension cords and splicing materials, for example, are available in marine versions designed to reduce the incidence of electrical problems caused by wet conditions.
The cause and type of injury here similarly support admiralty jurisdiction. Though electrocution is not peculiarly a maritime mishap, evidence indicates that the characteristics of a maritime environment may indeed have contributed to Bubla's death. Possible factors involved in the accident included water in the engine compartment of the boat and grounding wires on the dock that were rendered inoperative from exposure to the elements, including water under the dock. Thus, unlike Oman, this case involves injuries arising out of a maritime context rather than fortuitously occurring on or near navigable waters, and is properly considered under maritime law.
Finally, we consider "the traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law, the most important factor." Oman, 764 F.2d at 231. "That law," the Supreme Court explained in Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 270, 93 S.Ct. at 505, The instant case touches upon the maintenance and repair of seagoing vessels. It...
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