Bucchi v. Gleason

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Before BROWN; O'SULLIVAN
• Citation: Bucchi v. Gleason, 137 Conn. 25, 74 A.2d 212 (Conn. 1950)
• Decision Date: 06 June 1950
• Parties: BUCCHI v. GLEASON et al. In re JUDD'S ESTATE. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 212

74 A.2d 212

137 Conn. 25

BUCCHI v. GLEASON et al.

In re JUDD'S ESTATE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 6, 1950.

Margaret P. Camp and Edward B. Scott, New Britain, with whom, on the brief, was Mortimer H. Camp, New Britain, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Leo V. Gaffney, Hartford, for the appellant (defendant Pyle).

Jacob Schwolsky, Hartford, with whom was Henry J. Goldberg, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant Goddard).

Paul G. Cavaliere, New Britain, with whom, on the brief, was Algert F. Politis, New Britain, for the appellee (named defendant).

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, INGLIS and O'SULLIVAN, JJ.

O'SULLIVAN, Judge.

The complaint is in two counts. By the first the plaintiff seeks to recover the reasonable value of services claimed to have been performed for the named defendant's decedent, Alice M. Judd, under an alleged agreement to compensate him by her will. The second count seeks equitable relief which, in effect, would require the defendant Mrs. Theo L. Pyle to return to the defendant administrator the personalty and realty received from Mrs. Judd during her life, on the ground that these transfers have rendered the decedent's estate insufficient to provide for the payment to which the plaintiff is entitled under the first count. Shortly after the return day, the court, upon motion, ordered that Stanley Goddard, a brother of Mrs. Pyle, be joined as codefendant. The answers of all three defendants were in the nature of general denials. Goddard filed with his answer a counterclaim setting forth that the gifts received by its sister were induced by undue influence practiced upon the decedent, and, as relief, he sought their return to the decedent's estate. The case was tried to the court. Judgment was entered on the complaint in favor of all defendants, and, except as to the realty involved, in favor of Goddard on the counterclaim. The plaintiff and Mrs. Pyle have taken separate appeals to this court.

The finding, which is attached in each appeal but which is not subject to material correction, discloses these facts: The plaintiff went to work for Rollin D. Judd in 1922. There he remained until Judd died in 1929. A few days before his impending death, Judd obtained a promise from the plaintiff that he would remain in Mrs. Judd's employ as long as she lived. The plaintiff did as he had promised, working for Mrs. Judd as a gardener, chauffeur and handyman. While in her employ, he occasionally took on other part-time jobs for various people. This was done with her knowledge and consent, but this additional work was always subordinate to her right to have first call upon his time. Originally, Mrs. Judd paid him $28 weekly. Later, she increased this wage to $30. On several occasions she presented him with a yearly bonus of $100. During his employment she gave him $1100 to buy two accordions for his children. This latter sum with others received by him from time to time made a total of about $1450 which Mrs. Judd paid him in excess of his regular wage. On many occasions, she told the plaintiff that she was not paying him enough but that she would see he was well paid at her death. He believed she would do so. He rendered at all times loyal and faithful service to her.

In 1931, Mrs. Judd told the plaintiff that she had left him $1000 in her will. Two years later, she executed another will in which she bequeathed to him $3000 and her automobile. She informed the plaintiff of these bequests. On 1941, she made a third will wherein she devised to the plaintiff the home in which she lived and bequeathed to him $5000 and her automobile. Previous to executing the will, Mrs. Judd had told him of these contemplated testamentary gifts and had asked him if he was satisfied with them. He replied that he was. Each of the three wills she had executed up to this time provided for only a small legacy to her niece, Mrs. Pyle.

On August 15, 1944, Mrs. Ryle, who had been living in Florida, came to New Britain at her aunt's request. This request was prompted by the fact that Mrs. Judd's housekeeper was obliged to leave. Upon her arrival, Mrs. Pyle took over the management of Mrs. Judd's household. At the end of six weeks, Mrs. Pyle discharged the plaintiff. He was never thereafter permitted to enter the house or speak to Mrs. Judd alone.

For many years, Mrs. Judd's financial affairs had been cared for by a local bank, and, from 1940 on, under a general power of attorney. She owned her own home, which was worth $13,000, government bonds of the value of $15,000, cash and bank deposits in excess of $10,000, an automobile and personal effects of substantial value. She was also the beneficiary of an annuity under which she was entitled to receive $325 monthly as long as she lived.

Three weeks after her arrival in New Britain, Mrs. Pyle received from Mrs. Judd a deed of the house. This conveyance was made in consideration of Mrs. Pyle's written agreement to care for Mrs. Judd and act as her companion for the rest of her life. On September 27, 1944, Mrs. Judd revoked the power of attorney held by the bank, and Mrs. Pyle told the bank's representative that she would henceforth handle her aunt's finances. On October 9, 1944, Mrs. Judd gave her niece a power of attorney, and from that date on Mrs. Pyle took complete charge of all of her aunt's financial affairs. Between the last mentioned date and the following February, the bank accounts and government bonds were changed so as to make them payable to Mrs. Judd and Mrs. Pyle, or the survivor. On February 13, 1945, Mrs. Judd destroyed her will and at the same time executed a memorandum by which she attempted to give all of her personal property to Mrs. Pyle.

From August, 1944, until her death in December, 1946, Mrs. Judd was at times mentally confused, forgetful, suffering from infirmities of age and readily susceptible to suggestion. She died intestate, leaving as her only asset five shares of stock valued at $500. Her death was attributed to generalized causes, with arteriosclerosis and paralysis agitans specified. The named defendant is the administrator of her estate.

Upon these facts, the court concluded that there was no basis for a finding that Mrs. Judd agreed to compensate the plaintiff by her will, and that she had paid him compensation, while he was in her employ, which was not less than his services were reasonably worth. It further concluded that the personalty which Mrs. Pyle received from her aunt was acquired through undue influence. It entered judgment on the complaint against the plaintiff. On the counterclaim, the judgment incorporated an order that Mrs. Pyle turn over to the administrator on Mrs. Judd's estate all of the personalty received as gifts and, further, that she render an account.

We first dispose of the assignment of errors raised in Mrs. Pyle's appeal. As indicated above, the facts found have ample support in the evidence, and those which Mrs. Pyle seeks to incorporate in the finding, even if added, would not affect the result. Watrous v. Sinoway, 135 Conn. 424, 428...