Buchanan v. Angelone

Citation139 L.Ed.2d 702,522 U.S. 269,118 S.Ct. 757
Decision Date21 January 1998
Docket Number968400
PartiesDouglas McArthur BUCHANAN, Jr., Petitioner, v. Ronald J. ANGELONE, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, et al
CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Syllabus*

Following petitioner Buchanan's conviction of the capital murders of his father, stepmother, and two brothers, the prosecutor sought the death penalty based on Virginia's aggravating factor that the crime was vile. During the sentencing hearing, there were two days of testimony as to Buchanan's troubled family background and mental and emotional problems, and the prosecutor and defense counsel both made extensive arguments on the mitigating evidence and the effect it should be given in sentencing. The trial court instructed the jury, inter alia, that if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Buchanan's conduct was vile, "then you may fix the punishment . . . at death,'' but "if you believe from all the evidence that . . . death . . . is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment . . . at life imprisonment.'' The court refused Buchanan's request to give four additional instructions on particular statutory mitigating factors and a general instruction on the concept of mitigating evidence. The jury returned a verdict of death, the trial court imposed that sentence, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. The Federal District Court then denied Buchanan habeas corpus relief, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Held: The absence of instructions on the concept of mitigation and on particular statutorily defined mitigating factors did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In arguing to the contrary, Buchanan fails to distinguish between the differing constitutional treatment this Court has accorded the two phases of the capital sentencing process: the eligibility phase, in which the jury narrows the class of death-penalty-eligible defendants, and the selection phase here at issue, in which the jury determines whether to impose a death sentence on an eligible defendant. See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971-972, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 2634-2635, 129 L.Ed.2d 750. In the selection phase, the state may shape and structure the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence, so long as restrictions on the sentencing determination do not preclude the jury from giving effect to any such evidence. E.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 317-318, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2946-2947, 106 L.Ed.2d 256. The determinative standard is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied its instructions in a way that prevents consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. E.g., Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1197-1198, 108 L.Ed.2d 316. The instructions here did not violate these constitutional principles. This conclusion is confirmed by the context in which the instructions were given. The court directed the jurors to base their decision on "all the evidence'' and to impose a life sentence if they believed the evidence so warranted, there was extensive testimony as to Buchanan's family background and mental and emotional problems, and counsel made detailed arguments on the mitigating evidence. Because the parties in effect agreed that there was substantial mitigating evidence and that the jury had to weigh that evidence against Buchanan's conduct in making a discretionary decision on the appropriate penalty, there is not a reasonable likelihood that the jurors understood the instructions to preclude consideration of relevant mitigating evidence. Pp. ___-___.

103 F.3d 344 (C.A.4 1996), affirmed.

REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS and GINSBURG, JJ., joined.

Gerald T. Zerkin, appointed by this Court, Richmond, VA, for petitioner.

Katherine P. Baldwin, for respondents.

Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case calls on us to decide whether the Eighth Amendment requires that a capital jury be instructed on the concept of mitigating evidence generally, or on particular statutory mitigating factors. We hold it does not.

On the afternoon of September 15, 1987, Douglas Buchanan murdered his father, stepmother, and two younger brothers. Buchanan was convicted of the capital murder of more than one person as part of the same act or transaction by a jury in the Circuit Court of Amherst County, Virginia. See Va.Code Ann. §18.2-31(7) (1996). A separate sentencing hearing was held, in which the prosecutor sought the death penalty on the basis of Virginia's aggravating factor that the crime was vile. See Va.Code §19.2-264.3 (1995).

In his opening statement in this proceeding, the prosecutor told the jury that he would be asking for the death penalty based on vileness. He conceded that Buchanan had had a troubled childhood and informed the jury that it would have to balance the things in petitioner's favor against the crimes he had committed. App. 25-27. Defense counsel outlined the mitigating evidence he would present and told the jury that he was asking that petitioner not be executed based on that evidence. Id., at 29. For two days, the jury heard evidence from seven defense witnesses and eight prosecution witnesses. Buchanan's witnesses recounted his mother's early death from breast cancer, his father's subsequent remarriage, and his parents' attempts to prevent him from seeing his maternal relatives. A psychiatrist also testified that Buchanan was under extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the crime, based largely on stress caused by the manner in which the family had dealt with and reacted to his mother's death. Two mental health experts testified for the prosecution. They agreed generally with the factual events of petitioner's life but not with their effect on his commission of the crimes.

In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that "even if you find that there was the vileness that you do not have to return the death sentence. I will not suggest that to you.'' Id., at 43. While admitting the existence of mitigating evidence, and agreeing that the jury had to weigh that evidence against petitioner's conduct, the prosecutor argued that the circumstances warranted the death penalty. Id., at 43-44, 57-58. Defense counsel also explained the concept of mitigation and noted that "practically any factor can be considered in mitigation.'' He discussed at length petitioner's lack of prior criminal activity, his extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the offense, his significantly impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law's requirements, and his youth. Counsel argued that these four mitigating factors, recognized in the Virginia Code, mitigated Buchanan's offense. Id., at 59-61, 64-66.

The Commonwealth and Buchanan agreed that the court should instruct the jury with Virginia's pattern capital sentencing instruction. 1 That instruction told the jury that before it could fix the penalty at death, the Commonwealth first must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct was vile. The instruction next stated that if the jury found that condition met, "then you may fix the punishment of the Defendant at death or if you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the Defendant at life imprisonment.'' The instruction then stated that if the jury did not find the condition met, the jury must impose a life sentence. This instruction was given without objection. Id., at 39.

Buchanan requested several additional jury instructions. He proposed four instructions on particular mitigating factors-no significant history of prior criminal activity; extreme mental or emotional disturbance; significantly impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law's requirements; and his age. These four factors are listed as facts in mitigation of the offense in the Virginia Code. 2 Each of Buchanan's proposed instructions stated that if the jury found the factor to exist, "then that is a fact which mitigates against imposing the death penalty, and you shall consider that fact in deciding whether to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment.'' Id., at 75-76. 3 Buchanan also proposed an instruction stating that, "In addition to the mitigating factors specified in other instructions, you shall consider the circumstances surrounding the offense, the history and background of [Buchanan] and any other facts in mitigation of the offense.'' Id., at 74. The court refused to give these instructions, relying on Virginia case law holding that it was not proper to give instructions singling out certain mitigating factors to the sentencing jury. Id., at 39-40.

The jury was instructed that once it reached a decision on its two options, imposing a life sentence or imposing the death penalty, the foreman should sign the corresponding verdict form. The death penalty verdict form stated that the jury had unanimously found petitioner's conduct to be vile and that "having considered the evidence in mitigation of the offense,'' it unanimously fixed his punishment at death. Id., at 77. When the jury returned with a verdict for the death penalty, the court read the verdict form and polled each juror on his agreement with the verdict.

The court, after a statutorily mandated sentencing hearing, see Va.Code Ann. §19.2-264.5 (1995), subsequently imposed the sentence fixed by the jury. On direct appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court reviewed Buchanan's sentence for proportionality, see Va.Code Ann. §17.110.1-17.110.2 (1996), and affirmed his conviction and death sentence. Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 384 S.E.2d 757 (1989), cert. denied sub nom., ...

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