Buchanan v. Angelone

• Decision Date: 30 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 96-4,96-4
• Parties: Douglas McArthur BUCHANAN, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ronald J. ANGELONE, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections; Commonwealth of Virginia, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 344

103 F.3d 344

Douglas McArthur BUCHANAN, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ronald J. ANGELONE, Director, Virginia Department of

Corrections; Commonwealth of Virginia,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 96-4.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 30, 1996.

Decided Dec. 30, 1996.

ARGUED: Gerald Thomas Zerkin, Gerald T. Zerkin & Associates, Richmond, VA, for Appellant. Katherine P. Baldwin, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, VA, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Donald R. Lee, Virginia Capital Representation Resource Center, Richmond, VA; Frank K. Friedman, Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, P.L.C., Roanoke, VA, for Appellant. James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General of Virginia, Office Of The Attorney General, Richmond, VA, for Appellees.

Before HALL and ERVIN, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Senior Judge BUTZNER wrote the opinion, in which Judge HALL and Judge ERVIN joined.

OPINION

BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge:

In 1988, Douglas McArthur Buchanan, Jr., was convicted of capital murder in Virginia and sentenced to death. After exhausting his state remedies, he petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his petition, he alleged numerous constitutional defects in the state court proceedings. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, Buchanan presents five issues for review. After careful consideration of his contentions and the record, we find no reversible error and affirm the district court's disposition.

I

On the afternoon of September 15, 1987, Buchanan murdered his father, his stepmother, and his two half brothers. The Virginia Supreme Court's opinion recounts the details of the crime. Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 394-96, 384 S.E.2d 757, 760-61 (1989).

Buchanan was charged with capital murder for the killing of "more than one person as part of the same act or transaction." Va.Code Ann. § 18.2-31(7) (Michie 1996). In four separate indictments, the grand jury also charged him with the first degree murder of each victim. In addition, he was charged with four counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a murder.

Buchanan pleaded not guilty to all charges. He was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Amherst County, Virginia. The jury found him guilty of capital murder for killing his father, four first degree murders, and the firearm offenses. Following a separate hearing, the jury sentenced Buchanan to death for the capital murder, to life in prison for each of the first degree murders, and to a term of imprisonment for the firearm offenses. The circuit court imposed the recommended sentences.

Buchanan appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia. The court vacated the redundant conviction of first degree murder for the killing of Buchanan's father and affirmed the other convictions and the related sentences, including the death penalty. Buchanan, 238 Va. at 418, 384 S.E.2d at 774. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Buchanan v. Virginia, 493 U.S. 1063, 110 S.Ct. 880, 107 L.Ed.2d 963 (1990).

Buchanan then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Amherst County. After the circuit court dismissed his petition, he appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which also denied the petition. The United States Supreme Court again denied certiorari. Buchanan v. Murray, 506 U.S. 988, 113 S.Ct. 501, 121 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992).

Buchanan sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, which denied relief. On appeal, Buchanan now asserts five claims, one relating to the competence of his trial counsel, three alleging errors in his trial, and one challenging the adequacy of the Virginia Supreme Court's appellate review.

II

Buchanan's first claim is that the sentencing jury was inadequately instructed about mitigating evidence. With regard to mitigation, the court told the jury: "[I]f you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the defendant at life imprisonment." In addition, the statutory verdict form required the jury to indicate that it had "considered the evidence in mitigation of the offense."

At trial Buchanan asked the court to give a more detailed instruction on mitigation. Specifically, he asked the court to tell the jury that it should consider as mitigating factors his youth, his clean criminal record, and whether he was "under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance" when he committed the crime. Each of these factors is designated as mitigating evidence by Virginia Code § 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1996). During the sentencing hearing Buchanan submitted evidence supporting each factor, and Buchanan's counsel was permitted to discuss the factors in his closing argument.

Buchanan now argues that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury about the specific mitigating factors supported by his evidence violated his constitutional rights in two ways. His first argument rests on the Eighth Amendment. In his view, the trial court's nonspecific instruction did not appropriately channel the jury's discretion so as to avoid an arbitrary or capricious outcome.

The Eighth Amendment requires that a capital sentencing jury's discretion be "guided and channeled by requiring examination of specific factors that argue in favor of or against imposition of the death penalty, thus eliminating total arbitrariness and capriciousness in its imposition." Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2969, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). To accomplish this purpose, a capital sentencing jury must be properly instructed. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3057, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990). However, the Eighth Amendment does not require states to adopt specific standards for instructing juries on aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2749-50, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983).

Guided by those constitutional principles, this court has previously analyzed and rejected the argument now asserted by Buchanan. In Clozza v. Murray, we held that Virginia's death penalty scheme survives constitutional scrutiny, despite its "failure to instruct the jury on statutory mitigating factors." 913 F.2d 1092, 1105 (4th Cir.1990). In addition, this court has reviewed and approved the constitutionality of jury instructions, used in other Virginia death penalty cases, that were essentially identical to the instructions contested in this case. Jones v. Murray, 947 F.2d 1106, 1119-20 (4th Cir.1991); Briley v. Bass, 750 F.2d 1238, 1248-49 (4th Cir.1984).

In its verdict, the jury, as required by Virginia Code § 19.2-264.4, certified that it had "considered the evidence in mitigation of the offense." In Jones, we concluded that "[b]y allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence, [Virginia's sentencing] procedure ... satisfied the requirement of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of individualized sentencing in capital cases." 947 F.2d at 1120. In light of this precedent, Buchanan's Eighth Amendment claim must fail.

Buchanan's second argument asserts a federal due process violation. According to Buchanan, the trial court's nonspecific mitigation instruction was inconsistent with Virginia's death penalty sentencing statute and, as a result, denied him the benefit of the Commonwealth's statutory sentencing scheme. Buchanan argues that this alleged violation of state law infringed his rights under the Due Process Clause.

It is true, at least in the context of discretionary sentencing by a jury, that denial of a state procedural right may rise to the level of a federal due process violation. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 2229-30, 65 L.Ed.2d 175 (1980). However, there was no such violation in Buchanan's case because, contrary to his assertion, the trial court's instruction was consistent with the sentencing statute. The statute establishes a capital defendant's right to present mitigating evidence during the sentencing hearing. It neither imposes nor implies an obligation to instruct the jury about specific mitigating factors. Va.Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4.

Our reading of the statute is consistent with the Virginia Supreme Court's interpretation. It is clear from that court's decisions that the statute does not require the trial court to list specific mitigating circumstances. See, e.g., LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 594-95, 304 S.E.2d 644, 661 (1983). Because the jury instructions in this case were consistent with the sentencing statute, Buchanan's due process argument must also fail.

III

The second claim advanced by Buchanan is that the trial court impermissibly limited his ability to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. This claim is based on the trial court's exclusion of hearsay testimony offered by Buchanan's expert witness, Dr. Robert Brown.

Dr. Brown was Buchanan's principal mitigation witness. In preparation for trial, he performed a psychological evaluation of Buchanan and extensively investigated his personal and family history. As part of his investigation, he interviewed many of Buchanan's friends and relatives.

Dr. Brown testified at trial that, in his expert opinion, Buchanan was under extreme emotional stress at the time of the killings. He went on to testify extensively about the evidence that supported his conclusion. However, the trial court did not permit him to repeat some of the statements made to him during the interviews he had conducted. Sustaining the prosecution's hearsay objection, the judge excluded all such statements made by individuals who had not appeared at trial. Although the statements were excluded, the judge offered to stay the proceedings and allow the individuals who had made the statements to testify in person. Buchanan declined the offer.

Buchanan insists that application of the hearsay rule in this case violated his...