Buchanan v. City of San Antonio

• Decision Date: 13 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-50350,95-50350
• Citation: 85 F.3d 196
• Parties: 5 A.D. Cases 987, 8 NDLR P 129 Richard R. BUCHANAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 196

85 F.3d 196

5 A.D. Cases 987, 8 NDLR P 129

Richard R. BUCHANAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-50350.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 13, 1996.

Malinda Ann Gaul, Kala S. Dumont, Gaul & Dumont, San Antonio, TX, for Richard R. Buchanan, plaintiff-appellee.

Luis Augusto Moreno, Villarreal, Moreno & Ruiz, San Antonio, TX, Don W. King, Jr., City Attorney's Office for the City of San Antonio, San Antonio, TX, for City of San Antonio, defendant-appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before REAVLEY, GARWOOD and JOLLY, Circuit Judges.

REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:

Richard Buchanan sued the City of San Antonio under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), ¹ after the city repeatedly turned down his applications to become a city police officer. The district court awarded him a judgment of $300,000 in compensatory damages, together with back pay, attorney's fees and interest. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

Buchanan is a patrolman with the Bexar County sheriff's department. He injured his back during a foot chase of a suspect in 1986. He claimed that he fully recovered from this injury. After being off work for a few months, he returned to duty with the sheriff's department, and testified that he has had no recurring problems with his back since that time.

Buchanan wanted to join the San Antonio police force, because the pay and benefits were better than those offered by the sheriff's department. On numerous occasions he applied for a job with the police department, but was always turned down. He last applied for employment with the police department in April of 1992, and was rejected in October of 1992. The dates of his last application and rejection are relevant, since the ADA became effective on July 26, 1992. ² The ADA is not applied retroactively. ³

In August of 1993 he filed this suit under the ADA, alleging in general terms violation of the Act due to discrimination on the basis The district court took the motion for judgment under advisement at the close of the first day of trial. The next morning, the court announced that it was granting the motion, would allow each side a few minutes to look over the court's proposed charge, and would then charge the jury. By these actions the court made clear that it would not allow the introduction of any additional evidence. The court then instructed the jury that the city had violated the ADA and submitted two special interrogatories to the jury on damages. The jury answered "yes" to the first question, inquiring whether Buchanan "has sustained damages from Defendant City of San Antonio's violation of the [ADA]." It then awarded $300,000 in compensatory damages for "future pecuniary losses, emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, and mental anguish." After the verdict, the district court entered judgment for this amount, and also awarded back pay, attorney's fees and post-judgment interest.

                of disability.   The case proceeded to trial.   At the close of plaintiff's evidence, plaintiff moved for judgment as a matter of law.   The motion was based on two specific violations of the ADA which were not pleaded in the complaint.   Plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the city had (1) subjected him to a physical examination before making a offer of employment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d), and (2) failed to keep information regarding his medical condition confidential and in a separate file, also in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)
                

DISCUSSION

A. Judgment as a Matter of Law

Judgment as a matter of law against a party is proper on an issue if "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." ⁴ A judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that reasonable people could not arrive at a verdict to the contrary. ⁵

If anything, an even greater showing is required where, as here, the plaintiff moves for and receives judgment as a matter of law before the jury hears from the defendant. Rule 50 itself only contemplates judgment as a matter of law against a party after that party "has been fully heard on an issue." While courts have the power to direct a verdict in plaintiff's favor at the close of plaintiff's case,

[t]his power must nonetheless be exercised with great restraint in order to avoid the possibility that a party will be precluded from presenting facts which make out a question for the jury. Where there is any doubt at all as to the propriety of a directed verdict, district courts should not jump the gun but should wait until both sides have presented their evidence before ruling on motions for directed verdict. ⁶

Buchanan did not establish as a matter of law a standard claim of discrimination under the ADA, and does not argue otherwise. The ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." ⁷ A "disability" includes "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual," "a record of such an impairment," and "being regarded as having such an impairment." ⁸ A "qualified individual with a disability" means "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." ⁹

Buchanan did not establish as a matter of law that he has a "disability," that he was "a qualified individual with a disability," or that the city discriminated against him because of his disability. For example, evidence was introduced that Buchanan was rejected not because of his prior back injury, but because he had failed to wait one year from his prior rejection before reapplying, as required by city policy, and because of his prior work history. ¹⁰

B. Premature Physical and Confidentiality

The basis for Buchanan's motion for judgment as a matter of law was two alleged specific violations of the ADA regarding employer information about an applicant's medical history. He relied on 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d), which prohibits an employer from conducting a medical examination of a job applicant unless, among other requirements, the employer has already made the applicant a job offer conditioned on a medical examination. This provision of the ADA also provides that a post-offer medical examination is only allowed if (in addition to other requirements and exceptions not relevant here) "information obtained regarding the medical condition or history of the applicant is collected and maintained on separate forms and in separate medical files and is treated as a confidential medical record."

Buchanan established through the city's own records that Buchanan was given a medical examination in August of 1992, after the effective date of the ADA. We cannot agree with the city that it conducted a medical examination only after it had made a conditional offer of employment. While Buchanan did sign an acknowledgement in May of 1992 that he was receiving a conditional offer of employment, the document itself makes clear that the offer was not conditioned solely on a medical examination, but was instead conditioned on successful completion of "the entire screening process," which included "physical and psychological examinations, a polygraph examination, a physical fitness test, an assessment board, and an extensive background investigation."

Buchanan did not establish as a matter of law that the city failed to keep medical information obtained after the effective date of the ADA in a separate file and failed to treat such information as confidential. While the evidence clearly showed that information regarding Buchanan's medical condition was provided to the department officials in charge of hiring decisions after the effective date of the ADA, and that medical information was included in Buchanan's general personnel file, Buchanan did not establish that this information was obtained after the effective date of the Act. We agree with the EEOC that the ADA does not require the segregation or confidential treatment of medical information obtained before the effective date of the ADA. ¹¹

C. Proof of Damages

A further gap in support for this judgment is the absence of proof of damage even if the other predicates had been established, caused by a premature medical examination. Our reading of the ADA requires a causal link between the violation and the damages sought by the plaintiff. The remedies provided under the ADA are the same as those provided by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to 2000e-6, 200...