Buchanan v. Evans, 74-1418

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Citation96 S.Ct. 381,423 U.S. 963,46 L.Ed.2d 293
Docket NumberNo. 74-1418,74-1418
PartiesMadeline BUCHANAN et al. v. Brenda EVANS et al
Decision Date17 November 1975

See 423 U.S. 1080, 96 S.Ct. 868.

The judgment is affirmed.

Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice POWELL join as to Parts I and II B, dissenting.

Appellants insist that the judgment of the District Court is wrong under our holding in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974), while appellees insist that it is consistent with that case. But this case comes here as an appeal from an order of a three-judge District Court enjoining the enforcement of a state statute, a question not even present in Milliken. The three-judge District Court by its order of April 16, 1975, enjoined appellants from relying upon1 provisions of a Delaware statute which by their terms had expired six years earlier. Because in doing so I believe the District Court decided an issue that is demonstrably moot, I would reverse its judgment on this point. Since the additional question of whether the Milliken issues briefed by the parties are properly before us under any conceivable theory is one which veritably bristles with jurisdictional problems, I would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument on these points. The Court's summary affirmance, in my opinion, not only wrongfully upholds an erroneous injunction issued by the District Court, but because of the difficult jurisdictional questions present in this case leaves totally beclouded and uncertain what is decided by that summary affirmance.

I

The challenged Delaware statute, known as the Educational Advancement Act, was enacted by the legislature in June 1968 'to provide the framework for an effective and orderly reorganization of the existing school districts of this State through the retention of certain existing school districts and the combination of other existing school districts.' 14 Del.C. § 1001.2

Appellant Delaware State Board of Education and its members were placed under an explicit timetable by this statute. By September 1, 1968, it was to develop specific criteria for implementing a reorganization plan in accordance with requirements contained in the statute; by October 24, 1968, it was required to develop a plan conforming to these criteria, to submit the plan to local boards of education, and to receive and pass on their objections to the proposed plan. 14 Del.C. § 1004(a) and (b). Section 1005 provided that on July 1, 1969, 'all proposed school districts contained in the plan as adopted [under § 1004] shall be constituted and established as reorganized school districts.'3

Section 1004(c) contained an exclusion which was the basis of appellees' constitutional attack on the statute.4 It provided that, in contrast to the wide discretion conferred upon the state board with respect to other school districts in the State, the city of Wilmington should constitute a single school district. The District Court sustained appellees' claim that this provision invidiously discriminated against Negroes, finding that although there had been no intent to do so on the part of the legislature the effect of the statute was to lock in Negro school children within the Wilmington school district in a way that might not have resulted if that district had been subject to the state board's discretionary power to consolidate as were the remaining districts in the State under the 1968 legislation. The District Court summarized this portion of EEA in the following language:

'The key reorganization provisions of the Act provided an exemption of approximately one year from the long-standing requirement in Delaware law that consolidation of contiguous school districts must be approved by a referendum in each of the districts affected. 14 Del.C. §§ 1001-05. In other words, for a limited time, the State Board of Education was authorized to consolidate school districts according to the dictates of sound educational administration and certain statutory criteria. The Wilmington School District was explicitly excluded from the reorganization powers of the State Board by § 1004(c)(4): 'The proposed school district for the City of Wilmington shall be the City of Wilmington with the territory within its limits.' Wilmington was also excluded implicitly from any consolidation plan by § 1004(c)(2), which limited the maximum pupil enrollment in any proposed school district to 12,000.' 393 F.Supp., at 438 (emphasis added).

The difficulty with the District Court's holding, quite apart from its constitutional merits, is that the statute authorized action by appellant state school board only until July 1, 1969. As the District Court explicitly found, the reorganization powers from which Wilmington was excluded lapsed on that date. After that date, neither the city of Wilmington nor Negro school children attending schools in the city could suffer any discrimination as a result of the state board's enforcement of the statute: the state school board no longer had unilateral power to effect consolidation. That step can be accomplished only by approval of the voters in the affected school districts by referendum. Under 14 Del.C. § 1027, while a voter-approved consolidation plan can be rejected by the state board in its discretion, a voter-rejected consolidation plan can not be resurrected by the state board.5

Thus by July 1, 1969, the state board had been relegated, Cinderella-like, to the status which it occupied prior to the 1968 legislation. The provision of § 1004(c), limiting the authority of the state board with respect to the school district consisting of the city of Wilmington, was relevant, if at all, at the time this case was heard by the three-judge court, only as an historical fact. Whatever may be the proper weight to be accorded this historical fact in the assessment by a single-judge district court of the factors made relevant inMilliken, it was functus officio as a part of an operative statute.

A three-judge District Court cannot enjoin the operation of a statute which has expired by the time the Court's decree is entered. Indeed, so strongly has this Court felt about the necessity for a 'live controversy' that it has vacated the judgment of the District Court where the statute was repealed after the ruling of that court but before decision here. Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U.S. 412, 92 S.Ct. 574, 30 L.Ed.2d 567 (1972). A fortiori, a prayer for restraint against a state officer's enforcement of a statute which expired prior to litigation presents a dead issue. The grant of judicial power in Art. III of the United States Constitution limits federal courts to cases or controversies, and a dispute about the constitutionality of a statute which is no longer in effect is moot in the classical sense.

II

Presumably the Court's summary and unexplained affirmance of the judgment of the District Court upholds its issuance of an injunction against the enforcement of sections of a law which by their own terms have expired. By reason of the summary nature of the Court's action, however, neither the parties nor the District Court can know what additional effect the affirmance here may have. Although the parties have briefed the Milliken issues, I believe that there are all but insurmountable jurisdictional difficulties to the Court's reach- ing them, whether it were to affirm or to reverse the injunctive portion of the District Court's judgment. I would at the very least note probable jurisdiction and hear argument on them in order to make a principled determination as to whether we have authority on this appeal to deal with those issues at all.

A.

On the assumption that the District Court was correct in issuing the injunction against the enforcement of the Delaware statute, an assumption with which I disagree for reasons previously stated, there is the most serious question as to whether the Court could reach the Milliken issues even if it wished to do so. This case is here on direct appeal only because 28 U.S.C. § 1253 authorizes such appeal 'from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.'

This language stands in sharp contrast to the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1252, dealing with direct appeals from District Court's judgments invalidating Acts of Congress, the relevant language of which is:

'Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of any court of the United States . . . holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action, suit or proceeding. . . .'

Construing this language in United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960), the Court stated that it seemed 'to indicate a desire of Congress that the whole case come up . . ..' 362 U.S. 17, 27 n. 7, 80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524.6

By contrast, the much narrower language of § 1253 allows appeal here not from a final judgment or decree but only from 'an order granting or denying . . . an interlocutory or permanent injunction . . ..' It is established by the consistent holdings of this Court that this section, together with 28 U.S.C. § 2281, are to be narrowly, rather than broadly, construed. Gonzalez v. Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 98, 95 S.Ct. 289, 42 L.Ed.2d 249 (1974); Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 248, 61 S.Ct. 480, 85 L.Ed. 800 (1941).

The Court's opinion in Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 76, 80 S.Ct. 568, 4 L.Ed.2d 568 (1960), is highly instructive on this point. There the issue was whether, in an appeal pursuant to § 1253, this Court and the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain nonconstitutional attacks on the challenged statute as well as...

To continue reading

Request your trial
39 cases
  • Coalition to Save Our Children v. BD. OF EDUC., Civ. A. No. 1816-1822 MMS.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Delaware)
    • February 1, 1991
    ...eleven school districts in northern New Castle County. Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F.Supp. 428, 438 (D.Del.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 963, 96 S.Ct. 381, 46 L.Ed.2d 293 (1975). After three weeks of evidentiary hearings, the three-judge court rejected remedial plans proposed by the parties and ordered the......
  • Evans v. Buchanan, Civ. A. No. 1816-1822.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Delaware)
    • April 10, 1981
    ...de jure segregation in the former Wilmington school district and ten suburban districts in Northern New Castle County. 423 U.S. 963, 96 S.Ct. 381, 46 L.Ed.2d 293 (1975). Following that decision, the three-judge court concluded after an evidentiary hearing that an inter-district remedy was n......
  • Evans v. Buchanan, Civ. A. No. 1816 to 1822.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Delaware)
    • January 9, 1978
    ...in New Castle County. Evans v. Buchanan, 379 F.Supp. 1218 (D.Del.1974), and 393 F.Supp. 428 (D.Del.), summ. aff'd., 423 U.S. 963, 96 S.Ct. 381, 46 L.Ed.2d 293 (1975). In formulating the appropriate remedy to redress the systemwide violation, the three-judge court relied heavily on the guida......
  • Morgan v. Kerrigan, s. 75--1184
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • January 14, 1976
    ...district boundaries are drawn with segregative intent, Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F.Supp. 428, 445--46 (D.C.Del.), aff'd 423 U.S. 963, 96 S.Ct. 381, 46 L.Ed.2d 293 (1975); United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 374, 46 L.Ed.2d 288 (1975); see Un......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Mapped out of local democracy.
    • United States
    • Stanford Law Review Vol. 62 No. 4, April - April 2010
    • April 1, 2010
    ...the districts); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 433-36 (D. Del. 1975) (three-judge court), summarily aff'd by Buchanan v. Evans, 423 U.S. 963, 963 (1975) (three Justices dissenting) (finding interdistrict violations including state transportation funding and policies, optional attendan......
  • Collective individualism: deconstructing the legal city.
    • United States
    • University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 145 No. 3, January 1997
    • January 1, 1997
    ...1358, 1360 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); see also Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 432 (D. Del. 1975), aff'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975) ("[T]o the extent that segregation imposed by state law has had inter-district effects, federal courts can fashion appropriate inter-d......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT