Buchanan v. Kerr-McGee Corp.

• Decision Date: 18 October 1995
• Docket Number: KERR-M,No. 16097,16097
• Citation: 121 N.M. 12,908 P.2d 242,1995 NMCA 131
• Parties: Muriel BUCHANAN, Claimant-Appellant, v.cGEE CORPORATION, d/b/a Quivira Mining Company, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

Page 242

908 P.2d 242

121 N.M. 12

Muriel BUCHANAN, Claimant-Appellant, v.KERR-McGEE CORPORATION, d/b/a Quivira Mining CompanyRespondent-Appellee.

No. 16097.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Oct. 18, 1995.

[121 N.M. 13] Earl Mettler, Mettler & LeCuyer, P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Claimant-Appellant.

George W. Kozeliski, Gallup, New Mexico, for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

BUSTAMANTE, Judge.

Muriel Buchanan(Claimant), widow of Henry Buchanan(Worker), appeals an order denying her claim for death benefits under the New Mexico Occupational Disease Disablement Law (the Occupational Disease Law).NMSA 1978, §§ 52-3-13 to -60 (Repl.Pamp.1991 & Cum.Supp.1995).Claimant raises two issues on appeal: (1) is Claimant's claim for death benefits barred by a settlement and release made by Worker during his lifetime, and (2) did the Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) err in deciding Worker's lung cancer was noncompensable because of the presence of a non-occupational risk factor?Deciding that there is no bar and that the WCJ applied an incorrect standard of proof to the facts, we reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Worker was an underground uranium miner employed by Kerr-McGee Corporation d/b/a Quivira Mining Company(Employer) and its subsidiaries for more than twenty years.In 1985, Worker suffered a work-related back injury for which he filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits.In addition, Worker joined a silicosis claim under the Occupational Disease Law to the back injury action.In 1987, the district court awarded Worker compensation benefits for his back injury.Contemporaneously, Worker and Employer entered into a settlement agreement with regard to the silicosis claim which required Employer to pay Worker $15,000 in exchange for a release (the Release) in full of all claims under the Occupational Disease Law.Worker signed the Release in January 1987.The Release included the following language:

However, if it should develop that I did receive any other injuries or damages or was involved in any other accident or suffered any other exposure which might hereafter lead to another occupational disease disablement while employed by KERR-McGEE CORPORATION or QUIVIRA MINING COMPANY, f/k/a KERR-McGEE NUCLEAR CORPORATION, at any time, then this Release forever releases and discharges KERR-McGEE CORPORATION, QUIVIRA MINING COMPANY, f/k/a KERR-McGEE NUCLEAR CORPORATION, and their subsidiaries, insurers, successors and assigns, and their officers, agents, servants and employees who or which could or might possibly be liable for any such injuries, disablement or damages, whether discovered or latent or otherwise.

Worker and Employer stipulated that the settlement would bind Worker and "his dependents."Claimant did not read or sign the Release and she took no part in the negotiation and settlement of Worker's claims under the Occupational Disease Law.

In January 1993, Worker was diagnosed with lung cancer.Worker filed an occupational disease claim against Employer.In September 1993, Worker died of " '[m]etastatic squamous cell carcinoma of the lung' " while his claim was pending.Claimant eventually filed her own complaint seeking death benefits and medical expenses.

The WCJ ordered the case to be submitted on briefs and stipulated facts.After briefing, the WCJ dismissed Claimant's complaint on two grounds, each independently fatal to Claimant's course of action: (1) the Release bars Claimant's claim; and (2) Worker's disablement and death were not caused by an occupational disease arising out of his employment.

DISCUSSION

With regard to issues of fact, we review this case using the whole record standard of review.SeeHerman v. Miners' Hosp., 111 N.M. 550, 552, 807 P.2d 734, 736(1991);Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight), 108 N.M. 124, 126-30, 767 P.2d 363, 365-69(Ct.App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 33, 781 P.2d 305(1988).Whole record review is not an excuse for an appellate court to reweigh the evidence and replace the fact finder's conclusions with its own, although it does allow the reviewing court greater latitude to determine whether a finding of fact was reasonable based on the evidence.Herman, 111 N.M. at 553, 807 P.2d at 737.With regard to issues of law, this Court determines whether the WCJ correctly applied the law to the facts, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the determination below.SeeGolden Cone Concepts, Inc. v. Villa Linda Mall, Ltd., 113 N.M. 9, 12, 820 P.2d 1323, 1326(1991);see alsoTexas Nat'l Theatres, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 97 N.M. 282, 287, 639 P.2d 569, 574(1982).

Issue 1.Does the Release Bar Claimant's Recovery for Death Benefits?

The WCJ determined that the express language of the Release bars Claimant's recovery of death benefits.The WCJ reached her decision by applying broadly accepted concepts of contract interpretation and public policy, with which we have no quarrel in the abstract.For example, the WCJ noted that the courts of New Mexico favor settlement and that settlements will be enforced in accordance with their terms absent an ambiguity in the terms of the settlement agreement or release.SeeRatzlaff v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 98 N.M. 159, 163, 646 P.2d 586, 590(Ct.App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794(1982).In addition, a settlement agreement or release can be challenged if there is a lack of consideration, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, mistake, undue influence, overreaching, or other factors supporting unenforcability.Id.Hendren v. Allstate Ins. Co., 100 N.M. 506 508, 672 P.2d 1137, 1139(Ct.App.1993).Claimant did not assert that there was any ambiguity in the Release, and the WCJ found no evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, duress, or other grounds for challenging the Release.Absent a direct challenge to the facial validity of the Release, the WCJ held that Worker had released Employer from all claims arising under the Occupational Disease Law.

The WCJ's decision presupposes that Worker's valid release is also effective to release Claimant's cause of action as a surviving dependent under the Occupational Disease Law.We disagree with this premise and the conclusion that follows from it.We hold that Claimant, as Worker's widow and dependent, has independent statutory rights to death benefits which arise upon Worker's death, and Claimant is not bound by the Release.The claim of a dependent arising from the death of a worker is a new and separate claim and is not derivative of the worker's claim.SeeGonzales v. Sharp & Fellows Contracting Co., 48 N.M. 528, 537-38, 153 P.2d 676, 681-82(1944);2 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation§ 64.10(1995).A unilateral settlement or release by a worker of his or her own claims does not bar the surviving dependent's claim even if the release signed by the worker explicitly purports to release the dependent's claim, as was the case here.Brown v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 127 N.J.Super. 93, 316 A.2d 478, 480(Ct.App.Div.1974), aff'd per curiam, 65 N.J. 555, 325 A.2d 689(1974);Fossum v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 289 Or. 787, 619 P.2d 233, 237(en banc), reh'g denied and modified, 290 Or. 267, 624 P.2d 1074(1980);2 Larson, supra, § 64.12(1995).Our holding is in accord with the great weight of authority from other jurisdictions.SeeKay v. Hillside Mines, Inc., 54 Ariz. 36, 39, 91 P.2d 867, 870(1939);American Steel Foundries v. Industrial Comm'n, 361 Ill. 582, 198 N.E. 687, 690(1935);Routh v. List & Weatherly Const. Co., 124 Kan. 222, 257 P. 721, 724(1927);In re Cripp, 216 Mass. 586, 104 N.E. 565, 566(1914);Smith v. Kiel, 115 S.W.2d 38, 41(Mo.Ct.App.1938);Viersen & Cochran Drilling Co. v. Ford, 425 P.2d 965, 967-68(Okla.1967).

Restated in the language of contract law, Claimant's cause of action under the Occupational Disease Law is a new and separate claim, and it is not barred by the Release because Claimant was not a party to the Release and received no consideration for relinquishment of her dependent's claim for death benefits.SeeFleet Mortgage Corp. v. Schuster, 112 N.M. 48, 49, 811 P.2d 81, 82(1991)(it is a general rule that one who is not a party to a contract cannot maintain suit upon it, nor is bound by it).

The Occupational Disease Law does not directly address the issue before us.That is, there is no specific provision of the Occupational Disease Law which explicitly states that survivor's benefits constitute a claim completely separate and apart from the worker's claim.In addition, there is no provision in the statute which addresses in any fashion the effect of a broadly worded release form executed by a worker but not signed by any of worker's dependents.We can glean, however, the outcome most compatible with the intent and purpose of the Occupational Disease Law by comparing its treatment of the worker's disability benefits with the treatment accorded dependent's death benefits.

Section 52-3-10(A) provides:

A.There is imposed upon every employer a liability for the payment of compensation to every employee of such employer who suffers total disablement by reason of an occupational disease arising out of his employment, subject to the following conditions[.]

In contrast, Section 52-3-10(B) provides:

B.There is imposed upon every employer a liability for the payment of compensation to the dependents of every employee in cases where death results from an occupational disease arising out of his employment, subject to the following conditions[.]

The Occupational Disease Law thus draws a clear distinction between an employer's obligation to its employees for benefits during their lifetime and an employer's obligation to "the dependents" of its employees for death benefits.

Similarly, Section 52-3-14(A), (B), and (G) distinguish between the benefits payable to the worker and those payable to the worker's dependents upon the worker's death.The benefits payable to dependents are: (...