Buchanan v. Tower Automotive, Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 January 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-C-925.,No. 97-C-1182.,No. 97-C-1192.,No. 97-C-926.,97-C-925.,97-C-926.,97-C-1182.,97-C-1192. |
| Citation | 31 F.Supp.2d 644 |
| Parties | Gwendolyn BUCHANAN and Georgia Hamberlin, Plaintiffs, v. TOWER AUTOMOTIVE, INC., Tower Automotive Products Company, and A.O. Smith Corporation, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
F. Thomas Olson, Hall Charne Burce & Olson, Milwaukee, WI, for Plaintiffs.
Shelly A. Ranus, Timothy G Costello, Krukowski & Costello, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
This is a race discrimination case. However, it did not begin as one case. Instead, it began as multiple cases which were ultimately, upon stipulation of the parties, consolidated into one case. The net result of the foregoing is that, as of February 20, 1998, the date upon which the order of consolidation was signed, there was pending before this court a complaint in which plaintiffs Georgia Hamberlin ("Hamberlin") and Gwendolyn Buchanan Mallory ("Buchanan") allege that they were discriminated against on the basis of their race when they were not interviewed and/or selected for the position of manpower clerk by the defendants. The relevant conduct giving rise to the allegations is alleged to have occurred in October and November 1994. At that time the plaintiffs were employees of defendant A.O. Smith Corporation ("A.O.Smith"). However, and as is found more particularly in the statement of facts set out below, in or about April 1997, defendant Tower Automotive Products Co. purchased from A.O. Smith certain assets of A.O. Smith Automotive Products Co., Inc., which was at that time a division of A.O. Smith. Tower Automotive Products Co. continued to utilize the assets of A.O. Smith Automotive Products Co., Inc. in the same manner and fashion that A.O. Smith had utilized those assets. Tower Automotive Products Co. also continued to employ substantially all of the employees that were formerly employed by A.O. Smith Automotive Products Co., Inc. Defense counsel has entered an appearance on behalf of all three defendants — Tower Automotive, Inc., Tower Automotive Products Co., Inc., and A.O. Smith Corporation. Furthermore, the defendants have collectively filed a motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint. Consequently, for purposes of brevity, the defendants will be referred to throughout this Decision and Order collectively as "Tower".
To reiterate, the plaintiffs claim that they were discriminated against by Tower. They assert claims under Title VII, i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Since the filing of this action the parties have engaged in extensive discovery. Now, after the close of such discovery, Tower has filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of this action. Tower's motion has now been fully briefed by the parties and is ready for resolution. For the reasons which follow, Tower's motion for summary judgment is granted.
Consistent with its obligation under Local Rule 6.05 (E.D.Wis.), Tower submitted proposed findings of fact in support of its motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs responded to those proposed findings of fact and, consistent with Local Rule 6.05(b)(2), presented additional proposed factual propositions to which Tower has replied. The net result is that the following facts are undisputed for purposes of resolution of Tower's motion. Additional undisputed material facts, however, may be referenced throughout the body of this Decision and Order.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin has jurisdiction to preside over this matter, or to otherwise decide if it has jurisdiction to so preside, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(3) and 1981, and 18 U.S.C. § 1331. (Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact ("DPFF") # 1).
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin is the proper federal venue for this civil action. (DPFF, # 2).
Plaintiff Hamberlin is an adult resident of the State of Wisconsin. (Deposition of Georgia Hamberlin ("Hamberlin Dep.") at 4) (DPFF # 3).
Plaintiff Buchanan is an adult resident of the State of Wisconsin. (Deposition of Gwendolyn Buchanan Mallory ("Buchanan Dep.") at 4) (DPFF # 4).
Defendant Tower Automotive, Inc. ("Tower Automotive") has its principal place of business located in Minneapolis, Minnesota. (DPFF # 5).
Defendant Tower Automotive Products Company, Inc. ("Tower Automotive Products") maintains its corporate headquarters and principal place of business in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and operates as a division of Tower Automotive. Tower Automotive Products is engaged in the business of manufacturing and distributing automobile and truck frames. (Affidavit of Robert F. Trednic ("Trednic") ("Trednic Aff.") at ¶ 8) (DPFF # 6).
Defendant A.O. Smith has its corporate headquarters and principal place of business located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Prior to April 1997, A.O. Smith was engaged at its facilities on North 27th Street in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in manufacturing and distributing automobile and truck frames. (Trednic Aff. at ¶ 7) (DPFF # 7).
In April 1997, Tower Automotive Products purchased from A.O. Smith certain assets of A.O. Smith Automotive Products Company, Inc. ("A.O. Smith Automotive"), which was at that time a division of A.O. Smith. (Deposition of Robert F. Trednic ("Trednic Dep.") at 4) (Trednic Aff. at ¶ 6) (DPFF # 8).
Tower Automotive Products continues to utilize the assets of A.O. Smith Automotive in the same manner and fashion that A.O. Smith had utilized those assets. Tower Automotive Products also continues to employ substantially all of the employees that were formerly employed by A.O. Smith Automotive. (Trednic Dep. at 4-5) (Trednic Aff. at ¶¶ 8-9) (DPFF # 9).
Tower Automotive Products presently manufactures and distributes automobile and truck frames at its facilities located on North 27th Street in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. (Trednic Aff. at ¶ 7) (DPFF # 10).
The hourly production employees at Tower Automotive Products are members of various unions and are subject to the provisions of various collective bargaining agreements. (Deposition of Trudy Fredenberg ("Fredenberg") ("Fredenberg Dep.") at 11-12) (DPFF # 11).
Hamberlin was hired by A.O. Smith on September 21, 1974. (Hamberlin Dep. at 6) (DPFF # 12).
Hamberlin worked a variety of hourly production jobs for A.O. Smith and continued her employment with Tower Automotive Products after April 1997. (Hamberlin Dep. at 64, 142-54, Ex. 6) (DPFF # 13).
While working as a production employee at A.O. Smith, Hamberlin joined the A.O. Smith Steelworkers Union, Local No. 19806 ("Steelworkers Union"). She was covered by the collective bargaining agreement between A.O. Smith and the Steelworkers Union. (Hamberlin Dep. at 15-16) (DPFF # 14).
Hamberlin continued to work as a production employee following Tower Automotive's purchase of the assets of A.O. Smith Automotive, a division of A.O. Smith. (Hamberlin Dep. at 142-45) (DPFF # 15).
Prior to obtaining employment at A.O. Smith, Hamberlin obtained an Associates Degree in Business Administration from Sawyer Business College in 1978. (Hamberlin Dep. at 5-6) (DPFF # 16).
Buchanan was hired by A.O. Smith as a production employee on April 21, 1976. (Buchanan Dep. at 13) (DPFF # 17).
While working as a production employee at A.O. Smith, Buchanan joined the Steelworkers Union. She was covered by the collective bargaining agreement negotiated between A.O. Smith and the Steelworkers Union. (Buchanan Dep. at 11) (DPFF # 18).
Buchanan continued to work as a production employee following Tower Automotive's purchase of the assets of A.O. Smith Automotive, a division of A.O. Smith. (Buchanan Dep. at 130) (DPFF # 19).
Buchanan obtained a Bachelor's Degree in Professional Communication in Business Management from Alverno College in 1987. (Buchanan Dep. at 6) (DPFF # 20).
Buchanan obtained a Master's Degree in Communications from Marquette University in 1993. (Buchanan Dep. at 10) (DPFF # 21).
In 1994, Clinton Day ("Day"), an African-American male, was employed by A.O. Smith as a manpower clerk in the Manpower Department. (Deposition of Clinton Day ("Day Dep.") at 14-15) (DPFF # 22).
In 1994, Fredenberg was employed by A.O. Smith as administrator in the Manpower Department. (Fredenberg Dep. at 15) (DPFF # 23).
In 1994, Trednic was employed by A.O. Smith as supervisor of the Manpower Department (Trednic Dep. at 5) (DPFF # 24).
In or about October 1994, Day advised Fredenberg that he intended to retire from A.O. Smith at the end of December 1994. (Day Dep. at 17-18) (Fredenberg Dep. at 15) (DPFF # 25).
Shortly thereafter, Fredenberg advised Trednic that Day planned to retire at the end of December 1994, and that his manpower clerk position would be vacant. (Fredenberg Dep. at 15-16) (Trednic Dep. at 8) (DPFF # 26).
Fredenberg and Trednic felt that it was necessary to fill Day's manpower clerk position as soon as possible due to the critical nature of the job duties performed in that position. (Fredenberg Dep. at 16-17) (Trednic Dep. at 8, 16, 22-24) (DPFF # 27).
The individual chosen to fill the manpower clerk position vacated by Day would be responsible for processing requests submitted by production floor personnel for hourly workers. That would require an analysis of the terms of the applicable collective bargaining agreements to determine which employees were eligible for the available positions, whether through recall, transfer, bumping or hire, and which employees would be affected by such production moves. (Fredenberg Dep. at 7-15) (Trednic Dep. at 37-38) (DPFF # 28).
At the direction of Trednic, Fredenberg created a list of job-related qualifications for the manpower clerk position. (Fredenberg Dep. at 16-17) (Trednic Dep. at 12-13) (DPFF # 29).
Those job-related qualifications were then given to Georgia Polansky ("Polansky") to be incorporated into a "Position...
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...are irrelevant to whether the Title VII Plaintiff has raised a prima facie case of disparate treatment"); Buchanan v. Tower Automotive, Inc., 31 F.Supp.2d 644, 654 (E.D.Wis.1999) (failure to interview based race is a violation of Title VII). Plaintiff offers sufficient evidence that her ini......