Buchanan v. Williams

• Decision Date: 06 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2:05-0091.,2:05-0091.
• Parties: Tracey A. BUCHANAN, Plaintiff, v. Harold WILLIAMS, individually and in his official capacity, Jimmy Austin, Smith County Sheriff's Department and Smith County, Tennessee, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

434 F.Supp.2d 521

Tracey A. BUCHANAN, Plaintiff, v. Harold WILLIAMS, individually and in his official capacity, Jimmy Austin, Smith County Sheriff's Department and Smith County, Tennessee, Defendants.

No. 2:05-0091.

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Cookeville Division.

June 6, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Chadwick W. Stanfill, Nimmo, Hoehn & Nimmo, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff.

John D. Kitch, Nashville, TN, James David Bass, Carthage, TN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

HAYNES, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Tracey A. Buchanan, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Defendants: Harold Williams, individually and in his official capacity as deputy sheriff of Smith County; Jimmy Austin, a Tennessee citizen; the Smith County Sheriff's Department and Smith County, Tennessee. Plaintiff asserts claims for violations of her rights under Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and for a conspiracy to violate those rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Plaintiff also asserts pendent state law claims for conversion, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence and civil conspiracy. Plaintiff's claims arise out of the seizure of her automobile and its contents as well as a search of her purse by the Defendant Williams, who was acting as a Deputy Sheriff of Smith County when he conducted these searches and seizures, in concert with the Defendant Austin.

Before the Court are the Defendant Williams' and Smith County Defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 20) and the Defendant Austin's motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 23). In their motions, Williams and the Smith County Defendants argue, in sum: (1) that Plaintiff's state law claims fall within the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, ("TGTLA") Tenn.Code § 29-20-100 et seq. over which state courts have exclusive jurisdiction; (2) that the Smith County Sheriff's Department is not a proper party for Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims; (3) that with Smith County as a Defendant, Plaintiffs Section 1983 claim against Williams in his official capacity should be dismissed as unnecessary; (4) that Williams, in his individual capacity is entitled to qualified immunity; (5) that Smith County cannot be held liable under Section 1983 due to the lack of unlawful policy, custom or practice; and (6) that punitive damages against Smith County are unavailable as a matter of federal law. The Defendant Austin's motion argues in essence, that proof is insufficient to support a judgment on Plaintiff's federal and state claims against him.

Plaintiff responds that her proof is sufficient to support a judgment against all Defendants on all claims and that her federal rights were clearly established at the time of the Defendants' acts.

A. Review of the Record¹

Prior to the search and seizure at issue, Plaintiff and Defendant Austin had a personal relationship. On July 29, 2004, Austin, a former deputy sheriff of Smith County, Tennessee sued Plaintiff in the General Sessions County of Smith County, Tennessee and obtained a judgment against her in the amount of $4,355.87. To enforce his judgment, Austin secured a writ of execution from the General Sessions Court of Smith County, Tennessee. On October 8, 2004, the writ was issued to the Wilson County Sheriff's department for Plaintiff's 2000 Mercury Cougar.

At Austin's request, Williams, a deputy sheriff of Smith County, traveled to Plaintiff s residence in Davidson County, Tennessee to serve and execute the writ. Williams seized Plaintiff's 2000 Mercury Cougar that contained her purse, antique clock, jewelry box and other personal property. Austin accompanied Williams in this seizure of Plaintiff's personal property and drove Plaintiff's vehicle to the Smith County Sheriffs Department. Austin later told Plaintiff that he went to the jail to get an officer to go with him to serve the writ and to seize her automobile and that Williams told him that he would go. (Docket Entry No. 17, Buchanan Deposition at p. 84).

It is disputed whether these Defendants allowed Plaintiff to retrieve her personal property on the day of the seizure. Austin later told Plaintiff that he learned from Williams that she had no money in her purse on the day of the seizure. Plaintiff later recovered her jewelry box and antique clock that were damaged. A few days after the seizure of Plaintiff's vehicle, Austin told Plaintiff that he and Williams searched the trunk of her vehicle. Id. p. 102. Austin was not employed as a deputy of Smith County at the time of the seizure. (Docket Entry No. 33, Bane Deposition at p. 27).

B. Conclusions of Law

"The very reason of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 56, Federal Civil Judicial Procedure and Rules (West Ed.1989). Moreover, "district courts are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgment sua sponte, so long as the opposing party was on notice that she had to come forward with all of her evidence." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Accord, Routman v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 873 F.2d 970, 971 (6th Cir.1989).

In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the United States Supreme Court explained the nature of a motion for summary judgment:

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment 'shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.

As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.

Id. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis in the original and added in part). Earlier the Supreme Court defined a material fact for Rule 56 purposes as "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citations omitted).

A motion for summary judgment is to be considered after adequate time for discovery. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where there has been a reasonable opportunity for discovery, the party opposing the motion must make an affirmative showing of the need for additional discovery after the filing of a motion for summary judgment. Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 355-57 (6th Cir.1989). But see Routman v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 873 F.2d 970, 971 (6th Cir.1989).

There is a certain framework in considering a summary judgment motion as to the required showing of the respective parties as described by the Court in Celotex

Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.. .. [W]e find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (emphasis deleted).

As the Court of Appeals explained, "[t]he moving party bears the burden of satisfying Rule 56(c) standards." Martin v. Kelley, 803 F.2d 236, 239, n. 4 (6th Cir.1986). The moving party's burden is to show "clearly and convincingly" the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Sims v. Memphis Processors, Inc., 926 F.2d 524, 526 (6th Cir.1991)(quoting Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir.1986)). "So long as the movant has met its initial burden of `demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,' the nonmoving party then `must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 353 (6th Cir.1989) (quoting Celotex and Rule 56(e)).

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the Court of Appeals warned that "[t]he respondent must adduce more than a scintilla of evidence to overcome the motion [and] . . . must `present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.' " Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989)(quoting Liberty Lobby ). Moreover, the Court of Appeals explained that

The respondent must `do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.' Further, '[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find' for the respondent, the motion should be granted. The trial court has at least some discretion to determine whether the respondent's claim is `implausible.'

Street, 886 F.2d at 1480 (cites omitted).

If both parties make their respective showings, the Court then determines if the material factual dispute is genuine, applying the governing law.

More important for present purposes, summary judgment will not lie if the...