Buchanan v. Wood

• Decision Date: 04 June 1986
• Citation: 720 P.2d 1285,79 Or.App. 722
• Parties: Dennis BUCHANAN, in his capacity as County Executive, and Multnomah County, a home rule political subdivision of the State of Oregon, Respondents-Cross- Appellants, v. Daniel E. WOOD, Appellant-Cross-Respondent. A8306-04179; CA A32883.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

Page 1285

720 P.2d 1285

79 Or.App. 722

Dennis BUCHANAN, in his capacity as County Executive, and Multnomah County, a home rule political subdivision of the State of Oregon Respondents-Cross- Appellants, v. Daniel E. WOOD, Appellant-Cross-Respondent.

A8306-04179; CA A32883.

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted May 24, 1985.

Decided June 4, 1986.

Susan E. Watts, Portland, argued the cause for appellant-cross-respondent. With her on the briefs were Jack L. Kennedy and Kennedy, King & Zimmer, Portland.

John B. Leahy, County Counsel, Portland, argued the cause for respondent-cross-appellant. With him on the briefs was Jane Ellen Stonecipher, Asst. County Counsel, Portland.

Before JOSEPH, C.J., ^* and WARDEN and NEWMAN, JJ.

NEWMAN, Judge.

Defendant appeals a judgment declaring that the Court Reorganization Act (the Act) ¹ preempted a Multnomah County Home Rule charter provision ² for election of a District Court Clerk and that defendant was not entitled to a salary for the position. Plaintiffs cross-appeal from the award of attorney fees to defendant for trial and for appeal. ³ ORS 19.010(1) and ORS 19.010(2). We affirm on the appeal and reverse on the cross-appeal.

In October, 1981, the Governor signed the Act. It provided that, effective January 1, 1983, the state would assume primary responsibility for the operation and administration of the state's courts. The Act declared that,

"as a matter of state-wide concern, it is in the best interests of the people of this state that the judicial branch of state government, including the appellate, tax, circuit and district courts, be funded and operated at the state level. The Legislative Assembly finds that state funding and operation of the judicial branch can provide for best state-wide allocation of governmental resources according to the actual needs of the people and of the judicial branch by establishing an accountable, equitably funded and uniformly administered isystem of justice for all the people of this state." (Emphasis supplied.)

It is not disputed that the Act created state employed district court clerks and district court administrators to perform "duties, powers and functions" that, under prior law, had been performed by county employed clerks and court administrators. ⁴

On May 18, 1982, however, the voters of the county, by initiative Measure 6, amended the charter to provide for the election of a county employed district court clerk. The initiative provided:

"QUESTION: Shall certain county appointive offices be made elective, their salaries be set by popular vote, and other restrictions be enacted?

"PURPOSE: Amends County Home Rule Charter by making these presently appointed officers elective by people: Sheriff, County Clerk, District Court Clerk and County Assessor * * *."

The explanation in the Voters Pamphlet specified that the functions of the district court clerk were to be those "presently performed by the District Court Administrator selected by a majority of the county's 13 district court judges."

On August 26, 1982, the Board of County Commissioners appointed defendant district court clerk pending the election of a clerk. Before his appointment, defendant was assistant to the district court administrator. The Board also adopted Ordinance No. 336 which provided:

"The district court clerk of Multnomah County shall assist in the performance of the duties of the District Court Administrator under the supervision of the District Court Administrator."

In a special election in September, 1982, the county voters failed to repeal the May amendment. In the November, 1982, general election, the voters elected defendant to be district court clerk and approved a salary for the position of $30,130 per year.

As assistant to the district court administrator, defendant became a state employe on January 1, 1983, and the state paid him a salary for that position. ⁵ Defendant also received a salary from the county as district court clerk, although the Board did not assign duties to him in place of or in addition to those that he performed as a state employe. ⁶ Defendant performed no services as district court clerk after December 31, 1982.

In April, 1983, plaintiff Buchanan, as County Executive, directed the county comptroller to withhold defendant's county salary. Thereafter, the county filed this action to determine if the Act abolished the county office of district court clerk and if defendant was entitled to a salary for that office after December 31, 1982. Defendant counterclaimed for the amount of his salary from April 30, 1983, and for his attorney fees.

In his first assignment, defendant asserts that the court erred in ruling that the Act preempted the charter amendment of May, 1982, creating the elective office of district court clerk. Defendant concedes that under the Act the state took over the duties that, pursuant to the May measure, the Board had assigned to him as district court clerk, but he argues that the Board should have assigned to him other duties that the state did not take over.

Defendant, however, misdescribes the nature of the office of district court clerk that the voters created. The wording of the initiative amending the charter and the explanation in the Voters' Pamphlet show that the May, 1982, initiative gave to that office the particular functions that the district court administrator then performed. The functions that the initiative gave were taken over by the state pursuant to the Act. See Or.Laws 1981 (Special Session), ch. 3, § 12. The Act and the amended county charter conflicted, assigning the same functions to different offices.

Our resolution of the conflict necessarily involves defendant's second assignment, in which he argues that Article VI, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution precludes the state from preempting the county office. ⁷ Plaintiff responds that defendant's argument is a claim that the Act is unconstitutional and that, because defendant did not plead unconstitutionality as an affirmative defense, we should not consider it. ORCP 19 B. Defendant did, however, raise the issue both before and after trial, and it was argued extensively below. Plaintiff was not prejudiced by defendant's failure to plead unconstitutionality. Moreover, we cannot resolve the conflict between the state law and the county charter without resort to the constitution. Accordingly, we consider defendant's argument.

Defendant correctly asserts that the state's legislative power is limited by Article VI, section 10, which states:

"A county charter may provide for the exercise by the county of authority over matters of county concern. * * * A county charter shall prescribe the organization of the county government and shall provide directly, or by its authority, for the number, election or appointment, qualifications, tenure, compensation, powers and duties of such officers as the county deems necessary. Such officers shall among them exercise all the powers and perform all the duties, as distributed by the county charter or by its authority, now or hereafter, by the Constitution or laws of this state, granted to or imposed upon any county officer. * * * The initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people by this Constitution hereby are further reserved to the legal voters of every county relative to the adoption, amendment, revision or repeal of a county charter and to legislation passed by counties which have adopted such a charter * * *."

That provision gives "home rule" counties authority over "matters of county concern." See also Caffey v. Lane County, 298 Or. 183, 187, 691 P.2d 94 (1984). Legislative enactments, however, remain preeminent in substantive matters of statewide concern. See Pacific N.W. Bell v. Multnomah Co., 68 Or.App. 375, 378, 681 P.2d 797, rev. den. 297 Or. 547 (1984). The leading cases on conflicts between local "home rule" authority and state legislative power concern state constitutional provisions on city home rule, ⁸ which differ from Article VI, section 10. The city home rule provisions create an analogous sphere of local authority and, accordingly, we rely on them to resolve the conflict here. See Multnomah Kennel Club v. Dept. of Rev., 295 Or. 279, 666 P.2d 1327 (1983); Schmidt v. Masters, 7 Or.App. 421, 428, 490 P.2d 1029 (1971), rev. den. (1972). ⁹

Two types of state statutes impinge on local autonomy: "those which regulate the organization of local government and those which deal with substantive state policy and affect local government." City of Roseburg v. Roseburg City Firefighters, 292 Or. 266, 275, 639 P.2d 90 (1981). We are faced here with the latter kind, because the organization of the court system is of paramount state concern. The effect of the Act on county governments is a result of the state's implementation of its substantive policy. In such a case, the state statute "prevails over contrary policies preferred by some local governments if it is clearly intended to do so, unless the law is shown to be irreconcilable with the local community's freedom to choose its own political form." LaGrande/Astoria v. PERB, 281 Or. 137, 156, 576 P.2d 1204, aff'd on rehearing 284 Or. 173, 586 P.2d 765 (1978). (Footnote omitted.)

Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, the voters intended to, and did create, the office of district court clerk to perform specific functions--those that the district court administrator then performed. The state's intention to preempt those functions is clear. The dissent concedes that the act preempted all of those functions, but suggests that the county "office" remained in existence and that the salary continued to attach to it. To suggest such a result overlooks the intent of the voters when they adopted the initiative. Their intent to create this elective office of district court clerk is inseparable from their intent to give it the functions that the district court administrator then performed. The state's...