Bucher v. Northumberland County

• Decision Date: 10 October 1904
• Docket Number: 217
• Citation: 59 A. 69,209 Pa. 618
• Parties: Bucher v. Northumberland County, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

59 A. 69

209 Pa. 618

Bucher v. Northumberland County, Appellant

No. 217

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

October 10, 1904

Argued May 23, 1904.

Appeal, No. 217, Jan. T., 1903, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. Northumberland Co., Jan. T., 1903, No. 217, on verdict for plaintiff in case of George D. Bucher v Northumberland County. Reversed.

Trespass to recover damages for personal injuries. Before AUTEN, J.

At the trial it appeared that on January 3, 1899, the plaintiff fell on an icy pavement of the courthouse in Sunbury. At the trial defendant presented, inter alia, the following points:

18. A county is not a municipal corporation, it is merely a quasi corporation and can exercise only such powers and must perform only such duties as are given it by the state; it is an involuntary civil division of the state, created by statute to aid in the administration of the government. It is created by the sovereign power of the state, of its own sovereign will, without the particular solicitation, consent or concurrent action of the people who inhabit it, and it is merely the agent of the commonwealth. Answer: We will affirm that point; but we say to you, gentlemen of the jury, that we do not see its application to the case on trial. [17]

19. County commissioners are public officers elected under the general laws, and perform their duties, which are public under the authority of the state, and they are accountable to the public alone for their negligence. Answer: In its application to the case we refuse the point as drawn. [18]

20. The state not being chargeable with the negligence of its officers or agents, and the county being merely a subdivision and the agent of the commonwealth, it is not liable as such for the negligence of its officers. Answer: Refused. [19]

21. A county is not liable at common law for the negligence of the county commissioners. Answer: Refused. [20]

15 1/2. Under all the evidence in this case there can be no recovery because the county is not liable. Answer: Refused. [21]

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $2,500. Defendant appealed.

Errors assigned among others were (17-21) above instructions quoting them.

The judgment is reversed.

Charles C. Lark, county solicitor, with him Fred. B. Moser, for appellant. -- The defendant county being a quasi corporation and a political subdivision thereof and the agent of the state is not liable to the plaintiff in this case: Com v. Marshall, 3 W.N.C. 182; Kittanning Academy v. Brown, 41 Pa. 269; Vankirk v. Clark, 16 S. & R. 286; Chester County v. Brower, 117 Pa. 647; Com. v. Brice, 22 Pa. 211.

Counties being merely parts of the state government, they partake of the state's immunity from liability. The state is not liable except by its own consent; and so the county is exempt from liability, unless the state has consented; counties are not liable to implied common-law liabilities as municipal corporations are: Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 667; Hamilton County Commissioners v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109; Kincaid v. Hardin, 53 Iowa 430 (5 N.W. 589); Jasper County v. Allman, 142 Ind. 573 (42 N.E. Repr. 206); Ford v. School District, 121 Pa. 543; Sheppard v. Pulaski County, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 672 (18 S.W. Repr. 15); Lefrois v. Monroe County, 162 N.Y. 563 (57 N.E. Repr. 185); Wehn v. Gage County, 5 Neb. 494.

Charles M. Clement and John F. Schaffer, with them M. H. Taggart, for appellee. -- A county is liable in damages for injuries due to a defective sidewalk along county property: Lamoreux v. Luzerne County, 116 Pa. 195; Chester County v. Brower, 117 Pa. 647; Erie City v. Schwingle, 22 Pa. 384; Wilkinsburg Borough v. Home for Aged Women, 131 Pa. 109; Phila. v. Penna. Hospital, 143 Pa. 367; Grier v. Sampson, 27 Pa. 183.

Before MITCHELL, C.J., FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT and POTTER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE POTTER:

This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from a fall upon the sidewalk in front of the courthouse of the defendant county. The plaintiff alleges that his fall was due to the failure of the defendant to remove an accumulation of ice and snow from the pavement.

The main question for consideration upon this appeal is whether a county in this state can be held liable for the negligence of its officers in failing to keep in good condition the sidewalk in the public street in front of the county buildings.

It is strongly urged by the appellant that the defendant county, being a quasi corporation and a political subdivision of the state, is not liable to the plaintiff in this case. In support of this contention it is suggested that the courthouse is built primarily for the accommodation of the courts, on ground, the legal title to which must be held by the county. That courts are institutions of the state, and in maintaining the courthouse, the county acts as the agent of the state, and the state not being liable, its agent cannot be.

The plaintiff in bringing this action seems to proceed upon the theory that the county, as an abutting property owner, occupies precisely the same position as any private individual owner, or any corporation holding property for private use. But the title to the ground occupied by public buildings is vested in the county only for public use. Section 9 of the Act of April 15, 1834, P.L. 537, declares that the titles of courthouses, jails, prisons and work houses together with the lots of land thereunto belonging, "shall be and they are hereby vested in the respective counties for the use of the people thereof, and for no other use." By section 10 of the same act the commissioners are required, having first obtained the approbation of two successive grand juries and of the court of quarter sessions, . . . to erect such building or buildings as may be necessary for the accommodation of the courts.

Counties are very generally recognized as quasi corporations upon which duties wholly involuntarily are imposed. They possess no power and can incur no obligations not authorized by statute. The general rule is thus stated in Dillon on Mun. Corp. sec. 997: "In the United States there is no common-law obligation resting upon quasi corporations, such as counties, townships, and New England towns, to repair highways, streets or bridges within their limits, and they are not obliged to do so, unless by force of statute. Even when the legislature enjoins upon corporations of this character the duty to make and repair roads, streets and bridges, and confers the power to levy taxes therefor, the general tenor of the decisions is to treat this as a public and not a corporate duty, and to regard such corporations in this respect as public or state agencies, and not liable to be sued civilly for damages caused by the neglect to perform this duty, unless the action be expressly given by statute."

In Com. v. Brice, 22 Pa. 211, it was held that the principle that the public is not chargeable with the negligence of its officers is applicable to county officers. It was said (page 214): "The fact that a county has certain rights recognized in law as its own, does not sever it as a body from the state; but only distinguishes it in the state, and as a part of it, and allows local officers to enforce, in the name of the county, certain rights and duties which otherwise would have to be enforced in the name of the state. The institution of local divisions is merely a means of government, and counties and their officers are but parts of the machinery that constitutes the public system. This form of administration is no more a division of the government than is the allotment of particular localities, or particular functions, to what are usually called state officers."

In the case of Kittanning Academy v. Brown, 41 Pa. 269 (p. 272), this court said: "If counties were municipal corporations, they would have the power of regulating their internal policy by what the old Romans called leges municipales. But they lack the legislative faculty, and so are not, strictly speaking, corporations. Still, they are quasi corporations. They can perform many of the functions of proper municipalities. They can sue and be sued, can purchase, hold and alien lands, can appoint agents to execute their will, and can evidence their acts by a common seal. But because they cannot legislate, everything done by the agents of a county must be first authorized by the legislative power of the state."

The present chief justice, in Briegel v. Philadelphia, 135 Pa. 451, calls attention to the different measure of liability which applies to quasi corporations not having full municipal functions, and quotes from 2 Dillon on Mun. Corp sec. 961: "It is essential . ....