Buchholz v. Meyer Njus Tanick, PA

Decision Date03 January 2020
Docket NumberNo. 18-2261,18-2261
Citation946 F.3d 855
Parties Gustav BUCHHOLZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MEYER NJUS TANICK, PA, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge.

Gustav Buchholz received two letters from law firm Meyer Njus Tanick, PA ("MNT") about two debts he owed to Synchrony Bank. The letters, which appeared on MNT letterhead and were signed by an MNT attorney, informed Buchholz that MNT was acting as a debt collector and provided contact information for him to either challenge or pay the debts. Buchholz does not dispute the debts, but he alleges that the letters made him feel anxious and fear that MNT would sue him if he did not promptly pay.

So Buchholz sued MNT. Buchholz alleges that MNT violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. , by giving the impression that an attorney had reviewed his case and determined that he owed the debts. Buchholz alleges that MNT processes so many debt collection letters each day that no MNT attorney could possibly engage in a meaningful review of individual claims.

But Buchholz's case fails before we can even consider its merits. Because Buchholz has shown no injury in fact that is traceable to MNT's challenged conduct, he lacks standing to sue, and we lack jurisdiction to hear his case. We affirm the district court's dismissal of Buchholz's complaint.

I.

Buchholz, a Michigan resident, received two letters in May 2018 about overdue payments he owed on two accounts with Synchrony Bank.1 The letters came from MNT, a Minneapolis-based law firm, and appeared on MNT's letterhead. As Buchholz explains in his complaint, each letter referred to a specific account, but the content is identical and "formulaic in nature," save for the "information regarding the specific account the letter was referencing." (R. 12, First Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 14–15.) MNT attorney Kara Harms signed both letters, but Buchholz alleges that because the signatures are identical, MNT must have inserted "some sort of pre-populated or stock signature." (Id. at ¶ 17–18.)

Although MNT is a law firm, the letters do not threaten legal action. Indeed, the letters purport to be "communication[s] [ ] from a debt collector" and explain that MNT "has been retained to collect the above-referenced debt[s]." (See, e.g. , R. 14-2, Letter.) Still, Buchholz alleges that after he received the letters, he "felt an undue sense of anxiety that he would be subjected to legal action if prompt payment was not made." (R. 12, First Am. Compl. at ¶ 32.) Because of that anxiety, Buchholz "conferred with his counsel" about MNT's letters. (Id. at ¶ 33.) And then Buchholz sued MNT.

Buchholz alleges that MNT violated the FDCPA—specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, e(3), and e(10). His claim relies on a series of inferences, including that Synchrony Bank "clearly works with [MNT] on a regular basis" and that Synchrony Bank has a "proportionally large number of accounts that are subjected to collection activities." (Id. at ¶ 23, 22.) Buchholz asks the court to infer that because MNT works with Synchrony, MNT must send "a large number of collection letters to consumers on a daily basis." (Id. at ¶ 23.) And Buchholz alleges that because Kara Harms (whose signature appears on the two letters he received) is MNT's only Michigan-based attorney, "it is unlikely" she devoted "much time to Plaintiff's accounts, let alone the additional letters she sends out on a daily basis." (Id. at ¶ 29.) Indeed, Buchholz claims that MNT processes such a high volume of debt-collection letters that Harms and other MNT attorneys cannot engage "in a meaningful review of the underlying accounts prior to determining whether to send the collection letters." (Id. at ¶ 30). But the letters, which appear on law firm letterhead, create the impression that the attorney "has reviewed the file and made the professional, considered determination to send the letter." (Id. at ¶ 41.) And this, according to Buchholz, violates the FDCPA.

MNT moved to dismiss Buchholz's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failing to state a claim. The district court granted MNT's motion, holding that Buchholz lacked standing to sue MNT. Alternatively, the court held that even if it had subject-matter jurisdiction, it would have dismissed Buchholz's complaint for failing to state a claim. Buchholz appeals the dismissal of his complaint.

II.

This court reviews de novo a district court's dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g. , Cartwright v. Garner , 751 F.3d 752, 760 (6th Cir. 2014). In doing so, we take the allegations in the complaint as true. Id. at 759.

A.

Not all disputes have a home in federal court. Article III limits the judicial power to resolving actual "Cases" and "Controversies," not theoretical questions. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. And one "telltale" of a case or controversy is that "the parties have standing to bring it."

Hagy v. Demers & Adams , 882 F.3d 616, 620 (6th Cir. 2018). Although the term "standing" does not appear in Article III, our standing doctrine is "rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy" and limits "the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court[.]" Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). The effect is to confine "the federal courts to a properly judicial role[.]" Id.

There are three elements to standing. The plaintiff "must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Id. The plaintiff carries the burden of establishing those three elements, and at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must clearly allege facts demonstrating each element. Id. Moreover, the injury in fact must be both "(a) concrete and particularized, ... and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical[.]" Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Buchholz must first show that he has suffered an injury in fact, which itself includes two sub-elements, concreteness and particularization. Id. The parties do not dispute that Buchholz's injury is particularized, but as the Supreme Court has repeatedly underscored, particularization is not enough. Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1548 ; Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus , 573 U.S. 149, 158, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014) ; Massachusetts v. EPA , 549 U.S. 497, 517, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007). The injury must also be concrete, and the parties dispute if the alleged injury here meets that criteria.

A concrete injury is, like it sounds, "real and not abstract." Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (punctuation and internal quotation marks omitted). But that does not mean all concrete injuries must be tangible economic or physical harms. Spokeo noted that "intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete." Id. at 1549. Specifically, the Court cited cases that vindicate First Amendment values as examples in support. Id. (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum , 555 U.S. 460, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009) (free speech); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah , 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (free exercise)); see also Rachel Bayefsky, Psychological Harm and Constitutional Standing , 81 Brook. L. Rev. 1555, 1557 (2016) ("The idea that certain intangible interests can count for Article III standing is by no means novel.").

On the other hand, courts have recognized that there are, as there must be, limits on what kinds of allegations of intangible harm satisfy Article III. The Spokeo Court held that "it is instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts." 136 S. Ct. at 1549. In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State , the Court held that the alleged "psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees" is "not an injury sufficient to confer standing under Art. III[.]" 454 U.S. 464, 485, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). And in Humane Society of United States v. Babbitt , the court held that "general emotional ‘harm,’ no matter how deeply felt, cannot suffice for injury-in-fact for standing purposes." 46 F.3d 93, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1995). See also Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. , 551 U.S. 587, 619–20, 127 S.Ct. 2553, 168 L.Ed.2d 424 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (Courts should reject the "conceptualizing of injury in fact in purely mental terms[.]"). And at least one commentator has noted that "the Supreme Court has not directly analyzed the cognizability of psychological harm as injury-in-fact." Bayefsky, supra , at 1557.

In addition, and relevant here, some concrete, intangible injuries may also flow from statutory violations. Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1549. Indeed, Congress may "define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before[.]" Lujan , 504 U.S. at 580, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). But again, there are restrictions. Though Congress may create new procedural rights and provide plaintiffs with causes of action to vindicate those rights, separation-of-powers principles prevent Congress from expanding the scope of the judicial power beyond what Article III permits. See Huff v. TeleCheck Servs., Inc ., 923 F.3d 458, 464–65 (6th Cir. 2019). Congress cannot confer standing on a plaintiff—and thus open the door to federal court—when the plaintiff has not sustained an injury in fact; Article III's standing requirements still apply. Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1549....

To continue reading

Request your trial
145 cases
  • S.B. by and through M.B. v. Lee
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee
    • October 12, 2021
    ...(1992) )). Standing requires the Court to determine whether the "door to federal court" is open to a plaintiff, Buchholz v. Meyer Njus Tanick , 946 F.3d 855, 862 (6th Cir. 2020), but Governor Lee aims to stop Plaintiffs from even reaching the door's threshold so that the Court can make that......
  • Pierre v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • April 1, 2022
    ...Sixth and Eighth Circuit decisions have moved in the direction of restricting standing in such cases. In Buchholz v. Meyer Njus Tanick, PA , 946 F.3d 855 (6th Cir. 2020), the Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of standing, with a majority opinion by Judge Nalbandian and a separate op......
  • Salermo v. Hughes Watters & Askanase LLP
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
    • January 28, 2021
    ...J, dissenting). Said another way, a "concrete injury is, like it sounds, ‘real and not abstract.’ " Buchholz v. Meyer Njus Tanick, PA , 946 F.3d 855, 861 (6th Cir. 2020), quoting Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1548. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 68–69 (Wolters Kluwer 8th ed 2020)......
  • Arizona v. Biden
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
    • March 22, 2022
    ...that their injury is "fairly traceable’ " to the defendant's challenged conduct is ‘relatively modest[.]’ " Buchholz v. Meyer Njus Tanick, PA , 946 F.3d 855, 866 (6th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Bennett v. Spear , 520 U.S. 154, 171, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) ).......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT