Buck v. Buck (In re Buck's Will)

• Decision Date: 03 July 1914
• Docket Number: No. 18699[152].,18699[152].
• Parties: In re BUCK'S WILL. BUCK v. BUCK et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

126 Minn. 275

148 N.W. 117

In re BUCK'S WILL.BUCK

v.BUCK et al.

No. 18699[152].

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 3, 1914.

Appeal from District Court, Dodge County; Arthur B. Childress, Judge.

Contest of the Will of Lewis Buck, deceased, by Dennis Buck against Mary Whipple Buck and others. From an order admitting the will to probate, contestant appeals. Affirmed.

See, also, 142 N. W. 729.

Syllabus by the Court

The evidence in this case, one involving the mental capacity of testator to make his will, is held not so clearly and palpably against the verdict of the jury as to justify this court in reversing the order of the trial court in denying a new trial.

The record presents no reversible error either in the admission or exclusion of evidence or in the instructions of the court to the jury. M. H. Boutelle and R. T. Boardman, both of Minneapolis, and S. L. Pierce, of Dodge Center, for appellant.

J. J. Truax, of West Concord, and Lord & Ronken, of Kasson, for respondent.

BROWN, C. J.

Lewis Buck, a resident of Dodge county, died on January 25, 1912, leaving a last will and testament bearing date August 21, 1906, in and by which he disposed of his property, estimated as of the probable value of $25,000, the most of which was given to charitable and religious associations. The will was presented for allowance to the probate court and duly admitted to probate. Appellant herein, Dennis Buck, an adopted son of the testator, contested the allowance of the will and appealed to the district court from the order admitting it to probate. On the trial in the district court two specific issues were, at the request of contestant, submitted to the jury, namely: (1) Was the testator at the date thereof of sufficient mental capacity to make the will? and (2) was it procured by undue influence? The jury answered the first in the affirmative, thereby finding that the testator had sufficient mental capacity to comprehend his act; but, by answering the second question in the affirmative, found that the will was procured by undue influence. Thereafter the proponent of the will moved the court for a new trial of the second issue-namely, whether the will was procured by undue influence-and the motion was granted. From that order contestant appealed to this court, and the order was affirmed. 122 Minn. 463, 142 N. W. 729. After the cause had been remanded from this court contestant moved for a new trial of the issue of mental capacity, basing the motion upon several grounds, among others, that the verdict of the jury was not sustained by the evidence, and errors occurring at the trial. The motion was denied, and contestant again appealed.

[3] 1. It was urged on the former appeal that the issues of mental capacity and undue influence are so intimately associated and connected that it was error for the trial court to grant a new trial as to one of the issues only. The contention was not sustained, and we follow and apply our former decision. While the issues are in a measure intimately connected, and evidence upon one would have a more or less bearing upon the other, yet they are separate and independent facts, and a finding upon oen would not control the other. The close association of the two issues comes more particularly in reference to the evidence, and not in reference to the principal fact embodied in each, which are essentially independent. This feature of the case can therefore have no controlling importance in the determination of the question, involved on this appeal, whether the court below erred in refusing a new trial upon the issue of mental capacity.

[1] 2. The first contention of contestant is that the verdict of the jury affirming the mental capacity of the testator is clearly and palpably against the evidence, and that the court erred in not granting a new trial of that issue. We have examined the record with care, and are unable to concur in this contention. It is unnecessary to review the evidence. It would serve no useful purpose. It is sufficient to say that we have fully examined it with the result stated. The case comes clearly within the rule of Hicks v. Stone, 13 Minn. 434 (Gil. 398). A large number of witnesses were examined on the trial, about an equal number on each side, and the capacity of testator to transact his affairs was affirmed on the one hand and disputed on the other. The showing by contestant of incapacity is not so clear as to justify this court, far removed from the trial, to interfere and declare the verdict palpably against the evidence. While the evidence offered by contestant tends to show some strange peculiarities in the life and conduct of testator, one fact stands out prominently and without dispute, namely, that testator was, prior and subsequent to the date of the will, of sufficient mental power and capacity to accumulate and retain, until his death, a considerable property, and clearly to designate in the will the persons to whom he wished it to go at his death. He appears to have been frugal, saving, and...