Buck v. City of Rainsville
Decision Date | 09 November 1990 |
Citation | 572 So.2d 419 |
Parties | Paul Edward BUCK, as administrator of the estate of Marvin Edward Buck, deceased v. CITY OF RAINSVILLE. 89-739. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Steven G. Noles, Fort Payne, for appellant.
Terry Gillis of Kellett, Gillis & Kellett, Fort Payne, for appellee.
On September 1, 1987, Marvin Edward Buck was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Michael Steven Buck. The vehicle overturned on Church Street in Rainsville, Alabama, and Marvin was killed.
On June 14, 1988, Paul Buck, Marvin's father, was granted letters of administration for Marvin's estate. On August 30, 1988, Paul, as administrator of Marvin's estate, filed a wrongful death action against the City of Rainsville (the "City"), Michael Steven Buck, and fictitiously named parties.
The City filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Paul had not complied with the time requirement for presenting claims against the City pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 11-47-23. The trial court entered a summary judgment for the City and made that judgment final pursuant to Rule 54(b), A.R.Civ.P.
Section 11-47-23 provides:
(Emphasis added.) Paul did not provide notice to the City of his claim within six months of Marvin's death. Section 11-47-23 requires that notice be filed within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. In Diemert v. City of Mobile, 474 So.2d 663, 666 (Ala.1985), the Court held that if an action on a claim against a city is filed within the six-month period prescribed in § 11-47-23 then "it is sufficient presentation of the claim under the statute." Accordingly, if Paul's cause of action "accrued" at a point within the six months preceding the date on which he filed his action, then he complied with § 11-47-23, and that provision does not bar his action. 1 To determine whether Paul timely presented his claim, we must determine when Paul's cause of action "accrued" for the purposes of § 11-47-23.
In Hunnicutt v. City of Tuscaloosa, 337 So.2d 346 (Ala.1976), the Court addressed that same issue. In that case, Linda Hunnicutt, as administratrix of the estate of Doris Burkhalter, filed a wrongful death action against the City of Tuscaloosa. Doris Burkhalter disappeared on October 2, 1973. On June 23, 1974, her body was found in an automobile in Lake Tuscaloosa. Linda Hunnicutt, Doris's daughter, was appointed administratrix of Doris's estate on August 16, 1974. Hunnicutt filed a claim with the city on December 9, 1974, and also filed a wrongful death action on the same date. Tuscaloosa moved for a summary judgment, alleging that Hunnicutt did not provide notice of a claim against the city within six months of the accrual of the cause of action, as required by § 476, Title 37, Alabama Code of 1940 (Recompiled 1958) (the predecessor of Ala.Code 1975, § 11-47-23). The trial court entered a summary judgment for Tuscaloosa, and Hunnicutt appealed.
This Court wrote:
337 So.2d at 348-50. (Emphasis added.)
According to Hunnicutt, for the purposes of § 11-47-23, a wrongful death cause of action accrues on the first day following the passage of five days after the discovery of the death of the individual whose death is the basis of the action. 2 Paul argues that Hunnicutt improperly--and unnecessarily--referred to June 29 as the date of "accrual" of the cause of action; he contends that the cause of action does not accrue for the purposes of § 11-47-23 until the appointment of a personal representative who is the plaintiff in a wrongful death action. Hunnicutt's reference to June 29 as the date of the accrual was unnecessary, because, measuring even from the date the death became known, the action was filed within six months.
Alabama's wrongful death statute, Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-410, provides that "a personal representative may commence an action [for wrongful death]." A wrongful death action is statutory and did not exist at common law. Brown v. Mounger, 541 So.2d 463 (Ala.1989); Downtown Nursing Home, Inc. v. Pool, 375 So.2d 465 (Ala.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 930, 100 S.Ct. 1318, 63 L.Ed.2d 763 (1980); Kennedy v. Davis, 171 Ala. 609, 55 So. 104 (1911). Under the statute, the cause of action is vested in the personal representative. 3 Ex parte W.S. Newell, Inc., 569 So.2d 725 (Ala.1990); Brown, supra, at 463; Downtown Nursing Home, at 466; Hatas v. Partin, 278 Ala. 65, 67-68, 175 So.2d 759, 761-62 (1965); Bell v. Riley Bus Lines, 257 Ala. 120, 123, 57 So.2d 612, 615 (1952); Holt v. Stollenwerck, 174 Ala. 213, 216, 56 So. 912 (1911). "The words 'personal representative' are broader in some respects, but when used in this statute, they mean the executor or administrator of the testator or intestate." Hatas, 278 Ala. at 67, 175 So.2d at 760.
We have addressed on several occasions when a cause of action accrues. Hunnicutt cited Home Insurance Co. v. Stuart-McCorkle, Inc., 291 Ala. 601, 608, 285 So.2d 468, 473, (1973), for this succinct and long-settled definition of when a cause of action accrues: "the cause accrues as soon as the party in whose favor it arises is entitled to maintain an action thereon." (Emphasis added.) Using that definition, Hunnicutt suggested that the wrongful death cause of action accrued on the day following the passage of five days after the discovery of the death of the person whose death was the basis of the action. That suggestion assumed that Linda Hunnicutt, as personal representative, was entitled to maintain the wrongful death action on the first day following the passage of five days after the discovery of her mother's death, even though at that time she had not been appointed personal representative of her mother's estate.
Even if that assumption was legally correct at the time of the holding in Hunnicutt, the assumption is not legally correct now. In a series of cases beginning in 1974, the Court has consistently held that except in certain cases involving the death of a minor (see § 6-5-391), an individual cannot maintain a wrongful death action unless he has been...
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