Buck v. Colbath
Decision Date | 01 December 1865 |
Citation | 18 L.Ed. 257,70 U.S. 334,3 Wall. 334 |
Parties | BUCK v. COLBATH |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
COLBATH sued Buck in one of the State courts of Minnesota, in an action of trespass for taking goods. Buck pleaded in defence, that he was marshal of the United States for the District of Minnesota, and that having in his hands a writ of attachment against certain parties whom he named, he levied the same upon the goods, for taking which he was now sued by Colbath. But he did not aver that they were the goods of the defendants in the writ of attachment.
On the trial Colbath made proof of his ownership of the goods, and Buck relied solely on the fact that he was marshal and held the goods under the writ in the attachment suit.
The court refused to instruct the jury that the defence thus set up was a sufficient one; and the plaintiff had a verdict and judgment. This judgment was affirmed on error in the Supreme Court of Minnesota, and the defendant brought the case here under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act; an act which, as most readers will remember, provides that a final judgment in any suit in the highest court of a State where is drawn in question 'the validity of an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against its validity,' may be reviewed in this court.
Mr. Peckham, for the marshal, plaintiff in error, contended that the question whether the fact of his office, set up by the marshal, was or was not a sufficient defence to the suit brought against him, had been settled in the affirmative by the case of Freeman v. Howe in this court.1 In that case White sued a railway company in the Federal court and the marshal attached a number of rail-cars: seizing and taking them into his own possession. While thus in his custody, the sheriff, under process from one of the State courts, sought to take them out of his possession under a writ of replevin. The marshal, in the replevin suit, set up by way of defence the authority under the Federal court by which he held the property; in other words, that he held it as marshal of the United States. And this court held that a sufficient defence.
If the present action were replevin instead of trespass it cannot be doubted that the plaintiff below would fail. The fact that the suit is one of trespass makes no difference. The thing has nothing to do with forms of action. The court, we may almost say, so declared in Freeman v. Howe. Quoting a former case in this court,2 and declaring specifically that they 'agree' to it, they say:
'It is a doctrine of law too long established to require citation of authorities, that where a court has jurisdiction it has a right to settle every question which occurs in the case . . . and that where the jurisdiction of a court and the right of a plaintiff to prosecute his suit in it have once attached, that right cannot be arrested or taken away by proceedings in another court.'
Now, this question whether the property which the marshal seized, was or was not liable to the attachment, does occur 'in the case.' It springs immediately out of it. A suit against him in a State court for a trespass in taking the property does, moreover, in effect 'arrest'—for it obstructs and hinders—the proceedings in the Federal court. It subjects the marshal and those under whose directions he acts to the annoyance of a multiplicity of actions in various jurisdictions for things springing out of the same 'question.'
Independently of which, trespass and replevin are universally concurrent remedies for taking goods as these have been taken. To hold that this action was properly brought and not overrule Freeman v. Howe, would be to hold that the marshal had the right to take these goods and was yet liable for a trespass; was bound to hold them, and yet should suffer for the detention.
The principles, we suppose, upon which Freeman v. Howe went were these:
1. That where the officers of a court, State or national, have taken possession of a res, under process of attachment or execution, as the property of the defendant in such process, such res is in the custody of the law, and the possession of such officers or court is exclusive.
2. That the question, whether such res, so seized as the property of the defendant in the process, is rightfully seized by the marshal as the property of the defendant in the process, or otherwise subject to the exigency of the writ, is one of jurisdiction, the authority to decide which belongs exclusively to the court issuing the process; or, in the language of this court, the 'question is one of right and title to the property under the Federal process, and which belongs to the Federal, not the State courts to determine.'
There was nothing new in these principles. Hogan v. Lucas,3 and Taylor v. Caryl,4 asserted the first; and other cases5 assert in effect the second.
The last principle was thus stated by Marshall, C. J., in Slocum v. Mayberry:
'If the officer has a right under the United States to seize for a supposed forfeiture, the question, whether that forfeiture has been actually incurred, belongs exclusively to the Federal courts, and cannot be drawn to another forum.'
It was argued, in Day v. Gallup,6 that a State court would have jurisdiction to try the question after the case in the Federal court was concluded, and thus no longer pending, and the question had not therein been raised or decided. But the argument is not sound. If a court has 'exclusive' jurisdiction to decide 'every question which occurs in the case,' other courts cannot be trying these questions either at the same time or at any other.
Neither is there any hardship or inconvenience in the law as we assert it. The fact—if it be a fact, as is probable—may be objected, that the marshal and Colbath, the two parties to this suit, are citizens of the same State; that the question, whether these goods belonged to Colbath or not, and whether Buck, the marshal, was or was not a trespasser, was not in issue in the attachment suit, out of which the suit below sprung; and that, being citizens of the same State, Colbath could not sue the marshal in the Federal court, nor ever have the question of trespass decided in that jurisdiction to which we say that the question exclusively belongs. The same sort of objection was made in Freeman v. Howe. It was there argued by counsel for the defendant in error that the plaintiffs in the replevin suit were remediless in the Federal courts, both parties being citizens of the same State. But the court says 'that this is a misapprehension, and that a bill in equity may be filed to restrain or regulate the suit at law, and to prevent injustice or an inequitable advantage; such bill being supplementary to the original suit, and maintainable without reference to the citizenship of the parties.' It says, moreover, 'In a proceeding in rem, any person claiming an interest in the property paramount to that of the libellant, may intervene by way of defence for the protection of his interest;' and adds, that 'the same is equally true of a proceeding by attachment.'
Colbath had, therefore, a complete means of righting himself in the Federal court; which was first seized of the case; which knew its history from the beginning; and which, from the extent of its knowledge in the matter, and from having all parties before it, was best able to do full and complete justice to all concerned.
Mr. Carlisle, contra, for Colbath, defendant in error, replied ably to these positions. The full and very luminous manner in which the whole subject is handled by the court, deciding in favor of the cause maintained by Mr. Carlisle, dispenses, however, with the necessity of presenting this gentleman's arguments, or of remarking more than that along with them he suggested, not pressing it strongly, a point of jurisdiction. On that point he observed that the pleadings presented a single issue: whether the goods taken were the goods which the marshal was authorized to take under the process which he held? The pleadings did not admit that the Federal process in the hands of the marshal authorized or purported to authorize him to take the goods of Colbath. Nor did they question or deny his authority to take the goods of the defendants named in the writ. On the contrary, they plainly admitted this authority, and limited the plaintiff's ground of action to the abuse of that authority and to the misapplication of it to subjects not purporting to be comprehended or affected by it. It was nothing to the purpose, Mr. Carlisle observed, that the marshal did the act complained of by color of his office and of process in his hands, if that process did not purport to authorize the act.
Here, then, was not drawn in question 'the validity of an authority exercised under the United States.' The Federal process was admitted to be valid in the case in which it was issued. It was, therefore, not a case within the provisions of the 25th section of the Judiciary Act.
Day v. Gallup, which closely resembled this case (being an action of trespass under like circumstances), was dismissed for want of jurisdiction; although the taking complained of plainly appeared to have been upon process of execution, issued out of the Federal court, it being held that no case under the 25th section necessarily presented itself upon the record.
There seems to be no reason to doubt that the case comes within the provisions of the 25th section of the Judiciary Act. The defendant claimed the protection of 'an authority exercised under the United States,' and the decision was against the protection thus claimed; or, in other words, against the validity of that authority, as a protection to him in that action. Whether the authority which he thus set up was valid to protect him, is a question for this court to decide finally, and is properly before us under the writ of error to the Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Upon the merits of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Kansas City Gas Co. v. Kansas City
...with a view to pointing out the distinctions which must be observed in the practical application of the principle. In Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, 18 L.Ed. 257, Mr. Miller said: 'The rule that, among courts of concurrent jurisdiction, that one which first obtains jurisdiction of a case has......
-
Phelps v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n
...12 L.Ed. 841; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, 16 L.Ed. 749; Covell. v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176, 4 Sup.Ct. 355, 28 L.Ed. 390; Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, 18 L.Ed. 257. the property of a stranger to the proceeding has been taken will not justify a writ of replevin, or any other dispossessory or ......
-
Troll v. City of St. Louis
...176 Mo. 670 ; Mishawaka Mfg. Co. v. Powell, 98 Mo. App. 530 ; Keegan v. King [D. C.] 96 Fed. 758; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450 ; Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334 ; White v. Schloerb, 178 U. S. 542 [20 Sup. Ct. 1007, 44 L. Ed. 1183]; Chicago Union Bank v. Bank of K. C., 136 U. S. 223-236 [10 Sup......
-
United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co.
...111 U. S. 176, 182, 4 S. Ct. 355, 358, 28 L. Ed. 390), and "essential to the dignity and just authority of every court" (Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, 341, 18 L. Ed. 257), I, of course, subscribe. But I perceive no conflict between this salutary rule and the suits brought by the United Stat......
-
Table of Cases
...[2] Buchanan, In re Marriage of, 150 Wn. App. 730, 207 P.3d 478 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . 30.05; 64.02[1]; 69.02[5] Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. 334, 18 L. Ed. 257 (1865). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14.02[6][c][i] Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96 P. 1079 (1908) . . . . . . . . . . ......
-
§14.02 Jurisdiction
...and relief sought is long established, having been declared by the United States Supreme Court in Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334, 18 L. Ed. 257 (1865). [ii] Comity The doctrine of comity allows a court to give effect to the judgments of another jurisdiction out of deference and resp......