Buck v. Gibbs, 12.

Decision Date05 August 1940
Docket NumberNo. 12.,12.
Citation34 F. Supp. 510
PartiesBUCK et al. v. GIBBS, Atty. Gen. of Florida, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Frank J. Wideman, of Washington, D. C., and Manley P. Caldwell, of West Palm Beach, Fla. (Louis D. Frohlich and Herman Finkelstein, both of New York City, of counsel), for plaintiffs.

George Couper Gibbs, Atty. Gen., of Florida (Thomas J. Ellis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lucien H. Boggs, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Andrew W. Bennett, of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for defendants.

Before HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge, and LONG and BARKER, District Judges.

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs are owners of musical copyrights or rights of renewal therein, which have been pooled with the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, hereafter called ASCAP. Defendants are the state officers charged with enforcement of the two statutes the suit brings in question. As originally brought, the suit was to enjoin the enforcement of Chap. 17807, Laws of Florida, 1937.1 There was a temporary injunction, an appeal and an affirmance.2 After the enactment of Chapter 19653, Florida Laws, 1939,3 it was extended by a supplemental bill to include that chapter in its scope and to obtain injunctive relief, temporary and permanent as to it.

The claim of the original and supplemental bills in general was: that the statutes were confessedly aimed at ASCAP and its constituent members and were class legislation of the most indefensible kind and that in addition to violating the equal protection, liberty of contract and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, they violated various other constitutional provisions, Federal4 and State.5

In particular the claim as to ASCAP was that it had been organized not to increase, or obtain unfair, prices for the performing rights of copyrighted musical compositions, but to protect authors, owners and publishers from the systematic piracy of their performing rights which, acting alone, they were powerless to prevent. And there was the further claim as to it that by fair and reasonable contracts and arrangements, it had at the same time afforded full public use of and access to copyrighted musical compositions at fair and reasonable prices, and secured to copyright owners, the benefits of the copyright law. While the claim as to the statutes in question was that they had been enacted, not in response to a public need, to make effective the general will of the people of Florida, but at the instigation of an organized group or band of radio broadcasters and other users of music in order that, the association stricken down and outlawed in Florida, they might with complete impunity again pirate the performing rights to copyrighted musical compositions without making payment to the owners therefor. As to the 1937 statute, the claim in general was that, though put forward as an anti-monopoly statute, it was really a statute designed and enacted, in the interest and at the behest of this anti-copyright group, to deprive the members of the society of the protection, in Florida, of the copyright laws. In particular it was that, by at once outlawing ASCAP and providing for the performance, without compensation to them, of the copyrighted vocal or instrumental musical compositions of its members, the statute undertook in effect to nullify the copyright laws and to take plaintiffs' properties in their copyrighted compositions without compensation and without due process.

As to the 1939 statute, the claim was that its rigorous provisions for registration, its prohibitions against and restriction on blanket licensing, its prohibitions against collection of compensation when based in whole or in part on any program not containing such composition and its general provisions for filing fees, taxes, etc., are so in derogation of the rights of owners under the copyright law, and so onerous, that they amount to an illegal taking for private use, that is, for the benefit of broadcasters and other users, of plaintiffs' rights in and under their copyrights.

The defense in general was: a denial that the legislation was oppressively or partisanly conceived and that it operated in violation of any constitutional protection, and an assertion that it aimed at and constitutionally reached, the evils of a combination, to fix prices and in restraint of trade. A combination, organized and operating to fix the prices to be paid for, and to restrain freedom of trade in, the public performance of individual copyrighted musical compositions at a fair price per use, by blanketing them together under general licenses covering many compositions of many owners, authors and composers, and refusing to license or permit the licensing individually and per use of particular compositions. In particular the defense as to the 1937 Act was: that it was an anti-monopoly Act and that taken as such it was valid; that sections 2-A and 2-B and 6, which purport to authorize the performance within the state of copyrighted musical compositions without payment by the users therefor, have been repealed by the 1939 Act; and that the remaining sections are valid and the Act as to them must stand as an anti-monopoly Act condemning and making illegal, combinations like those of ASCAP and the other plaintiffs.

As to the 1939 Act, the defense was: that it is in general an Act for disclosure, and as such is valid under Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347, 27 S.Ct. 95, 51 L.Ed. 216, 8 Ann.Cas. 137; and that its other provisions requiring blanket licenses by two or more persons and prohibiting sales or licenses at a price, based other than on a use in a program of the particular music sold or licensed, are mere regulatory measures to reach and do away with the evils of blanket licensing in all its forms.

With their contentions thus put forward, plaintiffs and defendants ring the changes on their respective arguments. Plaintiffs urge upon us that ASCAP is a beneficial, defendants that it is an evil institution; plaintiffs that the copyright laws protect them from the legislation; defendants that copyright owners may not, any more than others, form combinations to monopolize or restrain trade. If the case were as simple in its issues as each contender thinks it is, if it turned, on the one hand, simply on whether plaintiffs had rights and, on the other, as simply on whether these rights were subject to regulation, we could and would end it quite simply by saying to defendants, "The plaintiffs certainly do have rights in their copyrighted musical compositions", and to plaintiffs, "These rights are certainly not beyond reasonable state regulation".

But the answer to the questions the suit raises is not so simply found. For conceding both plaintiffs' rights and the State's power to subject them to reasonable regulation, the difficulty remains of determining whether the statutes in question are unreasonable prohibitions masking under the guise of regulation, or if regulations, whether, unduly and beyond the legitimate purpose to be served, they hamper and restrict plaintiffs' undoubted rights. In short, the question for decision comes down at last to, and is to be decided by, not a general statement of principles, for as to them there is no real dispute,6 but a construction and interpretation of the statutes under attack, as to what they purport to do and whether they may constitutionally do that.

Both plaintiffs and defendants see plainly enough that this is so and by an analysis both of the statutes as a whole and of each section thereof, plaintiffs undertake to show their invalidity, defendants their validity. Plaintiffs pointing to the confiscatory provisions of Sections 2-A, 2-B, 4-A, 4-B, 5-A, 5-B and 6, by which the 1937 Act undertakes to permit performance, in Florida, of copyrighted music without compensation, urge upon us that not only these sections but the statute as a whole is invalid because, not a reasonable regulation of, but a repressive prohibition of, dealings in copyrighted music, it breathes and attempts to make effective throughout the unconstitutional spirit of repression and reprisal. Outlawing ASCAP and those in association with it, and expropriating their property for the use, without compensation, of radio broadcasters and others, it, they say in violation of every constitutional principle, operates as a kind of Bill of Attainder.

Defendants concede the invalidity of Sections 2-A, 2-B and 6. Indeed at one stage of the proceedings before us they offered to submit to a permanent injunction as to them. They insist, however, that the vice of these sections is peculiar and confined to them and does not pervade the Act, and that because this is so and particularly because the Act contains a separability clause, Sec. 12, and because, in the reference in the 1939 Act to sections of the 1937 Act as unrepealed, these sections were not included, these invalid sections should, by a kind of judicial surgery, be excised from the Act, leaving it to stand in its other provisions as an anti-monopoly statute.

We do not think so. In complete agreement with what was said in Buck's case as to the invalidity of Sections 2-A and 2-B of the Nebraska law, we find invalid the similar sections of the Florida 1937 Law. For the same reasons, that they unreasonably interfere with and in effect deprive the owners of their copyright protection, by imposing unlawful conditions, in effect a servitude, in favor of those desiring to use them, upon the performing rights in their copyrighted musical compositions, and even under named conditions completely take the copyright, by permitting use without compensation, we find Sections 3, 4-A, 4-B, 5-A, 5-B and 6, also invalid.

There remain: Sections 1, 2-C and 3, in effect declaring ASCAP and similar societies illegal associations, outlawing its arrangements for license fees, and proscribing and making an offense, attempts to collect them; ...

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8 cases
  • Tornillo v. Miami Herald Pub. Co.
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • July 18, 1973
    ...v. Associated Press, D.C., 52 F.Supp. 362, 372.13 Pompano Horse Club Co. v. State, supra; 17 Fla.Jur.Injunctions, § 46.14 Buck v. Gibbs, D.C., 34 F.Supp. 510, Mod. 313 U.S. 387, 61 S.Ct. 962, 85 L.Ed. 1416 (1940); Hunter v. Owens, 80 Fla. 812, 86 So. 839 (1920): Cragin v. Ocean & Lake Realt......
  • Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co. of Nebraska
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska
    • December 9, 1944
    ...for the relatively parallel history of legislation in Florida see: Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 59 S.Ct. 725, 83 L.Ed. 1111; Buck v. Gibbs, D.C.Fla., 34 F.Supp. 510; and Marsh v. Buck, 313 U.S. 406, 61 S.Ct. 969, 85 L.Ed. 1426. It may be observed at this point that this court attaches no wei......
  • State v. Mayhew, 43575
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • December 19, 1973
    ...(Fla.App. 1973), 281 So.2d 600. CARLTON, C.J., concurs. 1 Lovell v. Griffin, 363 U.S. 444, 450, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949.2 Buck v. Gibbs, D.C., 34 F.Supp. 510, Mod., 313 U.S. 387, 61 S.Ct. 962, 85 L.Ed. 1416 (1940); Hunter v. Owens, 80 Fla. 812, 86 So. 839 (1920); Cragin v. Ocean & Lake R......
  • State v. Aiuppa
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • May 1, 1974
    ...certain questions as to the constitutional validity of the Georgia statute from which Ch. 73--120 was patterned.3 Id.4 Buck v. Gibbs, D.C., 34 F.Supp. 510, mod. 313 U.S. 387, 61 S.Ct. 962, 85 L.Ed. 1416 (1940); Hunter v. Owens, 80 Fla. 812, 86 So. 839 (1920); Cragin v. Ocean & Lake Realty C......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • THE STRANGE CAREER OF THE THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT: FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1954-1976.
    • United States
    • Case Western Reserve Law Review Vol. 72 No. 4, June 2022
    • June 22, 2022
    ...295 U.S. 89 (1935) (affirming three-judge district court from S.D.N.Y.); and then citing Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941), aff'g 34 F. Supp. 510 (N.D. Fla. 1940) (three-judge court)). Not all of the prominent Court decisions on abstention were from direct appeals. E.g., Douglas v. City o......

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