Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Saffold

• Decision Date: 18 April 1921
• Docket Number: 21551
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: BUCKEYE COTTON OIL CO. v. SAFFOLD

87 So. 893

125 Miss. 407

BUCKEYE COTTON OIL CO. v. SAFFOLD

No. 21551

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 18, 1921

APPEAL from circuit court of Leflore county, HON. S. F. DAVIS Judge.

Action by Boyd Saffold against the Buckeye Cotton Oil Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed, and cause dismissed.

Reversed, and cause remanded.

Sam L Gwin and B. L. Mayes, for appellant.

We respectfully submit that the plaintiff's testimony even if considered alone, and stretched to its utmost, wholly fails to establish any liability on the part of the defendant for his regretable injury.

We submit in the first place, that the mere statement of the plaintiff that the dust and lint which fell from the press room into the basement could have been prevented from so doing, unaccompanied by any explanation other than his unexplained remark of "by building a better track," is insufficient to establish negligence. And that it is obvious, even from a consideration of the plaintiff's testimony alone that his injury was simply an unfortunate accident in so far as the defendant is concerned, and that this case is plainly to be classified with the case of Iler v. Nix, 114 Miss. 293, 75 So. 12; R. R. Co v. Downs, 109 Miss. 142, 67 So. 962; Y. & M. V. R R. Co. v. Perkins, 108 Miss. 111, 66 So. 273; Crossett Lumber Co. v. Land, 84 So. 16.

But conceding, for the purpose of this argument, that the bare statement of the plaintiff just referred to is sufficient to and does tend to show negligence on the part of the defendant, it is perfectly obvious and manifest on the face of the plaintiff's testimony that the negligence of which he complains had no connection in point of fact or in point of law with his injury; that it did not contribute to his injury in whole or in part, but that, on the contrary his own deliberate and voluntary act of starting the press and then cleaning the running machinery (or of cleaning the running machinery without stopping the press) was the sole and approximate cause of his injury.

We submit that, notwithstanding our contributory negligence statute, it is not always the case that a negligent act imposes legal liability, and we make this statement having before us the remarks of this court in the case of Ragland v. Native Lumber Co., 78 So. 542.

It may be conceded (though this court merely says there may be some merit in the argument) that a plaintiff is not debarred of recovery by his negligence unless his negligence is "the sole and approximate cause of the injury." The law, conceding it so to be, is an authority in the defendant's favor; for it is obvious that in this case the plaintiff's negligence was the sole and approximate cause of his injury. There was no causal connection whatever between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury. The only negligence complained of was the failure of the defendant to prevent the dust and lint from falling from the press room into the basement. But the result of such negligence extended no further than the clogging of the press. There all causal connection ceases. The clogged condition of the press did not bring about or contribute in the slightest degree, in fact or in law, to the plaintiff's injury. His injury was solely the result of the plaintiff's own act in not cleaning out the cotton before he started the press, or of not stopping the press before he attempted to do so, and of his unheard of act of attempting to clean a piece of moving machinery with his hands. Not only is it true that such act of the plaintiff himself was the sole and approximate cause of the injury but this court in a clear and lucid opinion has already adjudicated that such is the case.

The decision of this court to which we refer is Ovett Land & Lumber Company v. Adams, 109 Miss. 740, 69 So. 499. In the case of Ovett Land & Lumber Company v. Adams, supra, the facts were as follows: "The appellant (defendant below) owned and operated a saw mill. Logs were hauled from the camps up an incline to the saw shed by means of a cable attached to the log car. A belt ran over a spool wheel, to which the cable was attached, and while the appellee was hauling a log up the incline he noticed that the leather belt was slipping off of the wheel, and without stopping the machinery he placed his foot against the rapidly moving belt in an effort to push it back into place on the wheel, and a lip or projection in said belt struck against his foot as the belt revolved, threw him down and injured his leg . . . Appellee contends he was confronted with a sudden emergency, and was attempting to keep the belt from slipping off the wheel, and thereby prevent an accident which would have resulted in an injury to himself and to the machinery. The appellant contends that the defective belt was not the approximate cause of the injury, and that the appellee should have pulled a lever and stopped the machine before attempting to adjust the belting."

In the lower court the appellant here, defendant there, requested a peremptory instruction which the court refused and the case went to the jury and the jury found for the plaintiff. It was established in the lower court and conceded in this court that the belting was defective and the briefs of counsel, as they appear in the record, were devoted wholly to a discussion of whether the plaintiff's act failing to stop the machine was the sole and proximate cause of his injury. The opinion of the court is very brief and we will set it out in full:

"COOK, J., delivered the opinion of the court. As we read the record in this case, the court should have excluded all of the evidence offered by the plaintiff, and directed a verdict for the defendant. The alleged defect in the belt was not the cause of the injury. The lip, on the belt was harmless, so far as the plaintiff was concerned. The master provided a perfectly safe contrivance to operate the machine, and instead of using the safe means provided the plaintiff undertook to stop the machine by pressing his foot on a rapidly moving belt. This act of his was the approximate and sole cause of his injury. Reversed and cause dismissed."

So it appears that in the case of Ovett Land & Lumber Company v. Adams, this court has expressly decided that when a machine is equipped with an appliance for stopping and starting it, and the employee attempts to repair a defect in the machine while the machine is running, without utilizing the appliance and stopping the machine, his failure to stop the machine is the proximate and sole cause of his injury."

And this court will find, by examining the briefs of counsel in that case, that the case arose after the passage of our contributory negligence statute and that a large portion of both briefs was devoted to a discussion of whether the fact the belt was defective (in other words that defendant was negligent) would permit plaintiff to recover in view of our contributory negligence statute, notwithstanding the act of the plaintiff in failing to stop the machine.

The case of Ovett Land & Lumber Co. v. Adams, so clearly and unquestionably decides this case that it would be vain to indulge in an extended argument to demonstrate that fact. It appears beyond all doubt that the press was equipped with appliances for starting and stopping it, and that the plaintiff could have stopped the press and cleaned out the cotton in perfect safety. In the case of Ovett Land & Lumber Co. v. Adams, the court expressly decides that where the machinery is so equipped and the employee attempts to remedy a defective part of the machinery, without stopping the machinery, his failure to stop the machinery, is the "sole and proximate cause of his injury." If any other authority than the case of Ovett Land & Lumber Co. v. Adams, is necessary, there are several other decisions of this court to the same effect. Such cases as this do not frequently find their way to this court but there are several cases where conduct of the plaintiff was substantially similar to the conduct of the plaintiff in this case, and in no such case has the court allowed a recovery to stand.

Two cases of this character are the case of Natchez Cotton Mill v. McLean, 33 So. 723, and Newman Lumber Co. v. Dantzler, 64 So. 931.

In the McLean case the plaintiff attempted to collect some grease from a pair of revolving cog wheels and her hand was caught in the wheels, and though a young girl this court declined to allow a recovery. In the Dantzler case the court holds that there can be no recovery where the servant attempted to pull a ravel strip off of a belt without disconnecting the machinery, and that the refusal of an instruction to such an effect was a reversable error where one of the witnesses testified such was the case.

And this court will note in the case of Ovett Land & Lumber Company v. Adams, supra, the plaintiff claimed to have been confronted with, and to have acted under, a sudden emergency, still the court did not allow him to recover. In this case the plaintiff makes no such claim, there is no suggestion of it in his pleadings or his testimony.

F. M. Witty, for appellee.

There was, as we have attempted to point out, ample evidence to warrant the jury in believing that, while plaintiff was operating defendant's press, the defendant permitted lint, cotton and dust to clog the machinery and to come into the press room in large quantities; that this could, without great inconvenience or expense, have been avoided, but defendant did not do so; that, because of this condition plaintiff was compelled himself to clean up the cotton and, in so doing, to place his hands into close and dangerous proximity to the running machinery, that this work of cleaning was as much a part of plaintiff's duties as operating...