Buckhalter v. Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 September 1985
• Docket Number: PEPSI-COLA,No. 84-2559,84-2559
• Citation: 768 F.2d 842
• Parties: 38 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 682, 38 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,539, 54 USLW 2075 Robert BUCKHALTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.GENERAL BOTTLERS, INC., Roger Thomas Kiekhofer, & Robert Friend, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 842

768 F.2d 842

38 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 682,

38 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,539, 54 USLW 2075

Robert BUCKHALTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PEPSI-COLA GENERAL BOTTLERS, INC., Roger Thomas Kiekhofer, &amp Robert Friend, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 84-2559.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 23, 1985.

Decided July 18, 1985.

Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc Denied Sept. 27, 1985.

Irene L. Hill, E.E.O.C., Washington, D.C., Robert Morris (Law Student), for plaintiff-appellant.

William R. Sullivan, Jr., Seyfarth Shaw Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.

Before BAUER and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and GRAY, Senior District Judge. ^*

COFFEY, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff, Robert Buckhalter, appeals the ruling of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois that his claims of race discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a) (1982), and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 (1982) are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm.

I

The record reveals that the defendant, Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers, Inc. ("Pepsi-Cola"), hired the plaintiff, Robert Buckhalter, in September 1975, as a production line employee at its 51st Street plant in Chicago, Illinois. On June 10, 1978, Pepsi-Cola discharged Buckhalter, a black male, for violating Rule of Conduct IV-11, which prohibits employees from possessing alcoholic beverages or drugs on company property. Some two days thereafter, on June 12, 1978, Pepsi-Cola also discharged David Lynch, a white male, and James Ault, a white male, for violating Rule of Conduct IV-11. Buckhalter, Lynch, and Ault each filed grievances through their union representative and a grievance hearing was held for each employee pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between Pepsi-Cola and Teamsters Local 744. Following the presentation of evidence at the grievance hearings, the Industrial Relations Manager upheld the discharge of Buckhalter and Lynch but reinstated Ault, finding that the employer failed to introduce sufficient evidence to establish that Ault had, in fact, violated the company rule. See In re Buckhalter and Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers, Inc., 7 Ill.H.R.C.Rep. 96, 103-07 (1982) ("In re Buckhalter"). Buckhalter appealed the decision of the Industrial Relations Manager to the Labor Management Committee, consisting of three union representatives and three representatives from the Association of Chicago Bottlers of Carbonated Beverages, and they, likewise, upheld Buckhalter's discharge.

In August 1978, Buckhalter filed a charge with the Illinois Fair Employment Practice Commission ("FEPC"), alleging that Pepsi-Cola had engaged in race discrimination because it reinstated Ault, a white employee, but did not reinstate Buckhalter, a black employee. The FEPC conducted an investigation into the discharge incident and in March 1979, found a lack of substantial evidence to support Buckhalter's claim. Buckhalter requested that the FEPC reconsider its decision and on May 29, 1979, the FEPC reversed its prior determination and issued a complaint of race discrimination in violation of section 3(a) of the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 48, p 853 (1978), which provided in pertinent part that:

"It is an unfair employment practice: (a) For any employer, because of the race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry of an individual to refuse to hire, to segregate, or otherwise to discriminate against such individual with respect to hire, selection and training for apprenticeship in any trade or craft, tenure, terms or conditions of employment...." ¹

In accord with the provisions of Illinois law, the FEPC assigned Buckhalter's race discrimination complaint to Chief Administrative Law Judge Patricia Patton, who conducted an adjudicatory hearing of four days in length, in March 1980. Buckhalter and Pepsi-Cola, who were each represented by counsel, engaged in extensive pre-hearing discovery and submitted exhaustive legal memoranda in support of their respective positions. At the hearing, the parties examined and cross-examined witnesses in accord with the applicable Illinois Rules of Evidence. The parties introduced some ninety exhibits and documents including statistical data of the patterns and racial breakdowns of Pepsi-Cola's employee discharges. In addition, the parties made opening and closing statements to the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") and argued numerous evidentiary issues. At the close of the four-day adversarial proceeding, the testimony was compiled in five volumes of transcripts totaling 680 pages in length.

In July 1980, the Illinois legislature replaced the FEPC with the Illinois Human Rights Commission ("Commission" or "HRC"). See Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 68, p 1-101 et seq. (1983). The investigatory and adjudicatory powers of the HRC are identical to those of the FEPC but under the new law, the Illinois Department of Human Rights ("Department") conducts all investigations and the Commission conducts all adjudicatory hearings. The Illinois law provides that the Department of Human Rights is "[t]o issue, receive, investigate, conciliate, settle, and dismiss charges...." Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 68, p 7-101(B). According to the law, a complainant may file a written charge with the Department within 180 days after the occurrence of an alleged civil rights violation. The Department notifies the respondent of the filing of the written charge within ten days and subsequently conducts an investigation of the alleged discriminatory practice. If the Department determines that substantial evidence of a civil rights violation exists, it initially attempts to remedy the situation through a conciliation conference with the respondent. If no agreement can be reached, the Department files a complaint with the HRC. See Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 68, p 7-102(F).

The HRC is a body composed of nine members, appointed by the Governor of Illinois, that is authorized "to hear and decide by majority vote requests for review and complaints filed...." Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 68, p 8-102. Within five days after a complaint is filed by the Department, the HRC serves a copy of the complaint upon the respondent and notifies the parties of a scheduled adjudicatory hearing. The complainant and respondent may appear at the hearing with counsel to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The parties are afforded compulsory process "to compel the attendance of a witness or to require the production for examination of any relevant books, records or documents whatsoever." Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 68, p 8-104(C). The testimony taken at the hearing must be under oath or affirmation and a transcript of the entire proceeding must be compiled and filed with the HRC. Moreover the testimony elicited at the hearing "is subject to the same rules of evidence that apply in courts of [the State of Illinois] in civil cases." Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 68, p 8-106(E). The ALJ issues written findings of fact, reviews the evidence presented, and recommends that the Commission either affirm, modify, or dismiss the claim of employment discrimination. The ALJ submits the findings of fact and recommendations to a three-member panel of the HRC which considers the evidence along with the oral argument presentations of the complainant and respondent. The HRC may then "adopt, modify or reverse in whole or in part the findings and recommendations of the hearing officer." Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 68, p 8-107(E)(1). The law of Illinois requires that the HRC adopt the ALJ's findings of fact unless they are "contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence." Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 68, p 8-107(E)(2). The HRC issues a written order and decision that is published in the Illinois Human Rights Commission Reporter "to assure a consistent source of precedent." Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 68, p 8-110. If either the complainant or respondent want to contest the HRC decision, they may file an application for rehearing and if granted the case is reheard by the entire nine-member Commission. Moreover, the parties are at all times entitled to appeal the HRC decision and obtain additional judicial review in the Illinois Circuit Court system pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Review Act. See Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, p 3-101 et seq. On appeal, the Illinois Circuit Court's standard of review is that "the Commission's findings of fact shall be sustained unless the court determines that such findings are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence." Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 68, p 8-111(A)(2).

In March 1982, the ALJ issued her findings of fact and conclusions of law that were published, in compliance with Illinois law, in the Illinois Human Rights Commission Reporter. See In re Buckhalter, 7 Ill.H.R.C.Rep. at 102-15. The ALJ acknowledged that she conducted "a rather lengthy hearing in this matter" and that "despite all of complainant's detailed testimony on the events of the night in question, I have no reason to believe that Robert Buckhalter's discharge came about as a result of an indiscriminate imposition of discipline upon black employees." Id. at 108-09. In a detailed legal analysis of Buckhalter's claim, the ALJ initially recited that under the law of Illinois, a prima facie case of race discrimination "may be established by Complainant's showing that (1) he belongs to a racial minority, (2) that he was treated in a particular way by Respondent and (3) that similarly situated whites were not treated in the same manner." Id. at 109 (quoting L.Q. Hampton, and National Banking Co., 3 Ill.F.E.P.Rep. 40, 42 (1976)). The respondent must then "come forth with a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the difference in treatment...." Id. at 110. The ALJ ruled that Pepsi-Cola had established a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason "primarily because of the treatment afforded Daniel Lynch, a white employee discharged on Rule IV-11 grounds 2 days after [Buckhalter]." Id. According to the ALJ, "I find it...