Bucki v. Hawkins

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Williams
• Citation: Bucki v. Hawkins, 914 A.2d 491 (R.I. 2007)
• Decision Date: 31 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2005-199-Appeal.,2005-199-Appeal.
• Parties: Richard P. BUCKI v. Carol J. HAWKINS et al.

914 A.2d 491

Richard P. BUCKI v. Carol J. HAWKINS et al.

No. 2005-199-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

January 31, 2007.

Matthew P. Gabrilowitz, for Plaintiff.

Richard A. Vantienhoven, for Defendants.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice WILLIAMS, for the Court.

A late-night campout on waterfront property and nighttime swimming on a northern Rhode Island lake ended tragically when the plaintiff, Richard P. Bucki (plaintiff), dived off a dock into the dark water, striking his head on the sandy lake bottom. The plaintiff's resulting neck fracture prompted him to file this premises liability action against the defendant landowner, Carol J. Hawkins (defendant). After a jury ultimately awarded the plaintiff $60,300 plus interest, the trial justice granted the defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the basis that the defendant did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, and noted further that she was not liable pursuant to the protections of Rhode Island's Recreational Use Statute, G.L. 1956 chapter 6 of title 32. The plaintiff now appeals that judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

I Facts and Travel

The defendant is the record owner of lakefront property located at 18 Wood Road on Sand Dam Reservoir in the Town of Glocester. Beginning in 1990, defendant permitted Patricia and Philip Gagnon to live year-round and rent-free on her property. In exchange, the Gagnons maintained the property, sometimes paying the property taxes and other expenses. Although defendant visited the property on many summer weekends, she was in Maine on the day of the accident.

In early August 1996, the Gagnons' adult son, Timothy Gagnon (Timothy), invited plaintiff and several friends to camp at defendant's property. Timothy informed his friends that his parents would be away the upcoming weekend. The plaintiff, accompanied by his then wife and two friends, arrived at the lake house at 11:30 p.m. on Saturday, August 10, 1996, where a campfire already was burning.

After assembling his tent, plaintiff decided to go swimming in the lake. He borrowed swim trunks from Timothy, changed in his car, and returned to the campfire. The plaintiff jogged down a floating dock attached to the property and, with his arms outstretched, he dived into the dark water, striking first his hands and then his head on the sandy lake bottom.

An ambulance took plaintiff to Rhode Island Hospital where Mark A. Palumbo, M.D. (Dr. Palumbo) surgically repaired his neck. Doctor Palumbo diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from a "traumatic cervical spinal cord injury and traumatic cervical spine fracture and ligamentous injury." Thus, Dr. Palumbo screwed a halo ring to plaintiff's skull for traction, used stainless steel wires to reconnect plaintiff's fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh cervical vertebrae, and secured plaintiff's spine using plates and screws. Finally, Dr. Palumbo fused plaintiff's fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh cervical vertebrae using a bone graft from plaintiff's pelvic bone.

On July 30, 1999, plaintiff commenced suit against defendant, the Sand Dam Reservoir Association (association), Philip Gagnon, and Timothy Gagnon.¹ The plaintiff's three-count complaint alleged that defendants (1) breached their duty to warn plaintiff that it was unsafe to dive from the dock, (2) failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe manner, and (3) negligently supervised guests at the premises.

At trial, defendant testified that although a "No Trespassing" sign was posted on her property, she was aware that the Gagnons occasionally invited friends to the property to play horseshoes and volleyball, to swim, and to barbeque. Although she did not recall ever seeing anyone dive off the dock, she testified that she remembered seeing guests jump from the dock into the water. According to defendant, there were two unwritten rules that she believed all the Gagnons were aware of: (1) guests should not have glass beer bottles on the beach and (2) there should be no diving from the dock. Prior to the accident, however, defendant had not posted a sign or any other notice indicating that diving off the dock was prohibited.

Despite defendant's unwritten rules, plaintiff testified that no one ever advised him not to dive off the dock that evening. In fact, plaintiff testified that he had dived off the dock on three other occasions and never was instructed not to do so; he also testified that he previously had witnessed other guests diving there.

The plaintiff testified that he was familiar with the water's depth from his previous dives and investigation of the water. As a result, plaintiff said he felt comfortable diving into the water. Nevertheless, according to plaintiff, the water level had dropped at least a foot, if not more, on the day of the accident. The plaintiff's friend, Christopher Pieranunzi, corroborated this testimony. He said that on August 10, 1996, the lake appeared shallower than on previous occasions. Pieranunzi, who testified that he also dived off the dock, recalled the water level being belly-button high on previous occasions but said that the water level did not cover plaintiff's shorts the night of the accident. Pieranunzi estimated that the water level had dropped approximately one foot.

Erin Helton, who also was at the property on the night of the accident, disagreed, testifying at trial that there was no appreciable change in the water level. Helton said she had been at the property almost every weekend during the summer of 1996 and would have noticed if the water level had fluctuated by a foot or more. Warren H. Scott, a long-time seasonal resident of the lakefront community, likewise believed the water level had not changed in the summer of 1996. Scott testified that he was a ten-year member of the association — a group which, among other things, controls the lake's depth. Although the association may vote to lower vertical boards attached to the dam to adjust the lake's depth, Scott testified that he could not recall any occasion when the association voted to lower any of the boards during the summer months. Scott further said that he could not recall the water level dropping by a foot in the summer of 1996 and that such an event would be a memorable occasion.

The defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law at the conclusion of plaintiff's case and again at the close of all the evidence. The trial justice denied the first motion and reserved judgment on the second, instead submitting the case to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor for $603,000, but found plaintiff 90 percent comparatively negligent, thereby reducing the jury award to $60,300 plus interest. After the jury's verdict, defendant renewed her motion for judgment as a matter of law, which the trial justice granted on the basis that Rhode Island's Recreational Use Statute, chapter 6 of title 32, shielded defendant from liability.² The trial justice also ruled that there was no duty of care running from defendant to plaintiff. The plaintiff timely appealed this decision.

Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

II Analysis

The plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial justice erred when he relied exclusively on Rhode Island's Recreational Use Statute, chapter 6 of title 32, in ruling in defendant's favor. Beyond this error, plaintiff argues that defendant owed him a duty of care, which was breached. The defendant counters that the trial justice did not, in fact, rely exclusively on the Recreational Use Statute but, instead, based his decision on negligence.

A Standard of Review

This Court reviews "the entry of judgment as a matter of law by applying the same standard as the trial justice, `consider[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, without weighing the evidence or evaluating the credibility of witnesses, and draw[ing] from the record all reasonable inferences that support the position of the nonmoving party.'" Calise v. Curtin, 900 A.2d 1164, 1167-68 (R.I.2006) (quoting Tedesco v. Connors, 871 A.2d 920, 927 (R.I.2005)). "A trial justice may grant such a motion only after `a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue * * *.'" Hanson v. Singsen, 898 A.2d 1244, 1248 (R.I.2006) (quoting Super. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1)). Additionally, this Court reviews matters of statutory interpretation de novo. Park v. Rizzo Ford, Inc., 893 A.2d 216, 221 (R.I.2006).

B Negligence

The defendant's liability for negligence turns on whether defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care and whether that duty of care was breached. Whether a duty of care is owed is a question of law for the court and not the jury. Volpe v. Fleet National Bank, 710 A.2d 661, 663 (R.I.1998). Our plenary review reveals that there was no duty extending from defendant to plaintiff in this case. Although we affirm the trial justice's ruling with respect to duty, we do so after our own de novo review and on grounds other than those relied upon by the trial justice. See Ahlburn v. Clark, 728 A.2d 449, 452 (R.I.1999) (noting that this Court may "affirm a judgment on grounds not actually relied upon by the trial court to justify its ruling").

To determine whether a duty of care is owed, Rhode Island, having abolished the common law distinctions between invitee and licensee, employs the reasonableness test that was famously articulated by the Supreme Court of California in the case of Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968). Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 307, 333 A.2d 127, 133 (1975); see also Barrett v. Barrett, 894 A.2d 891, 895 (R.I.2006). With respect to invitees and licensees, courts must determine whether landowners have satisfied their affirmative duty to...