Buckley v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 09 June 1954
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 46205
• Citation: 3 Ill.App.2d 39,120 N.E.2d 375
• Parties: BUCKLEY v. CITY OF CHICAGO et al.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 375

120 N.E.2d 375

3 Ill.App.2d 39

BUCKLEY v. CITY OF CHICAGO et al.

Gen. No. 46205.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

June 9, 1954.

John J. Mortimer, Corp. Counsel of City of Chicago, Chicago, L. Louis Karton, Head of Appeals and Review Division, John L. Steffens, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Chicago, of counsel, for appellants.

Michael J. Thuma, Chicago, for appellee.

LEWE, Justice.

Defendant, City of Chicago, appeals from a judgment in the sum of $34,500 entered on the verdict of a jury in an action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from a collision between two automobiles at the intersection of two streets. Motions for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial were overruled.

The basic question presented is whether the failure of the City to maintain a stop sign at the intersection of a street designated by a city ordinance to be a 'through street' was the proximate cause of the injuries here complained of.

January 13, 1937 an ordinance was passed by the Council of the City of Chicago designating 107th Street, an east and west street, as a 'through street' between Cottage Grove Avenue on the east and Western Avenue on the west. Between these boundaries at all intersecting north and south streets the City installed stop signs. At the intersection of Throop Street stop signs were placed by the City at the southeast and northwest corners.

About 3:00 o'clock p.m. on August 6, 1950, plaintiff was driving his automobile west on 107th Street and the defendant Wilburn was proceeding north on Throop Street. While crossing 107th Street Wilburn's automobile collided with plaintiff's automobile in the northeast portion of the intersection. At the time of the occurrence there was no stop sign at the southeast corner of the intersection nor had there been any for many months before.

Plaintiff's evidence tends to prove that at the time of the collision plaintiff's automobile was proceeding west on 107th Street five or six feet from the north curb at about fifteen or twenty miles an hour; that Wilburn drove north on Throop Street into the intersection at between forty and sixty miles an hour; and that when the collision occurred the pavement was dry and visibility good. Wilburn testified that prior to the collision he had never driven an automobile on Throop Street in this vicinity and that he did not know 107th Street was a through street.

The City argues that its failure to maintain a stop sign merely furnished a condition and that defendant's negligence alone caused plaintiff's injuries.

Under similar circumstances the proposition presented here has been decided contrary to the contention of the City in Johnston v. City of East Moline, 405 Ill. 460, 91 N.E.2d 401. At page 464 of 405 Ill. at page 403 of 91 N.E.2d the court, adverting to Neering v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497, said:

"What constitutes proximate cause has been defined in numerous decisions, and there is practically no difference of opinion as to what the rule is. The injury must be the natural and probable result of the negligent act or omission and be of such a character as an ordinarily prudent person ought to have foreseen as likely to occur as a result of the negligence, although it is not essential that the person charged with...