Buckley v. Terhune
Decision Date | 17 March 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 03-55045.,03-55045. |
Citation | 441 F.3d 688 |
Parties | Brian A. BUCKLEY, Petitioner-Appellee, v. C.A. TERHUNE, Director of the California Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Allen Bloom, San Diego, CA, for the petitioner-appellee.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General; Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General; Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Noah P. Hill, Deputy Attorney General; Los Angeles, CA, for the respondent-appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. J. Spencer Letts, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-00-02435-JSL.
Before: MARY M. SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, STEPHEN REINHARDT, ALEX KOZINSKI, M. MARGARET McKEOWN, KIM McLANE WARDLAW, RAYMOND C. FISHER, RICHARD A. PAEZ, MARSHA S. BERZON, RICHARD C. TALLMAN, JAY S. BYBEE, and CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
The law regarding plea agreements entered into in state court is well-established. They must be construed in accordance with state law. In California, plea agreements are construed in the same manner as all other contracts. In this case, however, the California courts failed to do so and, as a result, Brian Buckley might have remained in prison for life instead of for the fifteen years for which he bargained. We are required to ensure that his constitutional rights are not so violated, and that the bargain he entered into with the state is honored.
The state appeals the district court's order granting Buckley's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and directing that he be released from prison because he had already served the full fifteen years. The district court ruled that the state court's finding that Buckley "well knew" that his sentence for second degree murder was fifteen years to life was both contrary to clearly established federal law in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and an unreasonable determination of the facts in violation of § 2254(d)(2). In accordance with the district court's order, Buckley has now been released. We affirm the judgment of the district court because, under § 2254(d)(1), the state court's failure to interpret Buckley's plea agreement according to California contract law resulted in a decision that was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law as set forth in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), and Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987).
On November 12, 1987, Buckley was charged with burglary, robbery and first degree murder in Ventura County Superior Court. The charges arose from allegations that Buckley and two others, Curtis Fauber and Christopher Caldwell, robbed and killed Thomas Urell in his home in July 1986.
On December 15, 1987, Donald Glynn, the deputy district attorney assigned to Buckley's case, sent Buckley's attorney a letter offering a plea bargain. The letter stated that, in exchange for Buckley's sworn testimony describing Fauber and Caldwell's participation in the Urell murder and in two additional unrelated murders, Glynn would dismiss the robbery and burglary charges against Buckley and move the court to declare the murder charge against him to be murder in the second degree. The letter was silent as to the sentence Buckley would receive. Glynn attached to the letter a typewritten felony disposition statement. That document contained the following relevant language:
CONSEQUENCES OF PLEA (Defendant to initial)
My attorney has explained to me the direct and indirect consequences of this plea including the maximum possible sentence. I understand that the following consequences could result from my plea:
I could be sentenced to the state prison for a maximum possible term of 15 year(s).
* * *
After I have served my prison term, I may be subject to a maximum parole period of LIFE (In re Carabes, 144 Cal. App.3d 927, 193 Cal.Rptr. 65).1
(Emphasis added). On December 17, 1987, Buckley initialed the paragraphs describing his agreed-upon sentence and signed the statement.
The district court found that at the time Buckley initialed and signed the felony disposition statement, a separate section of that document entitled "The District Attorney's Position on Sentence" was blank. At some point after December 17, 1987, but before the change of plea hearing on January 4, 1988, Glynn added a handwritten paragraph to that section: "At the time of sentencing the people will move the court to declare the murder to be murder in the second degree, with a maximum term of 15 years to life." (Emphasis added). Buckley did not initial the paragraph, and there is no evidence that he saw it before sentencing.
At the change of plea hearing, Glynn and Buckley engaged in the following colloquy:
I'd like to go into the terms of this agreement with you. In order — or as your part of the agreement you will agree to cooperate in the trials against Curtis Fauber and Christopher Cogwell [sic], and that you will testify in the Fauber case at all proceedings regarding the murder of Thomas Urell, David Church and Jack Dowdy, and testify truthfully regarding whatever you know about those murders. Do you understand that to be the situation?
(Emphasis added). The December 15 letter and the felony disposition statement were entered into evidence as constituting the plea agreement, and the court accepted and entered Buckley's guilty plea.
On January 7, 1988, Buckley testified on behalf of the prosecution at the guilt phase of Fauber's trial. On cross-examination, Buckley stated that he had been given a sentence of "fifteen years to life" in exchange for his testimony. On January 22, 1988, Buckley testified for the prosecution at a preliminary hearing in Caldwell's case. There, he acknowledged that his charged offense had been reduced to second degree murder, although there was no discussion of his sentence. On February 9, 1988 Buckley testified at the penalty phase of Fauber's trial. On cross-examination, when asked by defense counsel when he "expect[ed] to be released from prison" as a result of his testimony, Buckley responded, "seven and a half years."2
Buckley's sentencing hearing took place on March 1, 1988, after his testimony in the Fauber and Caldwell cases. At the hearing, Glynn informed the court that Buckley had "complied with the terms of the negotiated disposition." The prosecutor moved the court to declare the murder charge against Buckley to be murder in the second degree, and to dismiss the remaining two counts. The court granted the motion, ordered Buckley to pay $10,000 in restitution, and sentenced him to a prison term of fifteen years to life and a parole term of life. Buckley's counsel did not object to the sentence.3
On May 13, 1996, approximately eight years after Buckley's sentencing, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Ventura County Superior Court. On September 10, 1996, the court, in a two-page order, denied Buckley's petition:
The court finds that with the exception of one statement in the negotiated disposition statement . . . and a reference at the time of the taking of the plea on January 4, 1988, . . . the records demonstrate that the advisement was that the sentence would be 15 years to life as provided by law, and that the petitioner well knew this. . . . During the taking of the plea on January 4, 1988, [ ] petitioner was expressly advised that the maximum term of imprisonment was 15 years to life. . . . Any ambiguity concerning petitioner's understanding of the sentence he was to receive is put to rest by petitioner's own statement found in the transcript of January 7, 1988, during petitioner's testimony at the trial of Curtis Fauber that he understood his term of imprisonment would be 15 years to life . . . .
* * *
Based upon the record provided by counsel in the within matter, it is evident that petitioner well knew that the term of imprisonment for which he was to be committed to prison for the crime of second degree murder was 15 years to life. In re Mosher [sic], (1993) 6 Cal.4th 342, 354-355, 24...
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