Buckley v. Webb
| Decision Date | 10 April 1956 |
| Citation | 122 A.2d 220,143 Conn. 309 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Paul O. BUCKLEY v. Margot F. WEBB. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
Samuel Reich, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was Robert A. Epstein, Bridgeport, for appellant (plaintiff).
Samuel E. Friedman, Bridgeport, with whom was Arthur Levy, Jr., Bridgeport, for appellee (defendant).
Before INGLIS, C. J., and BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE and DALY, JJ.
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he is the owner of an undivided one-half interest in, and is in possession of, a parcel of land in the town of Newtown; that he acquired title to his interest by a deed dated November 22, 1947; and that the defendant is the owner of the other one-half interest but claims sole ownership adverse to the plaintiff's title and ownership. He prayed a judgment determining the rights in or to the land and settling the title. The defendant, in and by her answer, claimed the entire fee, alleging that she obtained it by a deed dated April 18, 1945, which was recorded in the Newtown land records on May 15, 1952. The court, by its judgment, found the issues for the defendant, that she had an absolute title to the land in fee simple as against the plaintiff and that he had no estate or interest in the land. The plaintiff has appealed.
The unchallenged material facts which were found are the following: The plaintiff and the defendant were married on October 12, 1941. On December 23, 1941, the plaintiff purchased, for their home, premises in Newtown and assumed the payment of a $15,000 mortgage thereon, held by Helen E. Woodworth. He desired to give the defendant a one-half interest in the property and instructed his New York attorney to prepare a deed which would convey such an interest to her. The attorney prepared an instrument which he believed would carry out the plaintiff's instructions, and on March 15, 1943, the plaintiff executed it. It purported to be a warranty deed conveying title to the premises from him to himself and the defendant as tenants by the entirety. The deed was recorded on March 15, 1943, in the Newtown land records.
In March or April of 1945, the parties separated, and thereafter each of them desired a reconciliation. The defendant told the plaintiff that she would resume living with him if he would provide her with some security. As part of the security, she requested sole ownership of the property in question, to be occupied by them as a home. The plaintiff agreed and instructed his attorney to prepare the necessary documents. On April 18, 1945, pursuant to the reconciliation agreement, the parties executed an instrument purporting to be a warranty deed conveying title to the premises from the plaintiff and the defendant to the defendant. The conveyance by the plaintiff to the defendant was unconditional and was intended by him to vest complete ownership of the property in her. On the plaintiff's instructions, his attorney delivered the deed to the defendant's attorney. At the time of delivery of the deed, the plaintiff told the defendant that it would be a blow to his pride if she recorded it and that he did not want people in Newtown to know that the property was not his. The defendant, desirous of preserving her marriage, instructed her attorney to keep the deed for safekeeping.
In late 1946 or early 1947, payment of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage upon the property was requested of the plaintiff. He informed the defendant of the request and she said that she would prefer to pay off the mortgage and have the property free and clear. The plaintiff, however, told her that she knew nothing of business and that it was advantageous to have a mortgage on the property. He consulted Attorney John F. Holian of Newtown to learn whether any local bank would be interested in making a loan upon the security of a mortgage which would replace the existing one. After communicating with the local banks, Holian informed the plaintiff that the City National Bank and Trust Company of Danbury would be interested in such a mortgage. The defendant was consulted and consented to the making of a mortgage to it. The plaintiff instructed Holian to prepare whatever papers would be required by the bank and authorized him to search the title of the property as requested by it. The defendant consented and agreed to have Holian act as her attorney in making any arrangements that might be necessary to obtain a mortgage from the bank. Holian made a search of the title. It revealed that the last recorded instrument affecting the title to the property was the deed dated March 15, 1943, which purported to create a tenancy by the entirety in the plaintiff and the defendant. In Holian's opinion that deed did not effectively create a joint estate in the plaintiff and the defendant because (1) a tenancy by the entirety is not recognized in this state and (2) the plaintiff deeded the property to himself. To carry out the recorded intent of the deed dated March 15, 1943, namely, that the defendant and the plaintiff would each have an undivided one-half interest in the property with survivorship, Holian prepared a quitclaim deed to Priscilla Carmody to be executed by the plaintiff and the defendant, and a quitclaim deed to the parties, with survivorship, to be executed by Priscilla Carmody. He also prepared a mortgage deed to be executed by the parties as mortgagors to the bank as mortgagee.
On November 22, 1947, Holian brought to the home of the parties the two quitclaim deeds and the mortgage deed. He explained to the plaintiff and the defendant that they were to execute a quitclaim deed to Priscilla Carmody, his secretary, and that she, in return, would quitclaim the property to them, thereby setting up a joint estate with survivorship. The defendant...
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...These two paragraphs constitute conclusions; see Gary Excavating, Inc. v. North Haven, 164 Conn. 119, 318 A.2d 84; Buckley v. Webb, 143 Conn. 309, 315, 122 A.2d 220; and, viewed as conclusions, they are consistent with the facts found.2 The defendant assigns error in the court's refusal to ......
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