Buckner v. Cnty. of Sullivan
| Decision Date | 03 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 12-CV-3770 (CS),12-CV-3770 (CS) |
| Parties | DONALD H. BUCKNER, JR., Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SULLIVAN, and MICHAEL SCHIFF, SHERIFF, COUNTY OF SULLIVAN, Individually, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Appearances:
Michael Sussman
Sussman & Watkins
Goshen, New York
Counsel for Plaintiff
Senior Assistant County Attorney
County of Sullivan
Monticello, New York
Stephen G. DeNigris
Schenectady, New York
Before the Court is the joint motion for summary judgment of Defendants Sullivan County (the "County") and Michael Schiff. (Doc. 58.) For the reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED.
The following facts, which are based on the parties' Local Rule 56.1 statements and supporting materials, are undisputed unless noted.
Plaintiff Donald Buckner, an African-American, began working at the County Sheriff's Department in September 1989 as a patrol deputy. (Doc. 71 ¶ 1.) He was promoted to detective in March 2004. (Id. ¶ 2.) The County Sheriff is (and was at all relevant times) Defendant Schiff.
On June 26, 2007, Plaintiff and thirty-three other officers were subjected to a surprise drug test by the County Sheriff's Department, which has a policy prohibiting drug use by officers. Plaintiff and another African-American officer, Lillian Allen, tested positive on the drug test, for cocaine and marijuana, respectively.3 .) (The parties dispute whether any of the other officers who were tested on that date tested positive, and the Court will address their evidence on this issue in detail below.)
The following month, Plaintiff's union, the Patrolman's Benevolent Association ("PBA"), filed a grievance against the County and Sheriff Schiff, asserting that the drug test had been performed pursuant to a policy and procedure that had not been negotiated with the PBA. (Doc. 70 ¶ 13.) The dispute centered over whether all officers in a randomly chosen shift could be tested, as occurred here, or whether individual officers had to be randomly selected from among all employees, as apparently had been done in the past. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 18-19.) That grievance was arbitrated in May 2008, and in August 2008 the arbitrator issued an award sustaining the PBA's grievance and ordering the County to revert to the prior drug testing policy and to rescind any disciplinary actions taken against employees as a result of the "unilaterally changed" drug testing procedure. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 22-23; DeNigris Decl. Ex. J.)
Shortly after the PBA filed its grievance, Sheriff Schiff filed a Notice of Discipline against Plaintiff, pursuant to Section 75 of the New York Civil Service Law, charging him with misconduct arising from the positive result on the June 26, 2007 drug test, and placed him on administrative leave. (Doc. 70 ¶ 14.) Plaintiff's Section 75 disciplinary hearing was adjourned for several years while the parties awaited the outcome of the PBA's grievance arbitration and while Plaintiff pursued an ultimately unsuccessful Article 78 action4 against Sheriff Schiff and the County related to the appointment of the impartial hearing officer for Plaintiff's hearing. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 25.) Plaintiff's disciplinary hearing finally took place on August 19, 2010. (Id. ¶ 32.) On December 10, 2010, after the impartial hearing officer issued a report concluding that Plaintiff had violated the County's drug policy and recommending his termination, Sheriff Schiff terminated Plaintiff's employment. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.) Separately, Defendants also terminatedOfficer Allen. See Allen v. Schiff, 908 F. Supp. 2d 451, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff'd, 586 F. App'x 759 (2d Cir. 2014).
In the instant lawsuit, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants used the drug test results in a racially discriminatory manner because they terminated him and Officer Allen based on the results but did not terminate Caucasian employees who allegedly failed the same drug test, (see First Amended Complaint ("FAC") (Doc. 16) ¶¶ 16-20), or who Defendants knew had used illegal drugs in violation of County Sheriff's Office policy, (see P's Mem. 4-6, 15-17). Plaintiff also cites as evidence of discriminatory intent two instances in which Arthur Hawker, the County Sheriff's Office Chief of Patrol, made allegedly racially insensitive comments to him prior to his termination. (FAC ¶ 21.)
Plaintiff brings a claim against Schiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection and a Monell claim against the County based on Schiff's status as the County's final decision-maker with respect to Plaintiff's termination. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 26.) Defendants have moved for summary judgment, arguing that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no genuine dispute that Plaintiff was terminated because he failed the drug test and not because of his race.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "[T]he dispute about a material fact is 'genuine' . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" if it Id. On a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255. The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact," and, if satisfied, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to present "evidence sufficient to satisfy every element of the claim." Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Moreover, the non-movant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), and he "may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation," Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 428 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Where an affidavit is used to support or oppose the motion, it "must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant . . . is competent to testify on the matters stated." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); see Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 310 (2d Cir. 2008). In the event that "a party fails . . . to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may," among other things, "consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion" or "grant summary judgment if the motion and supportingmaterials - including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is entitled to it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), (3).
Plaintiff brings a Section 1983 claim against Defendants based on the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. To prevail on this claim, Plaintiff must show that Sheriff Schiff, acting under color of state law, violated his constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Annis v. Cnty. of Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1998). As Defendants do not argue that Sheriff Schiff was not acting under color of state law, the only question is whether he violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
Because Plaintiff alleges disparate treatment in employment, his Equal Protection claim is treated like a Title VII claim for employment discrimination, and analyzed using the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2006). Under that framework, Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he satisfactorily performed his job duties; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; (4) in circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 1995). If Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination arises and the burden shifts to Defendants to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2001). If Defendants articulate such a reason, the presumption of discrimination is dropped and the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to show thatDefendants' reason is actually a pretext for unlawful discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993).
Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because he has not presented evidence by which a rational jury could infer that Defendants terminated Plaintiff based on his race. Plaintiff attempts to show discriminatory intent...
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