Buckner v. County School Board of Greene County, Virginia
Decision Date | 25 May 1964 |
Docket Number | No. 9325.,9325. |
Citation | 332 F.2d 452 |
Parties | James S. BUCKNER, Jr., and Thomas W. Buckner, infants, by James S. Buckner and Lucille V. Buckner, their next friends, Charles Morton and Stanley Morton, infants, by James E. Morton and Dorothy Morton, their next friends, and Thomas Brock and Emma Brock, infants, by Susie Williams, their next friend, Appellants, v. COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF GREENE COUNTY, VIRGINIA, Margaret B. Trimmer, Whitelow Snow, E. C. Compton, William H. Wetsel, individually and as Division Superintendent of Schools of Greene County, Virginia, and E. J. Oglesby, Alfred L. Wingo and E. T. Justis, individually and constituting the Pupil Placement Board of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Henry L. Marsh, III, Richmond, Va. (S. W. Tucker, Richmond, Va., on brief), for appellants.
No argument or brief for appellees.
Before SOBELOFF, Chief Judge, and HAYNSWORTH, BOREMAN, BRYAN and J. SPENCER BELL, Circuit Judges, sitting en banc.
Suing for themselves and in behalf of others constituting a class similarly situated, six Negro plaintiffs alleged in their complaint, filed in the Western District of Virginia, that the County School Board of Greene County, Virginia, is operating its school system in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint sought: (1) admission of the named plaintiffs to a specified school, (2) an injunction against the operation of a bi-racial school system throughout the county, and (3) an award of counsel fees.
It was alleged that there are two elementary schools in Greene County (one for white students and one for Negroes) and one white high school. Negro high school students are sent to a Negro high school out of the county.
After the filing of the suit, the Pupil Placement Board granted the applications of three of the six individual plaintiffs for their transfer to the only high school in the county. Two other infant plaintiffs applied through their foster parents for transfer to the county high school, but the Pupil Placement Board rejected the applications because the County Welfare Department, which had placed these children in the custody of the foster parents, had not signed the applications. Since the institution of the suit, the parents of the sixth plaintiff have informed the Placement Board by letter that they do not desire their child to be transferred. The District Court, believing the case to be moot because all of the individual infant plaintiffs were in schools chosen by their parents or legal guardians, removed the case from the active docket.
In refusing to consider injunctive relief and terminating the suit, the District Court disregarded the precedents in this court and elsewhere, and indeed the decisions of the Supreme Court itself.
In light of the Supreme Court's explicit holding that it is the obligation of local school authorities to take affirmative action to "make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance," Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300, 75 S.Ct. 753, 756, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955), it would be unreasonable for the court to require the plaintiffs to formulate plans for desegregation. As the Supreme Court said in the second Brown decision, "The burden rests upon the defendants * * *." (Emphasis added). The Court has since declared in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 1404, 3 L.Ed.2d 5 (1958), "State authorities were thus duty bound to devote every effort toward initiating desegregation and bringing about the elimination of racial discrimination in the public school system." (Emphasis added.) It is these school officials, not the infant plaintiffs or their parents, who are familiar with the operation of the school system and know the administrative problems which may constitute the only legitimate ground for withholding the immediate realization of constitutionally guaranteed rights.
By initially assigning Negro pupils to segregated schools and then permitting them, only upon application to the Pupil Placement Board, to transfer out of these segregated schools, the School Board has in effect formulated a plan which will require each and every Negro student individually to take the initiative in seeking desegregation. Naturally, as we have noted in Jones v. School Board of Alexandria, Virginia, 278 F.2d 72, 77 (4th Cir.1960), because of the existing racial pattern, in most cases "it will be Negro children, primarily, who seek transfers." In the context of the present case, it is only they who have need for transfers.
Speaking in a single voice on this point, this circuit has said in Bell v. School Board of Powhatan County, Virginia, 321 F.2d 494, 499 (4th Cir. 1963):
It is too late in the day for this school board to say that merely by the admission of a few plaintiffs, without taking any further action, it is satisfying the Supreme Court's mandate for "good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date."
The right of the plaintiffs to obtain injunctive relief for the class they represent as well as individual relief for themselves is clear beyond doubt. School Board of the City of Charlottesville, Virginia v. Allen (County School Bd. of Arlington County v. Thompson), 240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir.1956), upheld the plaintiffs' right "to obtain a general injunction against the school officials prohibiting racial discrimination in the administration of the schools * * *." Green v. School Board of City of Roanoke, Virginia, 304 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir.1962). And these cases blazed no new trail. Injunctions were similarly ordered in Frasier v. Board of Trustees of University of North Carolina, 134 F. Supp. 589, 593 (M.D.N.C.1955) (three-judge court), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 979, 76 S.Ct. 467, 100 L.Ed. 848 (1956), against discriminatory administration of the University of North Carolina.
In Green v. School Board of City of Roanoke, Virginia, supra, the court repeated that "the individual Negro appellants are entitled to relief, and also they have the right to an injunction on behalf of the others similarly situated." (304 F.2d at 124). (Emphasis added). The same principle was enunciated and injunctions were ordered in Jeffers v. Whitley, 309 F.2d 621 (4th Cir.1962), and Wheeler v. Durham City Board of Education, 309 F.2d 630 (4th Cir.1962). In the latter case the court said:
(309 F.2d at 633). (Emphasis added.)
In Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia, 317 F.2d 429 (4th Cir.1963), we again said:
"Not only are the individual infant plaintiffs entitled to relief which has been ordered but the plaintiffs are entitled, on behalf of others of the class they represent and who are similarly situated, to an injunction against the continuation of the discriminatory system and practices which have been found to exist."
The opinion in that case gives numerous supporting citations.
Just last term, in a Per Curiam opinion we remanded to the District Court a case almost identical with this one. Brown v. County School Board of Frederick County, Virginia, 327 F.2d 655 (4th Cir.1964). What we said there applies with equal force here:
"Since the record discloses the existence of a bi-racial system of schools, we remand for consideration of the plaintiffs\' prayers for an injunction and counsel fees in the light of this court\'s opinions in Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 317 F.2d 429 (4th Cir.1963), and Bell v. School Board of Powhatan County, 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir.1963)."
If, as alleged in the complaint, students were initially being assigned to schools in a racially discriminatory manner, "the School Board is actively engaged in perpetuating segregation." Bell v. School Board of Powhatan County, Virginia, 321 F.2d at...
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