Buckner v. Kennard

• Decision Date: 17 September 2004
• Docket Number: No. 20020178.,20020178.
• Citation: 2004 UT 78,2004 Utah 78,99 P.3d 842
• Parties: Perry BUCKNER, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. Aaron KENNARD, as Sheriff of Salt Lake County, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, and Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff's Merit Service Commission, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

99 P.3d 842

2004 UT 78

2004 Utah 78

Perry BUCKNER, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. Aaron KENNARD, as Sheriff of Salt Lake County, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, and Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff's Merit Service Commission, Defendants and Appellants.

No. 20020178.

Supreme Court of Utah.

September 17, 2004.

Byron J. Benevento, Michael R. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.

David E. Yocom, John P. Soltis, Valerie Wilde, Salt Lake, for defendants.

DURHAM, Chief Justice:

¶ 1 Plaintiffs (the deputies) are all employees of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office. The deputies filed suit against the defendants Sheriff Aaron Kennard, Salt Lake County, the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, and the Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriffs' Merit Service Commission (collectively, the county), seeking back wages as a remedy for their claims of pay inequity under the civil service statutes, breach of contract, and negligent misrepresentation. The claims arose after the county instituted a new pay plan in 1988, which credited law enforcement experience outside the sheriff's office more heavily than experience within the office in determining pay rates.

¶ 2 The trial court granted partial summary judgment for the deputies on grounds of collateral estoppel, based on an arbitration that had taken place in an earlier suit by a different group of deputies. Diamant v. Kennard, No. 92-0901549 CV (Utah Third Jud. Dist. Dec. 19, 1994) (order of dismissal with prejudice). In its decision, the trial court also held that the deputies (1) were not barred by the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1), from bringing a claim of statutory entitlement, and (2) had stated a claim for breach of contract. The county appeals the final judgment and the interlocutory rulings that merged into it.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In November 1988, a pay plan was instituted for deputy sheriffs in the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office that included a new formula for factoring past experience when determining salary increases and promotions. The formula increased the credit for prior law enforcement experience for those hired from outside the county, as compared to those already working for the county. In effect, those with experience in law enforcement outside the Sheriff's Office would receive higher pay than those with the same amount of experience inside the county. In 1990, the county began receiving complaints about disparities in pay between employees whose job experience and position were more or less similar. In response, the Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriffs' Merit Commission (the Commission) established a Pay Equity Committee (the Pay Committee) to evaluate the problem, and the Pay Committee issued the Pay Equity Committee Report (the Report) in April 1991. The Report concluded that pay disparities between otherwise equivalent employees did exist and identified six contributing factors, including the method of crediting prior service. The Report also recommended measures to bring all employees of the Sheriff's Office to parity in pay rates. However, the county did not implement a new pay plan addressing the disparities until September 1, 1994. The 1994 pay plan is not at issue in this case.

I. THE DIAMANT ARBITRATION

¶ 4 On April 30, 1991, a group of deputies including Kathryn Diamant (the "Diamant group," distinct from the present plaintiffs), filed a notice of claim for a wage dispute. In March 1992, the Diamant group filed suit against Salt Lake County, claiming (1) pay inequity under the County Personnel Management Act (CPMA), (2) constitutional tort, (3) violation of the federal Equal Pay Act, and (4) civil rights violations under the United States and Utah Constitutions. In March 1994, the parties agreed to dismiss the discrimination, Equal Pay Act and constitutional claims and to submit the CPMA claim to binding arbitration. On August 15, 1996, the arbitrator issued a ruling finding that "gross pay inequities" existed and establishing a formula for recompensing the individual Diamant group plaintiffs. The arbitrator issued a final decision in November 1996, awarding back pay for the period from 1990 to 1994 to the Diamant group.

II. THE BUCKNER PLAINTIFFS

¶ 5 On January 6, 1995, the county sent a letter to other deputies who had filed pay equity grievances, stating that the results of the Diamant arbitration (then ongoing) would not apply to anyone who had not been part of the Diamant suit. In August 1995, nineteen of these deputies, including Buckner, filed a notice of claim alleging pay inequities. On January 23, 1996, these nineteen filed the instant suit, claiming both pay inequity and negligent misrepresentation.¹ Forty-five deputies joined the suit on February 20, 1996. A third amended complaint was filed in August 1996, adding sixty more deputies as plaintiff, for a total of 124, and including a breach of contract claim.

¶ 6 The county filed a motion to dismiss. The first judge assigned to the case denied the county's motion, ruling that the deputies' pay equity claim was not barred by section 63-30-10(1) of the Governmental Immunity Act (GIA) and that they had pled facts sufficient to state a claim for breach of contract. Subsequently, the case was reassigned to another trial judge, who held that the prior judge's ruling on the motion to dismiss established the "law of the case." The court then granted partial summary judgment for the deputies on the pay equity and breach of contract claims, basing its ruling on collateral estoppel stemming from the Diamant arbitration.² The court then held a bench trial on the question of back pay awards to the individual deputy plaintiffs, ultimately awarding back pay to ninety-two of them. The county appeals from that judgment.

III. ISSUES ON APPEAL

¶ 7 The county presents nine issues on appeal, arguing that (1) failure to comply with the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act bars 105 of the plaintiff deputies from pursuing their statutory equitable pay claim, (2) the second trial judge erroneously applied the law of the case doctrine, (3) the trial court erred in holding that, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the Diamant arbitration barred the county's defenses to the contract and statutory wage claims in this litigation, (4) the statutes and policies referring to "equitable" pay for Salt Lake County deputies do not create an enforceable employment contract, (5) in any case, the deputies have no private statutory right of action under these statutes and policies to sue for pay equity and seek back pay as damages, (6) the county is immune to this suit because its adoption and use of a pay plan for deputies is a governmental function under section 63-30-3(1) of the GIA, (7) if a private statutory right of action exists, the county is entitled to judgment because it fully complied with the applicable statutes and policies, (8) if a right of action exists, the suit is barred because the statute of limitations for statutory actions expired in 1991, and (9) the trial court erroneously awarded pre-judgment interest on the back wages in this case.

¶ 8 Because we decide issues two, three, four, and five above—concerning the law of the case doctrine, collateral estoppel, the implied employment contract for deputies, and the existence of a statutory private right of action—in favor of the county, we need not reach the remainder of the issues presented.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 The propriety of a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss is a question of law that we review for correctness. Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1253 (Utah 1996). Only if it is clear that the claimant is not entitled to relief under any state of facts that could be proven to support the claim should a motion to dismiss be granted. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990).

¶ 10 Additionally, summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). We accord no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, and review them for correctness. Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, ¶ 5, 61 P.3d 989. We review findings of fact for clear error. Knight v. Salt Lake County, 2002 UT App 100, ¶ 6, 46 P.3d 247.

ANALYSIS

I. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND ARBITRATION

¶ 11 As indicated above, the trial court held that the Diamant arbitration provided a basis for the application of collateral estoppel in this case, and that the county was therefore precluded from litigating the issue of entitlement to back pay. Challenging this holding, the county contends that because the Diamant proceedings did not result in a final judgment on the merits, the elements of res judicata were not satisfied. The deputies counter that the trial court's preclusive rulings were correct and that because the county lost in the Diamant arbitration proceedings, "it should not get another bite at the apple." The question of whether an arbitration decision may be given preclusive effect is a matter of first impression for this court. For the reasons that follow, we hold that a private arbitration award does not have nonmutual collateral estoppel effect unless the parties expressly provide for such preclusive effect beforehand.

A. Collateral Estoppel

¶ 12 The doctrine of res judicata embraces two distinct theories: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, ¶ 33, 73 P.3d 325 (citing Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995)). Claim preclusion involves the same parties or their privies and the same cause of action. It "`precludes the relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated as well as those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior action.'" Macris & Assocs. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ¶ 19, 16 P.3d 1214 (quoting Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1...