Bucktown Partners v. Johnson

Decision Date10 November 1983
Docket NumberNo. 82-2801,82-2801
Citation119 Ill.App.3d 346,456 N.E.2d 703,75 Ill.Dec. 20
Parties, 75 Ill.Dec. 20 BUCKTOWN PARTNERS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Saniah JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant. v. MAIN BANK OF CHICAGO, Garnishee Defendant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Les Jin, Alan Alop, 18th St. Legal Services and James O. Latturner, Uptown Legal Services, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.

Margaret Scanlan Brown, Epstein, Grosby & Adler, Ltd., Chicago, for plaintiffs-appellees.

JIGANTI, Justice:

This action challenges the authority of the trial court to disregard the allegedly uncontradicted testimony of a party witness. The plaintiff, Bucktown Partners, brought a forcible entry and detainer action against the defendant, Saniah Johnson, for non-payment of rent. The trial court entered judgment against the defendant in the amount of $560. A garnishment proceeding was subsequently initiated against the defendant's bank to collect the judgment. The defendant moved to quash the garnishment because the funds in her account were allegedly public assistance payments that were exempt from garnishment under Article IV of the Illinois Public Aid Code. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 23, par. 11-3.) The trial court denied the defendant's motion and this appeal followed.

The substance of this appeal revolves around the fact that the defendant was the sole witness to testify during the hearing on the motion to quash the garnishment. She stated that she received $368 per month in public assistance benefits and $168 per month in food stamps to support herself and her three children. She further testified that public assistance was her sole source of income and that all of the funds in her bank account came from public assistance benefits. The defendant's bank ledger card was introduced into evidence and it reflected the following transactions:

                Withdrawals  Deposits  Date     Balance
                ----------------------------------------
                              $502.56  4-15-82   $502.56
                               280.00  4-19-82    782.56
                               280.00  5-17-82  1,062.56
                   $20.00              5-28-82  1,042.56
                    15.00              6-8-82   1,027.56
                   630.00              6-14-82    397.56
                               280.00
                               620.00  6-15-82  1,297.56
                   675.00              6-16-82    622.56
                   170.00              6-21-82    452.56
                    25.00              6-24-82    427.56
                    25.00              6-28-82    402.56
                

The ledger card thus reflected five deposits which were completed by the defendant. Other than the defendant's representation that all of the money in the account came from aid payments, the source of the initial deposit of $502.56 was not referred to at the hearing by either party. Regarding the three deposits of $280 each, the defendant testified that she did not pay her $280 rent to the plaintiff for three months and that she deposited the $280 into her bank account during each of those months. The remaining deposit of $620 was explained by the defendant to be a partial redeposit of the $630 that was withdrawn the previous day. Specifically, the defendant testified that she withdrew the $630 to pay the rent and security deposit on a new apartment and that the new landlord refused to accept the certified check offered by the defendant. Therefore, the defendant allegedly redeposited the money into her account. Other relevant facts that were elicited at trial shall be discussed later in this opinion.

The plaintiff offered no evidence to the effect that the funds in the defendant's bank account stemmed from a source other than the defendant's aid payments. Rather, the plaintiff contends that the defendant's testimony was contradictory and confused and was therefore unworthy of belief. The trial court found it "hard to fathom how a woman with three children getting $368 from the public aid agency and is paying $280 [in rent] can have over $1000 in the bank ..." Consequently, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to quash the garnishment.

In essence, the trial court chose simply to discount the defendant's testimony and concluded, contrary to her representations, that the funds in her account came from a source other than public assistance payments. On appeal, our sole concern is whether the trial court has the authority under Illinois law to disbelieve the testimony of a witness that is uncontradicted on a material issue. Specifically, the defendant remained totally uncontradicted and unimpeached regarding her statement that all of the money in her account came from assistance payments. While she may have been contradicted on matters other than the source of these funds, as we shall discuss later, the record is devoid of any evidence which contradicts the defendant's statement that the source of the money in her account was her assistance payments.

During the course of our examination of this issue, we have surveyed the case law of a number of states. Several jurisdictions simply hold that the trier of fact is not bound to believe uncontroverted testimony. (Cragin v. Woollett (1962), 104 N.H. 202, 182 A.2d 457; Carl v. Kurtz (1978), 255 Pa.Super. 198, 386 A.2d 577; Gee v. Gee (Mo.App.1980), 605 S.W.2d 815; Moser v. Brown (Iowa 1977), 249 N.W.2d 612; McPhaul v. Sewell (1978), 36 N.C.App. 312, 244 S.E.2d 158; Morphew v. Morphew (Ind.App.1981), 419 N.E.2d 770; Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp. (1979), 377 Mass. 719, 387 N.E.2d 1145; Baliulis v. Campbell Soup Co. (1979), 204 Neb. 739, 285 N.W.2d 227; see also Wigmore, Evidence § 2034, at 260-61 (3d ed. 1940).) The rationale often given for allowing the rejection of uncontradicted testimony is that the trier of fact is generally in the best position to measure the persuasiveness of evidence and the credibility of witnesses. (See, e.g., 93 Clearing House, Inc. v. Khoury (1980), 120 N.H. 346, 415 A.2d 671; Gee v. Gee (Mo.App.1980), 605 S.W.2d 815.) Similarly, other courts observe that the trier of fact is the sole judge of a witness' credibility (McPhaul v. Sewell (1978), 36 N.C.App. 312, 244 S.E.2d 158), or that it is the trier of fact's prerogative to disbelieve a witness' testimony (Carl v. Kurtz (1978), 255 Pa.Super. 198, 386 A.2d 577).

A number of other states also allow the trier of fact to disregard a witness' uncontradicted testimony, but only if the witness is either a party or someone else who has an interest in the outcome of the suit. (Rowe v. Goldberg Film Delivery Lines, Inc. (1937), 50 Ariz. 349, 72 P.2d 432; Smith v. Edward M. Rude Carrier Corp. (1966), 151 W.Va. 322, 151 S.E.2d 738; Belinskey v. Hansen (N.D.1977), 261 N.W.2d 390; see also Rea v. Rea (1978), 19 Wash.App. 496, 576 P.2d 84; City of St. Petersburg v. Vanoy Park Hotel Co. (Fla.App.1977), 352 So.2d 149.) One court phrased this approach in a different manner, stating that the uncontradicted testimony of an interested witness only raises an issue of fact. (Purser v. Purser (Tex.Civ.App.1980), 604 S.W.2d 411.) The rationale for allowing the rejection of the testimony of an interested witness is that his personal interest in the result may lead him to testify contrary to the facts of the case. See Rowe v. Goldberg Film Delivery Lines, Inc. (1937), 50 Ariz. 349, 72 P.2d 432.

Many of the jurisdictions we have surveyed, however, find that the positive uncontradicted testimony of a witness is either conclusive upon the trier of fact or may not be disregarded by the fact finder unless certain exceptions are satisfied. Most of the states hold that such testimony may be disregarded if it is "inherently improbable" (Laganiere v. Bonte Spinning Co. (1967), 103 R.I. 191, 236 A.2d 256; Dinneen v. Finch (1979), 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575; Auto Sales & Finance Co. v. Seavey (Me.1979), 401 A.2d 648; Lopez v. Maes (1970), 81 N.M. 693, 472 P.2d 658; Thomas v. Thomas (Okl.App.1976), 565 P.2d 722; Douglas Reservoirs Water Users Association v. Cross (Wyo.1977), 569 P.2d 1280), if it is contradictory or otherwise impeached (Laganiere v. Bonte Spinning Co. (1967), 103 R.I. 191, 236 A.2d 256; Dinneen v. Finch (1979), 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575; Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (Minn.1977), 258 N.W.2d 782; City of St. Petersburg v. Vinoy Park Hotel Co. (Fla.App.1977), 352 So.2d 149; Lopez v. Maes (1970), 81 N.M. 693, 472 P.2d 658; Spillers v. Colby (Okl.1964), 391 P.2d 895), if it lacks credence or is unworthy of belief (Laganiere v. Bonte Spinning Co. (1967), 103 R.I. 191, 236 A.2d 256; McGuire v. American Honda Co. (1977), 173 Mont. 171, 566 P.2d 1124), if it is surrounded by suspicious circumstances (Lopez v. Maes (1970), 81 N.M. 693, 472 P.2d 658), if it is evasive, impossible and equivocal (Douglas Reservoirs Water Users Association v. Cross (Wyo.1977), 569 P.2d 1280), if it is made improbable by direct or circumstantial evidence (In re New England Telephone and Telegraph Co. (1977), 135 Vt. 527, 382 A.2d 826, appeal after rem., Petition of New England Telephone and Telegraph Co. (1981), 139 Vt. 578, 433 A.2d 263; Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (Minn.1977), 258 N.W.2d 782; Spillers v. Colby (Okl.1964), 391 P.2d 895), or if legitimate inferences cast a reasonable doubt upon the truth or accuracy of the testimony (Lopez v. Maes (1970), 81 N.M. 693, 472 P.2d 658). A few states even require that the basis for recognizing an exception must be specifically stated in the record or else the uncontradicted evidence is conclusive upon the trier of fact. (Laganiere v. Bonte Spinning Co. (1967), 103 R.I. 191, 236 A.2d 256; State v. A. Capuano Bros., Inc. (1978), 120 R.I. 58, 384 A.2d 610; O'Leary v. Wangensteen (1928), 175 Minn. 368, 221 N.W. 430.) Of the exceptions, the most widely recognized is that which allows the trier of fact to disregard "inherently improbable" testimony. However, few guidelines are provided to determine whether testimony meets the inherent improbability standard. At least one court has found that in order to reject testimony as inherently improbable, there must exist either a physical...

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