Buckwalter v. Black Rock Bridge Co.
| Decision Date | 28 February 1861 |
| Parties | David R. Buckwalter <I>versus</I> The Black Rock Bridge Company. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
A. B. Longaker and James Boyd, for plaintiff in error.—1. The court had no power over the case, except this: "the entry of assessment as a judgment in the Common Pleas." No power to inquire into the reasons which induced the "award," which, by the act, was to be "final and conclusive." Upon these terms the charter was accepted by the company. Beside this, the exceptions to the award were too late, after the issuing of a fi. fa.
2 and 3. The questions raised by these assignments of error are, first, whether a corporation accepting an act of incorporation from the legislature, are bound to conform to its terms and stipulations; and second, whether, when a company enters into an agreement for the assessment of "any damages" which the opposite party "has sustained, or may or shall sustain," by reason of the erection of their works, they are not bound by it, whether it is strictly embraced in the act or not.
The charter and the agreement both recognise the plaintiff as owner of the ferry, to whom damage might be done by the erection of this bridge, and who, in that case, would be entitled to compensation.
It is evident that more than ordinary damages for occupying the ground was intended by the legislature, and we argue that he was entitled to all and every description of damages, whether consequential or otherwise. The diversion of travel was an injury to be compensated for. The act authorized the referees to assess "the damages, if any," meaning if any damage is occasioned.
The phrase "any damage" includes consequential damages: Monon. Nav. Co. v. Coons, 6 Barr 379. See also N. Y. & Erie Railroad Co. v. Young, 9 Casey 175; Railroad Co. v. Yeiser, 8 Barr 366; Mifflin v. Railroad Co., 4 Harris 182, as to the allowance of consequential damages when so expressed in the charter. But even if the act did not allow it, the agreement authorized the assessment of consequential damages, and the submission and award outside of the act, were valid and binding: Gallop v. Reynolds, 8 Watts 424; McAdams v. Stilwell, 1 Harris 96; Bingham v. Guthrie, 7 Id. 422.
The idea that nothing but actual damage was to be compensated for, is negatived also by the provision in the charter, which requires that the valuation made by the referees shall be paid before the erection of the bridge.
B. M. Boyer and J. J. Lewis.—The word "damages" has a legal signification, and in the construction of a statute should be received in its usual sense: Shrunk v. The Schuylkill Nav. Co., 14 S. & R. 81; Co. Lit. 257 a; Sedgwick on Damages 29; Overseers of the Poor v. Aurand & Wolf, 10 Watts 134. If Mr. Buckwalter is injured by the travel being diverted from his ferry to the bridge, it will be because of the superior facilities which the bridge offers to the public. But this is no invasion of his rights, for he had no right to compel the public to use his monopoly at the expense of their inconvenience. An improved machine or road always interferes with the use of those which are inferior, without giving to the injured party a right of action.
Mr. Buckwalter had no license for this ferry, nor any right to it, other than that derived from his owning both banks of the stream, one of which he holds subservient to the right of the Schuylkill Navigation Company to erect and maintain their tow-path over it. Any other riparian owner could establish a ferry without his consent.
The Act of Assembly does recognise his ownership in this ferry. This was asserted in Shrunk v. The Schuylkill Nav. Co., 14 S. & R. 81, under the Acts of March 9th 1786 and April 11th 1793, but was denied by this court. The special remedies provided in such cases were intended to cover all common law injuries: Sunbury & Erie Railroad Co. v. Hummell, 3 Casey 104; Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co., 4 Rawle 23. But do not include remote or contingent damages: Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Farr, 4 W. & S. 376; Same v. Freedly, 6 Wh. 115; Zimmerman v. Union Canal Co., 1 W. & S. 346; N. Y. & Erie Railroad Co. v. Young, 9 Casey 175; Monon. Nav. Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S. 101.
It is not denied that the right to claim compensation for such damages may be given by the legislature; but this has not been done here. No new definition of damages was intended in this charter. The words of the act are not "any damages," but "damages, if any."
As to the question of the court's jurisdiction, the cases of Mussina v. Hertzog, 5 Binney 387, Wilson v. Young, 9 Barr 102, McCahan v. Reamy, 9 Casey 586, recognise the power of the court to entertain exceptions to an award for plain mistake, even where the terms of the submission were that the award should be final and conclusive.
The act makes this award a judgment of the Common Pleas of Montgomery county, and brings it thus within its jurisdiction.
The opinion of the court was delivered, February 28th 1861, by THOMPSON, J.
It would be a difficult proposition to maintain, that the legislature, on granting corporate franchises to the defendants, could not do so upon the terms that they should pay and satisfy the plaintiff for any injury they might occasion to his ferry, because the damage might be in its nature consequential. That such damages may be claimed from and assessed against a company, if their organic law require it, has often been decided: Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 Barr 379; Mifflin v. Railroad Co., 4 Harris 182; Reitenbach v. Chester Valley Railroad Co., 9 Id. 105; New York and Erie Railroad Co. v. Young, 9 Casey 175. There are many other cases to the same effect. This is not upon the ground that the constitution requires compensation to be made for such injuries; for it does not. It is only for taking property under the right of eminent domain, that compensation is required to be made by the constitution. Here the terms upon which the privilege was granted and accepted, that compensation beyond this should be made, became a contract, and the company ought to be willing to observe it; if not, the law will compel them to do so.
The matter first to be ascertained is, whether the terms of...
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