Bucky v. Sebo
Decision Date | 18 November 1953 |
Docket Number | No. 80,Docket 22820.,80 |
Citation | 208 F.2d 304 |
Parties | BUCKY et al. v. SEBO et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Paul Kolisch, New York City, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Emanuel R. Posnack, New York City (Jonas J. Shapiro and Janet Perlman, New York City, of counsel), for defendants-appellants.
Before CHASE, Chief Judge, and CLARK and FRANK, Circuit Judges.
An agreement between plaintiffs and defendant Sebo, dated December 4, 1944, gave Sebo an exclusive license under plaintiffs' patents Nos. 2,239,379 and 2,292,044, relative to cameras. The agreement provided that the licensee should never contest validity and would not infringe or aid others to infringe; it also provided that, if the licensee made default in the payment of agreed royalties and failed to remedy the default within fifteen days after written notice, "the licensors may, at their option, cancel this agreement and revoke the license." The corporate defendant was a sub-licensee. After paying royalties for some time (in the aggregate amount of some $17,000), there was a default, and, after the required notice of default, the plaintiffs notified Sebo in writing on March 25, 1949, that they "hereby cancel the agreement of December 14, 1944, and hereby revoke the licenses therein granted." Some five months later, on August 30, 1949, plaintiffs brought this suit for infringement of the patents.
1. The trial judge held, in effect, that there was no infringement. We think there was none. The judge did not pass on the patents' validity. But he held defendants estopped to deny both infringement and validity, and it is suggested that impliedly he found defendants guilty of unfair competition. See his opinion, 115 F.Supp. 555. On the basis of his findings and conclusions, he perpetually enjoined defendants from directly or indirectly making, using or selling the cameras which they had been making and selling and which did not infringe plaintiffs' patents.
2. Plaintiffs' complaint contains no suggestion of either infringement-estoppel or unfair competition. The pre-trial order, although it specifies validity-estoppel as an issue to be tried, is utterly silent concerning those other two issues. Since the pre-trial order was not expressly "modified at the trial," pursuant to Rule 16, it is arguable that neither of those issues was open. But as plaintiffs' counsel during the trial made at least a brief reference to the issue of estoppel re infringement, and as defendants' counsel did not then object or ask an adjournment, we think that the trial judge was at liberty to consider that issue, for we read Rule 16 in the light of Rule 15(b), Fed.Rules Civ.Proc., 28 U.S. C. ( )
3. We think, for the following reasons, the judge erred in respect of estoppel concerning infringement: During the existence of a patent license, the licensee may be estopped to contest validity.1 But even this estoppel usually vanishes when the license terminates, either because of lapse of time or through complete repudiation of the license by the licensee or by act of the licensor.2 This is the more true as to infringement. For it is well settled that, even during the existence of the license, the licensee is not estopped to prove that his product is not within the claims of the patent.3
True, some cases hold that, when the license still endures and the licensor sues for royalties under the license agreement, the licensee is estopped to deny infringement in special circumstances such as these: (a) The license agreement specifically designates as included in the license the specific product on which the licensee has refused to pay royalties.4 (b) The patent has become widely associated with a name by which the licensee continues to label his product.5 We have found no case in which any such estoppel doctrine has been applied after termination of the license. Little wonder. For it would be peculiarly improper to apply it when — as here — the licensor has elected not to sue for royalties due under the license, but, instead, to cancel it and to sue on the patent for infringement.6
4. It is suggested, however, that some of the trial judge's findings of fact and conclusions add up to a determination of unfair competition. Although no mention of unfair competition was made in the pleadings or in the pre-trial order or at the trial, we would be disposed to hold that the trial judge or we could consider it, subject to the right of defendants to ask an opportunity to present further evidence to the trial court on that issue.7
There are findings which, if sufficiently supported by the evidence, might perhaps justify, not the permanent injunction which the judge ordered, but one enjoining the sale of defendants' cameras unless accompanied by appropriate notification that these cameras are unrelated to plaintiffs' and their patents.8 These findings are as follows:
The plaintiff, Gustav Bucky, The license agreement A
We turn to the evidence which might be said to support these findings:
(1) Gustav Bucky testified that the few cameras sold before the license agreement were "experimental models" and "not a production model." He had no recollection as to "any details" of such sales. This evidence does not support any inference that any "commercial product" had been so sold before the license agreement as to create any public impression that Coreco-Bucky meant a camera made by Bucky or under the plaintiffs' patents. Accordingly, that defendants' cameras, after the cancellation, have been labeled Coreco did not, on that score, constitute unfair competition.
(2) The brochure published in 1948 related to the Coreco-Bucky cameras and indicated that they were made under plaintiffs' patents. Sebo testified that in March 1949, when the license was cancelled, there were on hand three or four thousand copies of this brochure but that most of them were dumped although For a short time after the cancellation, defendants substituted "sales sheets" until 1950, when they put out a new brochure which omitted any reference to plaintiffs' patents and which related solely to Coreco cameras without any mention of Coreco-Bucky.
(3) Plaintiffs' own witnesses stated that the camera sold during the period of the license agreement and before its termination was known as "the Bucky camera."
(4) The sole testimony as to oral representations consisted of the following: Plaintiffs' witness, Janoff, testified that he had seen cameras exhibited under the name Coreco at the American Medical Association meeting at Atlantic City in June 1951. The following colloquy then ensued:
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