Buczynski v. General Motors Corp.
Decision Date | 24 August 1978 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 77-1644. |
Citation | 456 F. Supp. 867 |
Parties | Henry BUCZYNSKI, Alex Borusovic, and other retirees similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Lester Weiner & Associates by Marc C. Gettis, Roselle Park, N. J., for plaintiffs.
Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey by Laurence Reich, Newark, N. J., for defendant.
Plaintiffs in this class action1 are retired employees of defendant General Motors Corporation who had been receiving retirement pension benefits from the defendant pursuant to a pension plan negotiated between the defendant and plaintiffs' union. After the plaintiffs received worker's compensation payments pursuant to New Jersey's Worker's Compensation Act,2 the defendants reduced the plaintiffs' benefits under the plan by an amount equal to those payments, pursuant to Article IV, Section 2, of the plan.
The plaintiffs contend that the defendant cannot lawfully make such deductions in their pension benefits. They seek reimbursement of all pension benefits thus withheld and a permanent injunction against all such future deductions which are predicated upon the receipt of worker's compensation payments.
For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek.
Dealing first with the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in this removed matter, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, I conclude I have such jurisdiction to decide the issues. Even were there any question about the propriety of removal by the defendant, neither side has questioned it. Since it is clear I would have had original jurisdiction over the claims presented here, a valid judgment can be entered with respect to them.3Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 702, 92 S.Ct. 1344, 31 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).
The complaint as filed alleges that the plaintiffs are retired employees of the defendant, that they have been receiving pension benefits under a Pension Plan Agreement between their union and the defendant, that they have obtained judgments entitling them to worker's compensation benefits, and that the defendant threatens to reduce their pension benefits because they have recovered worker's compensation benefits. The complaint sets forth Article IV, Section 2 of the Pension Plan Agreement:
The complaint then alleges that the deductions threatened by the defendant are now in violation of a recent amendment to New Jersey's Worker's Compensation Act4 which provides that:5 "The right of compensation granted by this chapter may be set off against disability pension benefits or payments but shall not be set off against employees' retirement pension benefits or payments." The complaint concludes with a prayer for a permanent injunction against the threatened deductions.
Plaintiffs' action, therefore, is predicated upon an alleged breach or violation of the "unless prohibited by law" clause of the Pension Plan Agreement.6 Thus they argue that, since Article IV, Section 2 of the Pension Plan Agreement bars the defendant from offsetting pension benefits against worker's compensation benefits where "prohibited by law," and the New Jersey Worker's Compensation Act embodies such a prohibition, the continued deductions violate the express provisions of the Pension Plan Agreement.
The complaint did not advance a claim founded upon a theory that the offset provision is unlawful under ERISA. That claim was first raised indirectly when plaintiffs' counsel brought to this court's attention the recently decided Utility Workers Union of America v. Consumers Power Co., 453 F.Supp. 447 (E.D.Mich. 1978). The defendant's response was not a claim of prejudice by reason of a belated addition to plaintiffs' bag of legal theories of recovery.7 Instead, the defendant responded by referring the court to another case8 in the same court, the Eastern District of Michigan, which was decided contrary to the Utility Workers case.
The defendant, as I have noted, admits all of the material allegations necessary to a decision on the question of whether ERISA itself bars the offset involved, including that the pension plan falls within the coverage of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003.
Thus, I perceive no prejudice to the defendant in addressing the issue of the lawfulness of the offsetting in question under 29 U.S.C. § 1053 of ERISA. See 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1219.9
The minimum vesting standards provision of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1053, provides in pertinent part that:
In Utility Workers, it was held that a provision in a pension plan falling within the coverage of ERISA which provides that retirement pension benefits are to be offset against worker's compensation benefits is unlawful under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1053. This court is in full agreement with the well-reasoned opinion in that case.11
Under ERISA, a pension plan must provide that an employee's rights in his accrued benefits derived from his own contributions is nonforfeitable.12 The pension plan must also provide that an employee has a nonforfeitable right to a certain percentage of his accrued benefit derived from employer contributions,13 the particular percentage depending upon (1) his years of service or (2) his years of service and his age.
When a pension plan, such as the one under consideration here, makes the employee's right to a certain percentage of his accrued benefit derived from employer contributions conditional upon a factor other than years of service or years of service and age, the plan is unlawful, unless the factor is one of those set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3).
The pension plan herein makes the plaintiffs' rights to their accrued benefits conditional upon their not obtaining worker's compensation benefits. Such a factor is not one of those set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)14 As a result, the pension plan is unlawful.15
As noted previously, the Pension Plan Agreement between the defendant and the plaintiffs' union provides that retirement pension benefits may be offset against worker's compensation benefits "unless prohibited by law." At the final hearing in this case on May 15, 1978, the testimony established that after a number of years' absence from the General Motors' pension plan, the offset provision reappeared in the 1970 pension plan.16 The testimony also established that it was the defendant which proposed the reinsertion of the offset provision into the pension plan because there had been a "deluge" of worker's compensation cases from which the defendant sought "relief."17 The "unless prohibited by law" clause was also proposed by the defendant. The "unless prohibited by law" clause "meant just as the language indicated, pure and simple, that if there were states then having state laws which prohibited an offset and if in the future there would be state laws that prohibited offset that would be applicable and it was just that pure and simple."18
The defendant admits that the deductions it is making in plaintiffs' retirement pension benefits are prohibited by the recent amendment to New Jersey's Worker's Compensation Act. The defendant contends, however, that that amendment is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, in that it has been preempted by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a),19 which provides that:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supercede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
As I have already indicated in the preceding section of this opinion, the offset provision of the pension plan is unlawful under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1053. The New Jersey statute, insofar as it...
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Alessi v. Buczynski v. General Motors Corporation
...statute is solely concerned with protecting the employee's right to worker's compensation disability benefits." Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 456 F.Supp. 867, 873 (NJ 1978). Similarly, the other District Court Judge below reasoned that the New Jersey law "only has a collateral effect o......
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Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations of State of Wis.
...v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 16 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 391 (Wis.Cir.Ct.1978); Cf. Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 456 F.Supp. 867, 873 (D.N.J.1978); But see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Dept. of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 273 N.W.2d 786 (Wis.Ct.App.......
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EMPLOYEE BEN. COMMITTEE, ETC. v. Pascoe, Civ. No. 78-0483.
...Treas.Reg. § 1.411(a)-4(a) in holding that workers' compensation offsets constitute forfeitures under ERISA. Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 456 F.Supp. 867 (D.N.J.1978) aff'd on reconsideration 464 F.Supp. 133 (D.N.J.1978); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhatten, Inc., Civil Action No. 78-0434 (......
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Buczynski v. General Motors Corp.
...reached the same result. The district court judge in Buczynski issued two published opinions. The first opinion is reported at 456 F.Supp. 867 (D.N.J.1978). The second opinion, which denied reconsideration, is reported at 464 F.Supp. 133 (D.N.J.1978). The district court judge in Alessi issu......