Buechner v. Bond, 64348
| Citation | 650 S.W.2d 611 |
| Decision Date | 11 January 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 64348,64348 |
| Parties | John W. BUECHNER and Wayne Goode, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and John D. Schneider, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Respondent-Appellant, v. Christopher S. BOND, et al., Defendants-Respondents-Appellants. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Lewis C. Green, Green, Hennings & Henry, St. Louis, for plaintiffs-appellants.
John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Edward D. Robertson, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for defendants-respondents-appellants.
Gene J. Boesch, Deborah S. Grossman, Lewis, Tucker, Allen & Chubb, St. Louis, for plaintiff-intervenor-respondent-appellant.
This appeal is from a summary judgment that "total state revenues" is defined in article X, section 17(1) of the Missouri Constitution; that unspent revenue from prior fiscal year 1979-80, the 1980-81 opening balance, is a component portion of general revenue to be included in total state revenue; and that article X, section 18(b) violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The questions are whether such opening balance of the state budget for fiscal year 1980-81 is included in the definition of "total state revenues," and whether article X, section 18(b) is unconstitutional. The Missouri Constitution does define "total state revenues" but not so as to include the opening balance; the equal protection question is not ripe for adjudication, and therefore, not justiciable. Reversed.
State Representatives John Buechner and Wayne Goode filed the underlying action for declaratory judgment that defendants' calculation of the revenue limitation established by article X, section 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution improperly includes in the "total state revenues in fiscal year 1980-81" the opening balance for that fiscal year resulting in an unlawful increase of approximately $500 million in the revenue limit for fiscal year 1982-83. Defendants admit their calculations for the 1982-83 budget were accomplished by inclusion of the 1980-81 opening balance, and assert such calculations are as prescribed by the constitution. Plaintiffs contend that defendants, by furnishing the General Assembly with a budget calculated as admitted, make it impossible for plaintiffs and others in the General Assembly to vote rationally and accurately on revenue and appropriation bills, and that the issue thus posed between the legislative and executive departments requires resolution by the court.
The trial court permitted State Senator John Schneider to intervene as a plaintiff. He contends "total state revenues" as used in sections 18(a) and 17(1) of article X is not capable of definition and therefore void; alternatively, he agrees with plaintiffs that "total state revenues" cannot include the opening balance or unspent revenue from prior fiscal years. He also alleges that plaintiffs' interpretation of article X, section 18(a) "will probably" result in an unconstitutional expenditure of state funds in that the required refund will be paid to a single class of taxpayers.
The Hancock Amendment, article X, sections 16-24, has been the subject of litigation since its incorporation into the constitution of this state. In Buchanan v. Kirkpatrick, 615 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. banc 1981), this Court noted "[S]ince the amendment has already been adopted and the people have demonstrated their will, this Court's duty is not to seek to condemn the amendment, but to seek to uphold it if possible." Id. at 12. The rules applicable to construction of statutes are applicable to the construction of constitutional provisions; the latter are given broader construction due to their more permanent character. Boone County Court v. State, 631 S.W.2d 321, 325 (Mo. banc 1982). Words used in constitutional provisions must be viewed in context; their use is presumed intended, and not meaningless surplusage. Roberts v. McNary, 636 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Mo. banc 1982). The words used in constitutional provisions are interpreted so as to give effect to their plain, ordinary and natural meaning. Boone County, 631 S.W.2d at 324; State ex Inf. Danforth v. Cason, 507 S.W.2d 405, 408 (Mo. banc 1973). The plain, ordinary, and natural meaning of words is that meaning which the people commonly understood the words to have when the provision was adopted. Boone County, 631 S.W.2d at 324; Cason, 507 S.W.2d at 408. The commonly understood meaning of words is derived from the dictionary. Boone County 631 S.W.2d at 324.
"Total state revenues," as used in article X, sections 16 through 24 of the Missouri Constitution:
[I]ncludes all general and special revenues, license and fees, excluding federal funds, as defined in the budget message of the governor for fiscal year 1980-1981. Total state revenues shall exclude the amount of any credits based on actual tax liabilities or the imputed tax components of rental payments, but shall include the amount of any credits not related to actual tax liabilities.
Mo. Const. art. X, § 17. Every word in a constitutional provision is presumed to have effect and meaning. McNary, 636 S.W.2d at 335. The word "revenue" is not defined in any of these sections; therefore, it will be accorded its plain, ordinary, and natural meaning as found in the dictionary. "Revenue" is defined as "the annual or periodical yield of taxes, excises, customs, duties, and other sources of income that a nation, state, or municipality collects and receives into the treasury for public use...." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1942 (1964).
The language in article X, section 17, refers to the Governor's budget message for fiscal year 1980-81 when defining the elements of "total state revenues." The Governor's budget message indicates the percentage each available state asset contributes to the total budget requirement. Ninety-three percent of the 1980-81 budget was funded by revenues generated in 1980-81; seven percent was funded by unspent revenues from prior years, or the opening balance. The opening balance is included as an element of general revenue available for expenditure in that year. Thus, the opening balance is available as an asset along with anticipated new revenue which may be expended by the state in fiscal year 1980-81. It does not characterize the opening balance as revenue for fiscal year 1980-81. Revenue is that amount generated in a given fiscal year. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1942 (1964); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1158 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). The plain and ordinary meaning and use of the word in its context dictates that revenue for fiscal year 1980-81 is that which is generated in fiscal year 1980-81; not revenue which was generated in prior fiscal years. The opening balance is revenue from any number of prior years which has not been spent by the state. The opening balance cannot be revenue in 1980-81; it was revenue in some previous year or years. Therefore, the opening balance cannot be included in "total state revenues" for purposes of determining the revenue limit as set out in article X, section 18.
The first rule of construction of a constitutional amendment is to give effect to its intent and purpose. See City of Willow Springs v. Missouri State Librarian, 596 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Mo. banc 1980). The intent and purpose of the Hancock Amendment is to limit state spending by restricting revenues the state may generate in any given fiscal year.
[T]he central purpose of [the Hancock] Amendment ... is to limit taxes by establishing tax and revenue limits and expenditure limits for the state and other political subdivision which may not be exceeded without voter approval. [The] Amendment ... is popularly described as 'the tax and spending lid' amendment, words which also reflect its central purpose.
Buchanan, 615 S.W.2d at 13; see also McNary, 636 S.W.2d at 336. The objective of the amendment is accomplished only if the revenue limit is based on revenues generated for fiscal year 1980-81. Inclusion of an amount not revenue in that year artificially inflates the formula set out in article X, section 18(a), 1 and would allow the state to generate revenue in a greater proportion than that generated in 1980-81. This would defeat the intent and purpose of the amendment and cannot be permitted.
Plaintiff-intervenor contends the refund provisions of the Hancock Amendment violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. His argument is based on an assertion of "probability" that a refund would be necessitated in fiscal year 1983 which would unconstitutionally discriminate against certain classes of taxpayers. The trial court agreed and held section 18(b) 2 was unconstitutional for reasons expressed in the dissenting opinion in Buchanan, 615 S.W.2d at 26 (Morgan, J., dissenting).
Assuming plaintiff-intervenor has standing to raise this question, the issue is not ripe for adjudication because no such refund is imminent. In order that a controversy be ripe for adjudication a "sufficient immediacy" must be established. Nations v. Ramsey, 387 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Mo.App.1965). Ripeness does not exist when the question rests solely on a probability that an event will occur. Lake Carriers Ass'n v. McMillian, 406 U.S. 498, 506, 92 S.Ct. 1749, 1755, 32 L.Ed.2d 257 (1972). Plaintiff-intervenor's argument is based on probability and speculation. There is currently and foreseeably no excess which would cause a refund under section 18(b).
This Court noted an argument similar to plaintiff-intervenor's in Buchanan, 615 S.W.2d at 6.
In oral argument there was brief discussion ... some have urged that section 18(b) relating to repayment of excess revenues hereafter collected might be violative of the equal protection and due process provisions of the U.S. Constitution. The argument is that the taxes or revenues would, for the most part, be taken from the masses (the poor) and...
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