Buel v. State

• Decision Date: 26 September 1899
• Citation: 104 Wis. 132,80 N.W. 78
• Parties: BUEL v. STATE.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

104 Wis. 132

80 N.W. 78

BUEL

v.STATE.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Sept. 26, 1899.

Syllabus by the Judge.

1. The corpus delicti, and every element of it, in a criminal case may be established by circumstantial evidence as well as by positive or direct evidence, if such circumstantial evidence produces in the minds of the jury conviction, to a moral certainty, of the existence of all the requisite facts and excludes every other reasonable hypothesis.

2. The reception of irrelevant evidence against objection, prejudicial, if at all, by reason of an unwarranted use of it by counsel in addressing the jury or significance given to it by the instructions of the court, is not reversible error.

3. The right of cross-examination extends to a reasonable inquiry into the previous life and character of the witness, so far as the same bears on the credibility of his evidence, and the extent to which such examination may be carried rests in the sound discretion of the court, though it is an abuse of judicial authority to allow questions to a witness as to irrelevant matters, regardless of whether there are any circumstances reasonably suggesting them or they reasonably bear on his credibility, and for the purpose of creating, or which are manifestly calculated to create, prejudice in the minds of the jury against the witness, and, if he be a party, influence them to find against him because of such prejudice.

4. For the purpose of explaining the circumstance that soon after a homicide for robbery the supposed guilty party was much improved financially, he testified that a few months before the homicide he and the deceased conducted a profitable partnership business; and to rebut that the court permitted a memorandum book of the deceased in evidence, saying that it tended to impeach the evidence of the accused, which book did not show, definitely, that it was other than a personal memorandum book; there was no evidence that the accused ever saw or was in any way connected with it; and it did not refer, intelligently, to any business transactions between the accused and the deceased. Held, prejudicial error.

5. Evidence of threats made by third persons against the deceased was properly rejected, because, if offered to show motive for his leaving the country, it was irrelevant in the absence of evidence that he had knowledge of the threats; further, there was no controversy as to the real motive, and if offered to show that some other person than the accused was the guilty party, the evidence was irrelevant and hearsay.

6. A refusal to instruct the jury on the subject of the certainty of the existence of the facts requisite to a conviction, held not reversible error, since the general charge contained full instructions on the subject.

7. The giving of properly worded, specific explanatory instructions on the subject of reasonable doubt at the request of the attorneys for the accused, approved and advised; but a refusal to do so, when the general charge is full and plain on the subject so as to be understood, reasonably, by persons of ordinary comprehension, held not reversible error.

8. The giving of special instructions on leading legal questions, as requested, or embodiment of them in the general charge, especially in an important case where such special instructions are more specific than the general charge, advised; but the refusal to do so when such general charge is sufficiently plain to be understood by persons of ordinary comprehension, held not error.

9. Instructions so worded as to be difficult to understand, and so worded as to admit, reasonably,of a construction that would mislead the jury on a material point, held reversible error.

10. A general order to strike out all the hearsay evidence admitted on a trial, made at the close of the trial, without specifying the particular evidence referred to, leaving it to the jury to determine what is and what is not hearsay evidence, held error.

Error to circuit court, Sawyer county; John K. Parish, Judge.

Eugene Buel was convicted of murder, and brings error. Reversed.

J. B. Alexander and V. W. James, for plaintiff in error.

C. E. Buell, First Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

MARSHALL, J.

The evidence produced on the trial established or tended to establish the following: Peter F. Nelson,--an unmarried man of about 24 years of age, who had resided for a considerable length of time prior to the 17th day of September, 1896, with the plaintiff in error, Eugene Buel, a man of about 36 years of age, near the Indian reservation in a thinly-settled district in Sawyer county about nine miles from the village of Hayward,--in August, 1896, was charged by one Wettenhall with being guilty of having sustained criminal relations with the latter's daughter, and being the cause of her supposed condition of pregnancy. That resulted in Wettenhall and Nelson meeting a day or two thereafter, by appointment, at the village of Hayward, where Wettenhall insisted on Nelson marrying the daughter, which he declined to do. Soon thereafter, on the same day, on hearing that he was about to be prosecuted respecting the charge of causing the pregnancy of the Wettenhall girl, Nelson fled from the county and thereafter remained in hiding till about the 16th day of September following, when he met Buel, by appointment, at a railway station a short distance from Hayward, from which point the two traveled together to Hayward, arriving there about daylight on the succeeding day. The purpose of the trip to Hayward was to enable Nelson to draw some $400 which he had in the Sawyer County Bank and then leave the county before his presence at Hayward could become sufficiently known to lead to his arrest. Pugh, the cashier of the bank, was called upon by Nelson and Buel at his house before daylight on the day named and informed of the purpose of Nelson as stated, and that he intended to go to Chicago by way of Ashland. Pugh acceded to the request to immediately get the money for Nelson and to aid in keeping his presence in Hayward secret, and thereupon went to the bank and obtained such money, Buel and a policeman going with him, and Nelson remaining at the house. Pugh returned to his house with the money and paid it to Nelson, whereupon the latter and Buel immediately departed, going in the direction of Buel's home. The last that was seen of Nelson alive, he was in the company of Buel a few miles from the latter's home on the day in question. The day of the occurrence related, Buel was observed traveling on the road from Hayward towards his home alone, carrying a satchel, and later in the day he left his home with a pail and gun under the pretense that he was going to carry a lunch to Nelson; and still later the same day he returned home in a nervous condition and reported that Nelson complained that he had been chased by Indians. After the disappearance of Nelson as related, he did not write to any of his old neighbors or acquaintances as he was accustomed to do when away from home. Buel, during the time Nelson lived with him, was a very poor man and a very poor provider for his family, but after the former's disappearance there was a significant change in that regard, and there were other things, such as the purchase of a tract of land by Buel for $200 and various articles of personal property, indicating that he was possessed of a considerable sum of money. He took possession of all the personal effects of Nelson and treated them in every way as his own. In July of the next year after the occurrences detailed in the foregoing, the remains of a human being were found lying on the back in a bunch of thick bushes a few miles from where Nelson was last seen with Buel and within about one-half a mile from an unoccupied homestead claim of Buel, and somewhat further from such a claim which belonged to Nelson. The location of the discovery was in an out of the way place some four miles from any inhabited building except an old logging camp about a mile and a half away, which was occupied by a watchman. It was near an old Indian trail and the usual route from Buel's place of residence to his homestead claim. The fragments of the skull indicated that either before or after death it was broken in by some crushing blow or blows. The shoes were on the feet and the clothing was sufficiently preserved to show the color. No money or thing of value was found near the remains except a pocketknife, which was identified as one of two knives that had been sold by a merchant in Hayward, one of which was sold to Nelson. The trousers and shoes found on the remains were similar to those worn by Nelson. Evidence was produced to explain or discredit much of the evidence of the circumstantial evidentiary facts mentioned, and to impair the probative force of circumstances established, pointing to the guilt of Buel. The jury found him guilty of murder in the first degree and judgment was entered accordingly.

The motion to acquit the plaintiff in error and the motion to set aside the verdict for want of sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction were properly denied. Upon each vital question in the case there was credible evidence tending to establish the fact involved, contradicted or explained in many instances, it is true, by other evidence, but it was for the jury to weigh all the evidence and determine where the truth lay. Such determination is conclusive, unless we can say it was not warranted in any reasonable view of the evidence, and we clearly cannot say that. True, the evidence was all circumstantial, but that does not count strongly against the conviction, since a conviction may as well rest on circumstantial evidence as on direct evidence, if it has the necessary probative power to convince the mind beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of each of the elements requisite to make out the charge and exclude to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis. If the jury believed that the knife, shoes...