Buell v. Idaho Dep't of Transp. (In re Driver's License Suspension of James Kevin Buell)

• Decision Date: 19 April 2011
• Docket Number: No. 37404.,37404.
• Citation: 254 P.3d 1253,151 Idaho 257
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals
• Parties: In the Matter of the Driver's License Suspension of James Kevin Buell. James Kevin BUELL, Petitioner–Appellant, v. IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant–Respondent.

151 Idaho 257

254 P.3d 1253

In the Matter of the Driver's License Suspension of James Kevin Buell.

James Kevin BUELL, Petitioner–Appellant,

v.IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant–Respondent.

No. 37404.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

April 19, 2011.

James E. Siebe, Moscow, for appellant.

Susan K. Servick, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent.

MELANSON, Judge.

James Kevin Buell appeals from the district court's decision upon judicial review affirming the Idaho Transportation Department's order disqualifying Buell's commercial driver's license following his conviction for driving under the influence.For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.FACTS AND PROCEDURE

On October 21, 2006, Buell was arrested for driving a noncommercial vehicle while under the influence (DUI).After his arrest, Buell refused to take a breath alcohol concentration (BAC) test.As a result, Buell was given a suspension advisory form, his noncommercial driver's license was seized, and he was issued a temporary thirty-day noncommercial driving permit.Buell was charged with DUI.In December 2006, pursuant to a plea agreement, Buell pled guilty to the DUI and the civil BAC refusal matter was dismissed.Buell was not sentenced until July 10, 2007.At sentencing, the district court suspended Buell's noncommercial driver's license for ninety days but, in accordance with the parties' agreement, the suspension was backdated to begin on the day of Buell's arrest—October 21, 2006.On July 19, 2007, the Idaho Transportation Department(ITD) sent Buell a notice advising him that his commercial driver's license (CDL) was disqualified for one year beginning August 6, 2007.Buell requested an administrative hearing on his CDL disqualification.The hearing officer upheld the disqualification of Buell's CDL, but recommended that the disqualification be made retroactive to November 21, 2006, because that was the date Buell represented he had ceased having commercial driving privileges.¹

The ITD disagreed with the hearing officer's recommendation for a retroactive starting date of Buell's CDL disqualification.On September 7, 2007, the ITD wrote a letter to the hearing officer requesting reconsideration of the hearing officer's recommendation.The ITD argued that Buell's CDL privileges were not withdrawn until he received the notification letter on July 19, 2007, and that, consequently, there was no basis for backdating the disqualification.On October 1, 2007, the ITD sent an amended notice to Buell informing him that his CDL was disqualified beginning July 10, 2007.Several days later, the ITD sent a letter to Buell informing him that it was not bound by the hearing officer's recommendation that his CDL disqualification be backdated, that his CDL disqualification starting date had been changed to coincide with his DUI conviction date, and that, consequently, it was withdrawing its motion for reconsideration.²In response, Buell filed a petition for judicial review with the district court.On October 15, 2007, an ex parte order was issued staying enforcement of the disqualification and reinstating Buell's CDL pending the district court's judicial review.After a hearing, the district court upheld the hearing officer's disqualification of Buell's CDL.Buell appeals.³

II.ANALYSIS

On appeal, Buell argues that the administrative disqualification of his CDL, pursuant to I.C. § 49–335, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States ConstitutionandArticle I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution.Specifically, Buell asserts that, despite being civil in nature, the administrative disqualification of his CDL is so punitive as to effectively be a criminal penalty.Buell argues that, because the disqualification of his CDL is effectively a criminal penalty, he has been subjected to multiple punishments and convictions in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.In addition, Buell argues that due process requires that his CDL disqualification be made retroactive because I.C. §§ 18–8002,18–8002A, and49–335 are ambiguous as to when his CDL disqualification began.Buell also argues that estoppel principles should be applied to make his CDL disqualification retroactive to November 21, 2006, because that is the date he thought his CDL disqualification began.

The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the review of the ITD's decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke, or restrict a person's driver's license.SeeI.C. §§ 49–201,49–330,67–5201(2),67–5270.In an appeal from the decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity under the IDAPA, this Court reviews the agency record independently of the district court's decision.Marshall v. Idaho Dep't of Transp.,137 Idaho 337, 340, 48 P.3d 666, 669(Ct.App.2002).This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented.I.C. § 67–5279(1);Marshall,137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.This Court instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.Castaneda v. Brighton Corp.,130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265(1998);Marshall,137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.In other words, the agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record.Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs,134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742(2000);Marshall,137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.

The Court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.I.C. § 67–5279(3).The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67–5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced.Price v. Payette County Bd. of County Comm'rs,131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586(1998);Marshall,137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.If the agency's decision is not affirmed on appeal, "it shall be set aside ... and remanded for further proceedings as necessary."I.C. § 67–5279(3).

A.Double Jeopardy

Buell argues that he was subjected, in consecutive prosecutions, to multiple convictions and punishments for the same offense.Whether a defendant's prosecution complies with the constitutional protection against being placed twice in jeopardy is a question of law over which we exercise free review.State v. Santana,135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383(Ct.App.2000).We initially note that Buell does not claim that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Idaho Constitution provides any broader protection than that of the United States Constitution.⁴Therefore, we will analyze this claim under the Double Jeopardy provisions of the United States Constitution.SeeState v. Talavera,127 Idaho 700, 703, 905 P.2d 633, 636(1995);State v. McKeeth,136 Idaho 619, 625, 38 P.3d 1275, 1280(Ct.App.2001).The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."The Clause affords a defendant three basic protections.It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple criminal punishments for the same offense.Schiro v. Farley,510 U.S. 222, 229, 114 S.Ct. 783, 788–89, 127 L.Ed.2d 47, 56(1994);McKeeth,136 Idaho at 622, 38 P.3d at 1278.

Buell argues that he was subjected to multiple convictions and punishments for the same offense because, although civil in nature, the administrative disqualification of his CDL is so punitive in form and effect as to be transformed into a criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes.In 1995, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a defendant who was convicted of DUI and whose driver's license was subsequently suspended for ninety days pursuant to I.C. § 18–8002A was not subjected to multiple convictions and punishments in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Idaho Constitutions.Talavera,127 Idaho at 705, 905 P.2d at 638.Talavera argued that the ninety-day license suspension, under I.C. § 18–8002A, was so punitive that it should be considered a criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes.The Court held that the proper inquiry for determining whether a civil sanction rises to the level of a criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes is whether the sanction, as applied, bears a rational relationship to a legitimate remedial purpose.Id. at 705, 905 P.2d at 638.The Court noted that the remedial purpose of I.C. § 18–8002A is to provide maximum safety to the public by getting drivers who fail blood alcohol concentration tests off of public roadways immediately.Id.The Court held that, because the driver's license suspension was not disproportionate to the statute's legitimate remedial goal, it did not rise to the level of a criminal punishment and was not a violation of double jeopardy.Id.

Were we to rely on Talavera,we would consider whether the one-year disqualification of Buell's CDL, as applied to him, bears a rational relationship to a legitimate remedial purpose.The Court in Talavera noted that the purpose of I.C. § 18–8002A was to promote safety by quickly disqualifying drivers who pose a hazard to the public at-large.Similarly, the remedial purpose of I.C. § 49–335 is to provide for the safety of the public by removing problem drivers from the road through disqualification.Statement of Purpose, SB 1001 (1989).Because I.C. § 49–335 serves the same legitimate remedial goals as I.C. § 18–8002A, we would...